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Corruption in Social Services and
Human Development
Water, Sanitation and Electricity Sectors
M. SOHAIL AND S. CAVILL
ABSTRACT
Corruption costs the Water, Sanitation and Electricity (WSE) sectors millions of dollars every
year, siphoning off scarce monetary resources and diminishing a country’s prospects for
providing these crucial utilities for all. This paper examines how corruption manifests itself in
the WSE sectors in order to identify and design sector programmes aimed at improving the
well-being of the poor. It provides a comparative, cross-country study of the experiences of
countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Combating corruption in the WSE sector requires action
from the public sector, private sector, citizens, civil society organisations and the media to
monitor WSE services and promote more ethical behaviour. The authors note that particular
attention should be paid to the supply-side of corruption, as consumers’ willingness to pay
for better service creates a supply-side pressure that perpetuates corruption. The paper
concludes with policy pointers and recommendations for successful anti-corruption mechanisms
in the WSE sectors.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Access to Water, Sanitation and Electricity
(WSE) services are important for people’s
quality of life and thus human development.
In cities and towns, where economies of
scale prevail, water and sewage systems have
network suppliers – generally a public sector
provider (local, state or central govern-
ment). In rural areas, water boards or
engineering departments have traditionally
been responsible for delivering water
services to rural communities. However,
community and self-provision are also
common in the Asia-Pacific region; this can
include household systems (wells and hand
pumps as in large parts of rural Asia,
Bangladesh in particular), small indepen-
dent providers (water vendors, small net-
work providers, and cooperatives), and
community-managed sanitation systems in
urban settlements (for example, Orangi in
Karachi, Pakistan, and Parivartan in
Ahmedabad, India).
Whilst the supply of electricity is gene-
rally through a monopoly, attempts to
privatise electricity have led to the unbund-
ling of electricity supply into generation,
transmission, and distribution components
(although transmission and distribution
functions remain monopolies) (see Table 1).
In rural areas, off-grid systems have been
used in villages, in many cases using
renewable energy (wind-powered, solar,
tidal, bio-gas, or hybrid) to generate power
with fossil-fueled generators as backup. For
example, Sagar Island, Sunderbans in India
is supplied with electricity generated by
solar panels by the West Bengal Renewable
Development Authority. A local committee
oversees all aspects of operation, including
delivery of bills, collection from consumers
and monitoring the systems. Theft is almost
non-existent and defaults infrequently,
thanks to peer pressure and self-monitoring
by the user-group (Gulati and Rao 2007).
The provision of water, sanitation and
electricity is intended to achieve a number
of goals, such as:
• Human development goals: Including
public health, well being, welfare,
security, comfort, convenience, in-
come redistribution, poverty reduc-
tion, and enhancing human capital.
• Economic development goals: These
relate to economic growth, efficiency
of economic activities, facilitating
trade and creating employment.
• Environmental sustainability goals:
Including improvements to the envi-
ronment and conservation of natural
resources.
• Governance goals: For example, the
promotion of good governance, civil
harmony and social integration.
• Financial goals: Improving the house-
hold’s ability to generate income and
savings, for example, by enabling a
TABLE 1: OECD Multinational Electricity
Companies Active in Asia-Pacific
Company Activity Countries Active
AES Generation China, India, Pakistan,
Sri Lanka
EDF Generation China, Lao People’s
Democratic Republic,
Viet Nam
Tractebel Generation China, Thailand, Lao
& supply People’s Democratic
Republic
Enron Generation Philippines, Guam
Intergen Generation China, Philippines,
Singapore, Australia
Mirant Generation Philippines
Transalta Generation Australia
IP Generation Australia, Pakistan,
Thailand, Malaysia
CDC Generation Bangladesh
Source: Thomas et al. 2007.
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more productive use of women’s
time, or enhancing the scope of
household-based businesses.
The specific benefits of these services for
service users at the household and commu-
nity level are summarised below in Table 2.
TABLE 2: The Benefits of WSE Services
Water supply The literature published during the
International Drinking Water Decade
(IDWSSD, 1981–1990) has exten-
sively documented the health, time,
and labour benefits of improved reli-
ability, availability, quantity and quality
of water.
Sanitation The benefits of sanitary latrines
include improved health, increased
productivity, reduced public and
private health spending, improved
environment, convenience, privacy,
prestige, and comfort. However,
Pickford (1995) notes that it has
proved difficult to demonstrate con-
clusively that sanitation has direct
health outcomes.
Electricity The benefits of electricity include
improving productivity, lighting homes,
powering audiovisual appliances such
as radios, CD players and televisions,
moderating the health effects of
extreme climates, and improving
security, particularly in terms of
violence against women.
Millennium Development Goal 7, target
10 aims to reduce by half the proportion of
people without sustainable access to safe
drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015.
Although there is no specific MDG relating
to electricity none of the MDGs cannot be
met without affordable, accessible and
reliable energy services. However, delivering
higher quality and larger quantities of WSE
infrastructure services than current appro-
aches provide is still a major challenge for
many counties in Asia-Pacific region
(UNICEF 2006b).
The East Asia and Pacific regions have the
world’s largest numbers of people without
access to improved drinking-water1 sources
and sanitation2 facilities. Access to improved
drinking water and sanitation in East Asia
and the Pacific increased from 72 percent
to 79 percent. However, population growth
represents a key challenge for East Asia and
the Pacific: 27 million every year will need
to gain access by 2015 or the region will miss
the MDG target. The largest urban-rural
disparities in drinking-water coverage are
found in Mongolia (87 percent urban to 30
percent rural) and Papua New Guinea (88
percent urban to 32 percent rural). While
China’s rural population enjoys increased
access to improved water sources, its urban
population is actually losing access: urban
drinking water coverage dropped from 99
to 93 percent between 1990 and 2004. In
the Philippines, coverage in urban areas
dropped from 95 percent in 1990 to 87
percent in 2004. Sanitation coverage rates
rose from 30 percent in 1990 to 51 percent
in 2004, yet more than a third of the world’s
population without basic sanitation lives in
East Asia and the Pacific. More than two out
of three people in rural China live without
basic sanitation.
South Asia’s sanitation coverage is among
the lowest in the world, at 37 percent, about
the same as that in sub-Saharan Africa.
Although access to basic sanitation
throughout the region more than doubled
between 1990 and 2004 – from 17 to 37
percent – its starting point was so low that
the region is still far from reaching its MDG
target of 59 percent by 2015. Nevertheless,
Afghanistan, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka
are on track to meet the MDG sanitation
target, the latter of which already exceeded
its 2015 target by achieving 91 percent
coverage. Pakistan has made great progress
in expanding access to sanitation. Coverage
rose from 37 to 59 percent, and in rural
areas it rose from 17 to 41 percent.
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South Asia has boosted access to
improved drinking-water sources from 71
percent in 1990 to 85 percent in 2004 and
has virtually met its MDG target of 86
percent. India and Nepal have already met
the MDG water target, and Pakistan has
virtually achieved it. Nevertheless, arsenic
and fluoride contamination in Bangladesh,
India, Nepal and Pakistan threaten to
reverse progress made in expanding
improved water sources.
Corruption costs the WSE sector millions
of dollars every year; it siphons off scarce
monetary resources and diminishes a
country’s prospects for providing water,
sanitation and electricity for all. For
instance, the recent UNESCO (2006) report
on water cites corruption as the primary
reason why clean drinking water remains
unobtainable for 1.1 billion people.
Corruption has several negative conse-
quences in the WSE sectors:
• It discourages investments within the
WSE sectors by undermining the
performance and effectiveness of
both public and private sectors.
• It creates a bias in decision-making
on the allocation and location of
water supplies, or biases decisions
toward new large investment infra-
structure projects rather than opera-
tion and maintenance of old ones or
rehabilitation of systems, thereby
limiting the expansion and effective
delivery of electricity, water supply
and sanitation services, especially for
poor people.
• Corruption skews policymaking or
budget allocation towards sectors
where social returns (as contrasted to
the potential for obtaining private
kickbacks) are relatively low (Ades
and di Tella 1997a; Ades and di Tella
1997b).
• It undermines the financial stability
of utilities and, thus their ability to
offer reliable service to all their clients
and to extend services to all citizens.
• It decreases and diverts government
revenues that could be used to
improve water and other services.
Corruption can reduce government
revenues, in turn eroding the quality
of the services provided (Bearse et al.
2000).
• The price and the level of WSE pro-
vided are affected by corruption
(Shleifer and Vishny 1993).
• Corruption constrains the overall
management of water resources, for
example, by contributing to increased
pollution of freshwater resources and
over-abstraction of ground and sur-
face water, encourages inefficient
freshwater use and undermines
sustainability. Corruption plays a role
in intensifying the world’s regional
water scarcities.
While corruption arises for a variety or
reasons, corruption is particularly common
in infrastructure service provision (DFID
2002). There are a number of factors in the
water, sanitation and electricity (WSE)
sectors that increase the likelihood of
corruption (UNDP 2006). These include:
• Large-scale construction – construc-
tion is the ‘most corrupt’ sector (see
Transparency International UK. n.d.).
• WSE services exhibit economies of
scale, or network externalities that
make it technically more efficient to
have a single distributor of the
service. Thus, WSE services involve
‘natural monopoly’ issues regardless
of whether provision is public or
private.
• The technical complexity of WSE
570 Perspectives on Corruption and Human Development
services often leads to an asymmetry
of information.
• Shortfalls in supply and access to
service can provide significant oppor-
tunity for rent-seeking.
• The discretionary power of policy
makers and front line service provi-
ders creates unpredictability and
inequalities that can facilitate bribery.
2. CORRUPTION: AN
OVERVIEW
2.1 Definitions of Corruption
Various definitions of corruption have been
proposed (Table 3). By way of general
definition, corruption is the misuse of
entrusted power for personal gain either
at one’s own instigation or in response to
inducements.
According to Klitgaard (1988), if some-
one has monopoly power over a good or
service and has the discretion to decide
whether someone gets the good or service
or how much a person receives, and there
is no accountability whereby others can see
what that person is deciding, then we will
tend to find corruption. The World Bank
estimates that in highly corrupt countries
project corruption accounts for 30–40
percent in the water and sanitation sectors
(Water Integrity Network 2006).
The following forms of corruption have
been found in the WSE sector:
Bribery
Service providers may request (or wait to
be paid) money or a favour in return for a
service that they were obliged to provide as
part of their duties. According to estimates
TABLE 3: Definitions of Corruption
Author Definitions
Nye (1967) ‘Behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private interests
regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains, or violates rules
against the exercise of certain type of private regarding influence’.
Leys (1965) Behaviour that breaks some rule, written or unwritten, about the proper purpose to which
a public office/institution has been put.
Shleifer and Corruption without theft encompasses bribe demands from officials (on top of regular
Vishny (1993); payments for government services), while corruption with theft happens when even the
Raihan (2000) regular payment is not made to the government.
Klitgaard (1988) Corruption as monopoly power (M) plus discretion by officials (D) minus accountability C
= M + D – A. Corruption occurs when an agent betrays the principal’s3 interest in pursuit
of one’s own.
Werner (1983) (a) Public office-centred definitions involve a deviation from legal and public duty norms
for private benefit, whether in the form of pecuniary, status or influence gains. (b) Market-
centred definitions view corruption as a maximising activity in which officials manipulate
pecuniary gains according to the supply and demand in the market place of their official
domains. (c) Public interest-centred definitions stress the betrayal of public interest by
preferring particular to common interests.
Scott (1972) Market corruption is the selling of government goods and services to the highest bidder.
Non-market corruption is where people honour obligations to others, in ways that are
considered illegal, improper and/or corrupt by legal or other standards.
Williams (1987) How corruption is defined depends on the context in which it is located, the perspectives
of the definers and their purpose in defining it. For example, in some countries, particular
social taboos may lead some individuals to turn a blind eye to corruption.
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by the World Bank Institute (World Bank
2004b), more than US $1 trillion is paid in
bribes alone each year worldwide in both
developed and developing countries (not
including embezzlement of public funds or
theft of public assets). This is almost equal
to the combined GDP of low-income
countries.
• Offering staff money in order to get a
faster connection; the need to pay is often
indicated by slow service, inaction and/
or misplaced documents. The PAM Jaya
labour union in Jakarta revealed that over
40,000 customers of state-owned water
utility PT PAM Jaya had been connected
to the mains illegally by corrupt company
staff (Jakarta Post 2002).
• Transparency International Bangladesh’s
Baseline Survey on Corruption (1997)
shows that 60 percent of urban house-
holds either pay money or exert influence
in another way to get water connections
and to correct water bills (on top of their
legal payment). The report also says that
nearly one-third of urban households
have had their water bills reduced through
an arrangement with the metre readers.
• In Pakistan, an illegal electricity connec-
tion is called ‘kunda’. It is simply provided
by connecting a wire hook from the main
line. This is pretty obvious and can be
detected easily. In order for the area ins-
pector of the electricity department to
turn a blind eye a bribe is paid through
a middleman or agent. Almost every area
officer of the electricity department takes
such bribes. The payment is made on
monthly basis. The amount could be up
to Rs. 25,000 per month.
Fraud
An economic crime that involves some kind
of trickery, swindle or deceit. For example:
• Indonesian national police detained the
former president director of  PT
Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN), the
state electricity company in connection
with corruption in the procurement
process for two power plant projects,
each of which is alleged to have caused
losses to the state of as much as 100
billion rupiah (Reuters 2006).
• In Indonesia, Independent Power
Producers (IPPs) provided the family and
friends of politicians with ‘loan-financed’
shares in the company (Bayliss and Hall
2000). The loans were to be repaid with
the dividends from the shares, but the
shares were essentially gifts camouflaged
to escape the anti-corruption legislations.
• Gao Yan, former President and CEO of
the State Power Corp (China’s largest
electricity company) fled China to escape
arrest on corruption charges scandals in
the electricity industry. Reports suggest
that stock buybacks and the acquisition
of assets from a State Power subsidiary
may be at issue, with the company
reportedly only paying one-third of what
the assets were worth. (McMillan 2002).
Embezzlement
Theft of public or private funds. Embez-
zlement is a very serious issue in many
settings. For example, it has been estimated
that former Indonesian leader Suharto
embezzled anywhere between US $15 and
35 billion from his country, while Marcos
in the Philippines may have embezzled up
to US $5 billion (Smith et al. 2007). It is
very difficult to assess the extent of
embezzlement of public funds in the WSE
sectors, examples of embezzlement include:
• In the Philippines, as part of a crackdown
on corruption, President Gloria Arroyo
promised consumers who had been faced
with inflated electricity bills that they
would get their money back. The
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Supreme Court has ordered the Manila
Electric Company to reimburse an
estimated 28 bn peso (US $528 m) in
overbillings. (BBC News 2002).
• In July 2001, then Prime Minister of
PNG Sir Mekere Morauta publicly des-
cribed both his own party and his govern-
ment as systematically corrupt. These
corrupt elements, he suggested, were
attempting to block the privatisation of
state assets (which would reduce their
opportunities for exploiting public re-
sources) (Sydney Morning Herald 2001).
• The Royal Commission on Corruption
Control (RCCC) in Nepal sentenced
former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur
Deuba to two years in jail after convicting
him of embezzlement. Deuba was also
fined more than US $1 million for
wrongdoing over a contract to build an
access road for the controversial multi-
million dollar Melmachi drinking water
project. He is the highest-ranking leader
in Nepal ever found guilty of corruption.
However, Nepal’s opposition parties say
the corruption commission is carrying
out political vendettas. According to the
BBC report, the Asian Development
Bank (ADB) investigation said it did not
find any evidence of collusion or other
corrupt or fraudulent practices among
those involved in the bidding process for
a road contract of in the Melamchi Water
Supply Project contract (BBC News
2005a).
• Embezzlement might also take the form
of pocketing the money that was
collected from households to pay the
communal bills and operation and
maintenance for a community’s water
supply.
• In Pakistan, 21 Western companies were
investigated by the national anti-corrup-
tion agency in 1998 for alleged kickbacks
to the government of Benazir Bhutto and
for over-pricing. Bhutto’s government
had signed so many contracts with power
companies – some of which were for
installations in totally inappropriate
locations – that Pakistan was set to
produce far more energy than it could
possibly consume until 2010. Yet, the
government was contractually bound to
buy all the electricity produced, resulting
in financial burdens for the utility and
the government. Although all the compa-
nies filed sworn statements denying
corruption, six of them subsequently
confessed to offering bribes (Hawley
2000). The IMF made a new package of
loans at the end of 1998 conditional on
the government’s dropping the charges
against the companies (Hawley 2000).
Cronyism or Nepotism
Granting offices or benefits to friends and
relatives, regardless of merit. Examples
include:
• In Indonesia, following the resignation of
President Suharto, the Jakarta City
Government cancelled an agreement
with two companies involved in provid-
ing water to the capital. One of the com-
panies was owned by a long time Suharto
business partner; the other was con-
trolled by one of Suharto’s sons. These
companies, together with their foreign
partners (Suez Lyonnaise and Thames
Water), had illegally procured two long-
term concessions in 1997. The two con-
cessions, both for 25 years, came to a total
of US $1.4 billion (Lippe 1999).
• Biased water allocation based on
considerations other than optimum
service delivery are common, for
example, residential suburbs are left
without water because the supply has
been siphoned off to service the farm of
a prominent politician.
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• Enron attempted to supply power to the
Maharashtra state through a subsidiary,
under circumstances disadvantageous to
the state. This was achieved through
secret negotiations that violated India’s
Electricity Supply Act. The multi-billion
dollar plant was mothballed in 2001
because its electricity was prohibitively
expensive (Powers 1995).
2.2 Petty and Grand Corruption
Corruption takes many forms – from petty
corruption in metre reading and billing to
grand corruption in the allocation of lucra-
tive monopolies. Aminuzzaman (1996)
finds that the higher the level of bureaucracy
the less frequent but higher the amount of
bribe paid: the lower the level of bureau-
cracy the higher the frequency but the less
the amount of bribe. These practices differ
in scale but contribute to the same results
– weak operational and financial perfor-
mance and, for the poor in particular, dec-
lining service quality or reduced chances of
ever accessing network services.
Grand corruption involves politicians,
BOX 1: An Infamous Example of Grand Corruption
The US company Westinghouse Electric Corp won a contract in the early 1970s to build the
Bataan nuclear plant in the Philippines. It was alleged that it gave President Ferdinand Marcos
US $80 million in kickbacks. The plant cost US $2.3 billion – three times the price of a comparable
plant built by the same company in the Republic of Korea. Filipino taxpayers have spent US $1.2
billion servicing the plant’s debts – even though the plant has never produced a single watt of
electricity because it was built at the foot of a volcano near several earthquake faultlines. The
Philippine government is still paying US $170,000 a day in interest on the loans taken out to
finance the nuclear plant and will continue to do so up to the year 2018.
After Marcos was overthrown in 1986, the Philippine government brought a US civil action
alleging bribery and corruption in 1988 against Westinghouse and put a case before the
International Chamber of Commerce in Switzerland. The civil action was rejected, but three
months before the International Chamber of Commerce was to make a decision, Westinghouse
agreed to pay the Philippines government under President Ramos compensation of US $100
million (including a cash payment of US $40 million and two state of the art gas turbines worth
US $30 million). The Westinghouse settlement, however, does not cover even one year’s interest
payments on the debts the country incurred to build the plant.
In this case, a US district court found clear evidence that commissions were given to the
special sales agent, and the agent materially participated in securing awards for the supplier and
contractor implicated. However, the agent and the supplier/contractor were cleared of any bribery
charges by the US court, as well as the International Court of Arbitration and the Office of the
Ombudsman of the Philippines due to lack of evidence that the agent actually distributed part
of the commission to former President Marcos, who had supported awarding the contract to the
supplier/contractor implicated.
The Government’s decision not to operate the Bataan nuclear power plant (partly due to
concerns over its operational safety) contributed to the power crisis starting in the late 1980s.
The Government’s subsequent action in mitigating the power crisis, i.e., signing 42 contracts
with independent power producers (IPPs) that were awarded based on negotiation rather than
through transparent and competitive bidding, created overcapacity and contributed to the high
cost of electricity and the financial insolvency of the sector.
Source: Hawley 2000.
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senior officials, policy-makers, leading elites
and major companies (Table 4) using large
amounts of public resources to maintain
their own power, status and wealth. For
example, electricity or water and sanitation
projects can be used as vote winning oppor-
tunities rather than allocated on the basis
of priority/availability of financial resources.
Increased costs of projects and concessions
are typically funded through increased elec-
tricity or water tariffs and foreign borrow-
ing. Salvatore Schiavo-Campo, advisor for
public sector management and reform at the
Asian Development Bank cites the case of
one unidentified Asian country where state
assets declined by US $50 billion in 10 years
as a result of corrupt officials undervaluing
them for sale to local and foreign investors
in return for commissions (Evans 1999).
Petty corruption in the water, sanitation
and electricity sector is the everyday
corruption that takes place where the public
officials meet the public, for example,
administrative procedures and routine
service operations and maintenance. Petty
corruption includes ‘tea money’, ‘speed
money’ or ‘grease payments’, these are a small
payment made to secure or expedite the
performance of a routine, legal or necessary
action such as getting water or electricity
connection. Staff might also supplement
their salary by providing services ‘infor-
mally’ (for example, selling water on, cash
repairs, falsified metre reading and illegal
connections). This kind of petty corruption
might occur on a regular basis and involve
collusion between individuals and various
departments within the utility.
BOX 2: Petty Corruption in India
Research on petty corruption in India’s water sector shows that:
• 41 percent of the customer respondents had made more than one small payment (median
payment US $0.45) in the past 6 months to falsify metre reading to lower bills.
• 30 percent of the customer respondents had made more than one small payment (median
payment US $1.90) in the past 6 months to expedite repair work.
• 12 percent of the customer respondents had made payment (median payment US $22) to
expedite new water and sanitation connections.
The cumulative revenue losses stemming from falsified water metres add up to large sums
over time. This is money that alternatively could be spent on improved operation and
maintenance, new investments to improve water and sanitation systems for economically weak
groups, etc. Such alternative costs are rarely taken into account in corruption equations.
The study also indicates the frequency of side payments from contractors to public officials
within the water and sanitation sector: According to public official respondents, side payments
occur on a frequent basis:
• 17 percent said that it takes place every time.
• 33 percent claimed it was quite common.
• 8 percent said that it takes place about half the time.
• 17 percent said that it occurs occasionally.
• 25 percent said that it occurs infrequently/never.
The value of kickbacks to public officials normally ranged from six percent to 11 percent of
the contract value. The study also suggests that side payments for transfers of staff occur
frequently. Interestingly, side payments for promotions were less common.
Source: Davis 2004.
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According to Davis (2004) corruption
can be ‘collusive’ (the willing and planned
cooperation of the giver and taker – both
parties benefit from striking a ‘deal’), ‘extor-
tionary’ (forced extraction of bribes or other
favours from vulnerable people by those in
authority), or ‘anticipatory’ (paying a bribe
in anticipation of favourable actions or
decisions from an authority). The consu-
mers’ willingness to pay for convenience
(getting new connections quickly, avoiding
time-consuming paper work, etc.) has
created a supply side pressure that serves to
perpetuate corruption. With respect to elec-
tricity, the shortage of generation, transfor-
mer, and distribution line capacity provides
incentives for fairly widespread corruption
in new electric connections and increasing
the authorised load.
The sum total of ‘petty corruption’ can
be considerable. Petty corruption is one of
the reasons for the low payment collection
rates reported by many water, sanitation and
electricity companies in developing coun-
tries – meaning that insufficient funds are
available to purchase input fuels or maintain
generators or distribution networks. For
instance, approximately one half of total
system losses (amounting to an estimated
US $100 million) of the Bangladesh Power
Development Board (BPDB) and the Dhaka
Electricity Supply Authority (DESA) are
accounted for by mismanagement and
falsified metre reading. In Pakistan, non-
technical losses arising from electricity theft
became such a problem, in 1999, that the
government mobilised the army to super-
vise metre reading and billing. While there
were many illegal connections by low-
income households, the Pakistani army
found that significant quantities of
electricity were stolen by high-income
households, industry, and large commercial
establishments such as shopping malls
(Lovei and McKechnie 2000; Ruth 2002).
In particular, petty corruption affects the
poor. Transparency International’s South
Asia survey (2002) (in Bangladesh, India,
Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) found that
lower income households spend a larger
proportion of their income on bribes for
public services such as: healthcare, educa-
tion, power, land administration, taxation,
police and the judiciary and find it to be a
heavy financial burden because of both the
high frequency and the amounts paid.
Report card surveys in Bangalore revealed
that approximately a third of the city’s poor
had to pay a bribe to get a service or solve
a service related problem (Paul 1993).
2.3 Corruption in the
Asia-Pacific Region
In India, corruption is under the table. In
China, it is over the table, while in Indonesia
corruption includes the table (Akya 2006).
The Thais call it gin muong (nation eating).
In Chinese, it is known as tan wu (greedy
impurity), in Japanese oshoku (dirty job), and
TABLE 4: Petty and Grand Corruption
Petty Grand
Which levels Everyday corruption in administra- Large scale corruption
tive procedures and routine service
operation and maintenance, etc.
Amounts involved under Small amounts of money or gifts Large amounts of public resources involves
what circumstances where the public officials meet the politicians, senior officials, policy-makers,
public leading elites and major companies
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to the Pakistanis, it is ooper ki admani (income
from above) (Time 1967).
The Asia-Pacific region represents more
than half of the world’s population: China,
India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and
Japan rank among the 10 most populous
countries. Whilst corruption takes place
internationally, there is the perception that
it occurs on a more systematic basis in the
Asia-Pacific region and is often seen as a
part of how business is done between public
agencies and citizens, and between public
agencies and the private sector, as well as
within the public sector itself. Several
reports suggest that corruption has wor-
sened in many countries in Asia. The 2006
Corruption Perceptions Index of Transpa-
rency International found that developing
countries such as Myanmar, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Pakistan and
Cambodia were some of the most corrupt
in the region (Transparency International
2006a). Awareness of corruption has been
increasing, particularly since the economic
crisis that struck a number of countries in
Asia. Names like Estrada, Marcos (the
Philippines), Soekarno, Suharto (Indonesia)
are synonymous with corruption in Asia. In
2002 the convictions of two sons of Presi-
dent Kim Dae-Jung of the Republic of Korea
on corruption charges tarnished the
president’s achievements. Thailand’s
Thaksin Shinawatra is the most recent
addition to the list, and his recent ousting
by a military coup was the culmination of
corrupt political and business practices. The
following summary of anti-corruption
initiatives in the region is based on a
number of sources (Political and Economic
Risk Consultancy Ltd. 2006; OECD and
ADB 2005; OECD and ADB 2006).
According to Transparency Interna-
tional’s surveys and indices4, Singapore is
perceived to have the least corrupt public
sector among Asian nations, although it has
yet to ratify the UN Convention against
Corruption. Bangladesh is perceived to have
the most corrupt public sector. Bangladesh
is renowned for its weak accountability
institutions, for example, the Ombudsman
is still awaiting establishment, 35 years after
the Constitution mandated its establish-
ment. Pervasive corruption is present in all
branches of government: legislature, execu-
tive, judiciary and entrenched in all sectors.
Weak governance, manifest in poor public
service delivery and development outcomes
more generally, has been widely credited
with the rise of the Maoists in Nepal. The
political change in Nepal in April 2006 has
created an opportunity to mobilise against
the old order and change social and political
constraints that had been accepted as
given. In the Philippines, President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo came to power in 2001
when her predecessor, Joseph Estrada, was
swept from office on charges of corruption.
Nevertheless, President Arroyo has herself
faced allegations of corruption and poll
cheating.
The Republic of Korea has also been hit
by scandals involving political funding and
lobbying. But the Republic of Korea is one
of the few OECD countries that can claim
to have sent former presidents and leading
political figures to jail for corruption. The
IMF crisis in 1997 acted as catalyst to create
a more effective, efficient, and transparent
government in the Republic of Korea and
also led to the development of anti-corrup-
tion institutions that have teeth. The public’s
tolerance of the corruption decreased after
the IMF crisis. Several of the families behind
the country’s largest companies (such as
Samsung) have also been embarrassed by
scandals relating to their attempts to by-pass
inheritance taxes and pass on wealth from
one generation to the next.
Recently, there have been contract
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scandals in the government procurement
process, in Thailand, involving the cons-
truction of Bangkok’s new international
airport and road building projects. Thaksin
Shinawatra, prime minister of Thailand, was
indicted by the National Counter-Corrup-
tion Commission but was eventually
acquitted in a controversial decision by the
country’s Constitutional Court.
India already has a robust administrative,
regulatory and legal framework (rule of law
and freedom of speech), which helps to
provide a check on corruption and avenues
for victims of the problem to voice their
grievances. However, implementation and
enforcement need to be strengthened to
improve regulatory quality and government
effectiveness. The biggest governance chal-
lenge for India is to reduce the gap between
demand and supply of basic public services
like water, sanitation and electricity, which
implies enhancement of resources and
distribution in a more equitable manner.
Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi
of Malaysia made fighting corruption his
top priority after taking over from
Dr. Mahathir Mohamad in 2003. The
Malaysian government is setting up the
Anti-Corruption Academy, which aims to
serve as a regional centre to study and
disseminate information and provide
training in anti-corruption practices. The
promotion of good governance is Malaysia’s
priority in preventing corruption in its
public institutions. Other preventive
measures aim to instill integrity in the
society at large by targeting young people
through family and education programmes.
These and other elements of the Malaysian
anti-corruption strategy have been
consolidated in the newly launched National
Integrity Plan.
In Viet Nam, there is currently a consi-
derable degree of political will from both
the government and the party to fight
corruption, demonstrated by approval of the
Law on Preventing and Combating Corrup-
tion (2005) and an action plan to imple-
ment the law in February 2006. In addition,
in 2006, several institutions specialised in
corruption were created (before the acces-
sion of Viet Nam to the WTO formally in
early January 2007), namely, a Central Anti-
Corruption Steering Committee headed by
the Prime Minister, an Anti-corruption
Bureau in the Government Inspectorate,
and a Department of Public Prosecution of
Corruption Crimes in the Supreme People’s
Procuracy. Furthermore, the Press Law is to
be amended to strengthen media to play a
more active role in the fight against cor-
ruption.
Systemic corruption in Indonesia was the
main factor behind the failure of its
economy during the crisis of 1997-1998.
Seven years after the economic crisis and the
fall of the New Orde Administration,
corruption is still an important issue in
Indonesia. Under President Yudhoyono,
Indonesia has made many reforms and anti-
corruption structures and systems have been
implemented but progress on combating
corruption is slow (the same people from
the Suharto era are still in charge of the
bureaucracy, economic and political
systems). In 2005, the World Bank launched
a major report, ‘Combating Corruption in
Indonesia’ with a televised public debate. It
is reported that excessive regulation is mak-
ing it difficult for Indonesian companies to
compete on tenders against international
ones.
Hong Kong, China (SAR), on the other
hand, has a reputation for low corruption,
and this has enhanced its credentials as a
regional business centre. Independent Com-
mission Against Corruption (ICAC), police
and judicial system of Hong Kong, China
(SAR) deserve most of the credit for main-
taining the territory’s good image. The
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ICAC admits that the cases involving
corruption are becoming more complex.
There is a growing cross-border dimension
to corruption, which limits the ability of the
local authorities to investigate and prosecute
certain cases. In addition, many of the forms
of corruption that occur in the private
sector are extremely difficult to collect
evidence in order to proceed with arrests
and prosecutions. For example, irregular
payments that change hands between
groups like building supervisors and
maintenance firms occur so frequently that
they are almost systemic.
The Lao People’s Democratic Republic
government has acknowledged corruption
as an important issue, and has undertaken
some promising initiatives in the recent
years. A new Anti-Corruption Law was passed
in December 2005, and a new governance
strategy was shared with donors in Novem-
ber 2006. The main governance challenge
in Lao People’s Democratic Republic is the
general lack of technical, managerial and
administrative capacity at all levels. Lao
People’s Democratic Republic has a signifi-
cantly decentralised governance system,
with provinces responsible for service deli-
very. Yet, capacity at the sub-national level
governments is even weaker than at central
levels, and there is little oversight. Law
enforcement remains weak; no significant
corruption cases have been pursued through
the courts.
Since reforms began in 1978, China has
experienced rapid development: poverty
measured at US $1/day consumption fell
from more than half of the population in
1980 to less than 10 percent today. Never-
theless, corruption remains a huge problem
in China. Factors contributing to a reduc-
tion in corruption in China include the need
to adopt certain institutional reforms in
order to comply with WTO standards and
requirements and the pressures on state-
owned companies to improve their gover-
nance and transparency in order to list on
foreign stock markets. China has signed the
UN Anti-Corruption Convention, and has
recently passed an Anti-Money Laundering
Law. Strengthened Government commit-
ment to anti-corruption is evidenced in the
11th FYP and the ‘Harmonious Society’
framework, which focus on addressing
corruption and on improving the quality
and efficiency of public service delivery.
Opening the new Parliament, Governor-
General Sir Silas Atopare, said corruption
was one of the most significant factors in
reducing five million Papua New Guineans
to enduring one of the world’s lowest
standards of living. Politicians had to lead
by example and ‘shed the corruption tag on
leaders’, he said. Then Prime Minister of
Papua New Guinea, Sir Mekere Morauta
lamented that corruption in his country was
so deep and widespread that the nation’s
entire security was undermined by it.
Corruption in Papua New Guinea is begin-
ning to be matched by that of the Solomon
Islands, Nauru, Vanuatu and Fiji: corruption
is perhaps a factor in the challenge, in 2000,
to the legitimacy of the democratically
elected governments of the Solomon Islands
and Fiji. Melanesia is notorious as the
Pacific’s most fertile ground for massive
corruption, usually centering on the bribery
of political and public service leaders by
companies keen to access Melanesia’s forest,
mineral and fisheries wealth. Regional
efforts to combat corruption include the
‘Eight Principles of Accountability‘ for eco-
nomic and financial management and the
Biketawa Declaration (2000), which demon-
strates a commitment to good governance.
2.4 Corruption and Culture in
the Asia-Pacific Region
The region is very diverse in terms of its
cultural, social and political history.
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Corruption has been defined as a culturally-
accepted phenomenon. Socio-cultural
practices such as Chonji (money as a token
of appreciation), gift giving5, Kwan-Si
(acquaintanceship culture), guanxi, (‘social
relationships’ or ‘social connection’) are
often cited as one of the causes of corrup-
tion in the region. However, ‘the art of
guanxi cannot be reduced to a modern western
notion of corruption because the personalistic
qualities of obligation, indebtedness, and
reciprocity are just as important as transac-
tions in material benefit’ (Yang 1994). In
Vanuatu, and the Pacific in general, it has
been reported that people may be reluctant
to hold leaders accountable for corrupt
behaviour due to the custom that it is
against traditional Melanesian values to
criticise ‘big men’ (Ferrieux Patterson 2003).
Price (1999) argues that some kinds of
corruption in India are the function of
belief and the socio-political contexts, which
has a major role in influencing people’s
attitudes to corruption.
Gupta (1995) illustrates the importance
of social capital in facilitating corruption in
the region. He gives the example of two
rural men, who are unable to respond
‘correctly’ in their attempt to pay a bribe to
two state officials. The rural men did not
know the correct amount to pay and so were
publicly humiliated, making the state
officials in an even stronger position to
extort a higher bribe the next time round.
Gupta notes the frustration of the two
young men who were excluded from the
‘practice’ of bribe giving, noting that: ‘When
villagers complained about the corruption of
state officials, therefore, they were not just
voicing their exclusion from government
services because they were costly… More
importantly, they were expressing frustration
because they lacked the cultural capital
required to negotiate deftly for those services
(Gupta 1995).
In some countries (such as small Pacific
societies), to break the bond of loyalty and
reciprocity6 to family and peer groups
(primary school, secondary school and
college friends) is punished in a harsher
manner than breaking the law. In his study
of ‘rickshaw wallas’ in Nepal, Kondos (1987)
shows how the word ‘favouritism’ is seen by
westerners to be equivalent to corruption,
but for those involved, it is about obligations
to family and friends. Ruud (1998) found
that in West Bengal corruption is an
established strategy of coping with the
bureaucracy, with emphasise on the social
networks blurring the distinction between
private and public. People dedicate time and
effort to maintaining networks of contacts
and friendships making it impossible to
insulate the state from ‘corruption’ because
there is such spillover between the realm of
the state and the nature of practices that are
embedded in daily life. Ruud criticises the
use of the term ‘corruption’ by western
academia and media for its ethnocentrism
and failure to understand the importance
of moral imperatives to help one’s kin. In
such cases, Tanzi (1995) argues that special
measures must be taken such as a forced,
periodic reassignment of civil servants.
Military government has also been impli-
cated in creating rent seeking, for example
in the Republic of Korea (1961–1987),
whereby chaebols7 were able to make private
payments to public officials in order to
influence formulation of laws, rules and
regulations.
Others view traditional culture as crucial
to combating corruption, since social change
can only be sustainable if it can be inter-
nalised through the behaviour and values
of people, i.e. culture is considered a facili-
tator of development. In contrast to Max
Weber’s analysis of Protestant ethics, there
have been several competing theories that
seek to explain the high performance of East
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Asian economies in terms of values that are
traditional in that region (Buddhist, Confu-
cian or Taoist framework). Interestingly,
Bhutan is the least corrupt and most tradi-
tional among South Asian nations (SARID
2006).
Nonetheless, cultural difference should
never be used as an excuse for poor ethical
practice. The causes of corruption are
multiple, complex and always contextual.
No matter how pervasive bribery may be in
some countries, no country openly defends
the demand for, nor the payment of, bribes
as ethically acceptable. A claim that the
practice is ‘accepted’ locally usually means
that it is tolerated when kept secret.
2.5 Corruption and the Poor
The World Bank suggests that 20 to 40
percent of water sector finances are lost to
dishonest and corrupt practices (Stålgren
2006). The effect of corruption on the poor
can be gauged through both its:
• Direct impact, for example, increasing
the cost of  water, sanitation and
electricity services, which in turn result
in increased tariffs, lack of money to
expand networks to poor areas, or,
alternatively, mounting financial losses
leading to deteriorating service. At the
household level, corruption is experi-
enced through deficient water service
delivery and practices, and contributes to
the 40 billion working hours lost
annually at a global scale (Stålgren 2006).
• Indirect impact, for example, diverting
public resources away from social sectors
and the poor, and through limiting deve-
lopment, growth and poverty reduction.
Surveys indicate that those with low
income are more vulnerable to corruption
than those with higher income levels.
Gopakumar (2002) found that bribes were
a heavy financial burden on households, due
to both the high frequency of bribes and the
large sums paid. For example, in Pakistan,
92 percent of households using public
education services reported the payment of
bribes averaging Rs. 4,811 (US $86) –
compared to a gross national per capita
income of only US $410 per annum (Trans-
parency International 2002). The findings
indicate that those likely to be poor (i.e.
unemployed, those with low education, etc.)
are more vulnerable to corruption than the
better of socio-economic groups. When
asked about the source of corruption, most
respondents replied that bribes were
extorted by public servants: middle and
lower level civil servants were the key
facilitators of corruption.
Whilst the majority of commentators
view such instances of corruption as crimi-
nal and morally bad behaviour, there are
those who argue that in situations of poor
governance and infrequent service delivery,
corruption is a way of solving problems with
access to infrastructure services. Klitgaard
(1988) suggests that corruption can benefit
private actors by putting ‘goods and services
in the hands of people who value them the
most, who use them the most’. It has also
been reported that corruption may benefit
the poor by cutting red tape, making
decision-making predictable, motivating
underpaid workers and enables some to
obtain political power, for example, selling
a vote for services.
Nevertheless, the impact of paying bribes
for services is enormous for poor slum
people, and it directly affects their liveli-
hoods. One respondent to research con-
ducted by the authors said, ‘Because of the
cost of kerosene, and other extra payments
such as giving money to the police and other
officials of the law-enforcement agency for
their help, we cut off our food cost. Sometimes
we did not have enough food to eat’. Another
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reported that because of paying bribes they
could not meet their necessities, ‘It is really
tough for a day labourer to pay a high price
for electricity and water. You know it is not
possible to get electricity and water connec-
tions without bribes or extra money. So, our
budget is strained and we cannot afford to
meet our needs. We cannot save anything for
our future either’. Others said that they had
been deprived of basic foodstuffs, medical
facilities, incurred business losses, and
interrupted children’s education because of
having to spend money-paying bribes. Poor
people feel powerless and helpless when
they experience corruption.
Whilst the poor in developing countries
are often exposed to corruption on a daily
basis, their knowledge of how to confront
corruption and deal with inadequate service
provision is limited. Humiliation, exclusion
and frustration with corruption and mal-
treatment is compounded by a sense of
being voiceless and powerless to complain,
since complaining may result in losing
services altogether. Despite a relatively high
prevalence of corruption in the WSE sector,
few incidents are actually reported due to a
lack of knowledge of the procedures or a
feeling that it is not worth the trouble.
Female-lead and poorer households are
likely to be less aware of where to go to file
a complaint, the procedures, and more
vulnerable to corrupt practices.
2.6 Corruption and Development
Most future scenarios for Asia foresee rapid
growth continuing. Over recent decades,
Asia has seen dramatic economic growth,
first in the East Asian ‘Tigers’ of the Republic
of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, Province
of China, then Thailand, Malaysia and
Indonesia, and more recently in China and
Viet Nam. There has also been significant
progress in South Asia. In the 1990s, eco-
nomic growth helped reduce poverty in the
region from just over 40 to around 30
percent (ADB et al. 2005). However, typi-
cally, growth has gone hand-in-hand with
uneven development and rising numbers of
poor urban slum dwellers, migrants, and
rural communities in isolated geographical
regions, with problems of malnutrition,
high maternal and child mortality.
Commentators predominately hold two
views on the link between corruption and
development:
Corruption does not Always Hinder
Economic Growth in the Short-Run
Analysts have suggested that corruption
would disappear with economic liberalisa-
tion, political democratistisation and social
modernisation (Kaufmann 1997).8 The
World Bank’s proposed Governance and
Anti-Corruption (GAC) strategy, for exam-
ple, states a close correlation between good
governance and improved economic perfor-
mance and poverty reduction. Although
most economists agree that corruption
slows development, a corrupt country is
nevertheless capable of economic growth.
Indonesia’s economic miracle occurred in
the context of historically unprecedented
corruption. White (1996) has analysed the
economic liberalisation in China and found
that the transition to a market economy has
been accompanied by increasingly pervasive
and large-scale corruption. Kong (1996)
demonstrates how the Republic of Korea
economy has also grown steadily despite
fairly significant levels of political corrup-
tion; donations to political parties in ex-
change for business favours remains a major
form of corruption in the Republic of Korea.
Rose-Ackerman (1996a) acknowledges that
democracy and free markets are not invari-
ably a cure for corruption, while Leiken
(1997) argues that the end of the Cold War
has merely led to higher disclosures of
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corruption. Indeed, ‘Not too many years ago,
the economic successes of the countries of
East Asia were attributed by some observers
to a presumably positive impact of corrup-
tion in facilitating decision-making’ (Tanzi
1999). This has led to the proposition that
what we need to focus on is ‘good enough’
rather than ‘all out’ good governance.
Corruption is Bad for Growth
Corruption was once seen as a ‘necessary
evil’ that could ‘grease the wheels’ of deve-
lopment efforts: bilateral and multilateral
organisations and their clients once more
or less tacitly accepted corruption service
delivery. However, a growing body of
research showing that corrupt practices are
detrimental to economic efficiency and
social equity and thus limits the scope for
development opportunities.
Corruption aggravates income inequality
and is associated with slower economic
growth. There is some empirical research
that supports this theory. Mauro (2002),
looking at a cross-section of 67 countries,
finds that corruption negatively impacts on
the ratio of investment to GDP and argues
that if Bangladesh were to improve the
integrity of its bureaucracy to the level of
that of Uruguay, its investment rate would
increase by almost five percent of GDP.
While there is little hard evidence on the
incidence and costs of corruption within or
across countries or sectors, there is little
disagreement that these costs can be high.
For example, illegal payoffs can lower the
quality of  public works projects, and
increase their costs by as much as 30–50
percent (Rose-Ackerman 1996b). And there
is reason to believe that the costs of
corruption are disproportionately borne by
the poor. The World Bank (2000), presented
at the Bangladesh Aid Consortium meeting
in Paris, 2000 stated that ‘per capita income
in a corruption-free Bangladesh could have
nearly doubled, to US $700 instead of US
$350, which reflects the harmful impact of
bribery, kickbacks and similar under-the-table
payments on investment levels and misallo-
cated resources’ (News Network 2003). WBI
research suggests that countries that tackle
corruption and improve their rule of law
can increase their national incomes by as
much as four times in the long term, in
addition to drastically improving service
provision, such as water supply, sanitation
and health (Kaufmann 2004).
Girling (1997) demonstrates that corrup-
tion does not disappear in highly indus-
trialised, democratic societies, but rather
corruption changes as countries develop.
Robinson (1998) suggests that corruption is
a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon that
pervades all societies to varying degrees,
which is not amenable to quick-fix solu-
tions. Transparency International Corrup-
tion Perceptions Index points to high levels
of corruption in many rich countries as well
as poor ones.
2.7 Organising Concepts in
a Human Development
Approach
The affect of corruption in WSE sectors on
the poor will always be context and culture-
specific. However, a number of organising
concepts can help analyse how corruption
impacts human development.
Poverty
Poverty has many dimensions. In addition
to low income (living on less than US $1 a
day), illiteracy, ill health, gender inequality,
and inadequate public services are all
aspects of being poor. Corruption impacts
on the incomes of the poor by: (a) diverting
resources from social expenditure and
investment, and (b) minimising the effec-
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tiveness of water, sanitation and electricity
services. The link between corruption and
poverty is a vicious cycle (poverty may lead
one to be corrupt i.e. supply bribes in order
to access WSE services, which in turn can
increase one’s level of poverty). The current
focus on poverty reduction as a mean to
fight corruption and improve governance is
not only due to the perception that reduced
poverty decreases bribery, but also because
reduced poverty promotes a civil society
capable of reducing corruption.
Inequality
Poverty is not the same as inequality.
Poverty is concerned with the absolute
standard of living of a part of society – the
poor. Inequality refers to relative living
standards across the whole of society. If one
social group has better access to water and
sanitation facilities this may lead to health
inequalities (Stephens 1996).
Inequity
If one group benefits at the expense of
another group, this is an inequity. For
example, the urban poor often have least
access to piped water and are forced to pay
more than the wealthy for poor quality and
limited quantities of water from vendors.
This is an inequity because the wealthy
doubly benefit (in health and economic
terms) while the poor lose out twice over
(Stephens 1996).
Productivity
The absence of income earning or employ-
ment opportunities and the associated high
unemployment rates are the major cause of
poverty. Even if poor people are employed,
wages are often so low that they only alle-
viate the severity of poverty rather than
enabling them to maintain a reasonable
quality of life. Corruption leads to wider
income disparities because those with influ-
ence gain more advantages; and those
without, lose out. Corruption affects basic
livelihoods. For example in Rajasthan, mini-
mum wages, which were part of a drought
relief programme organised by the state,
were hardly ever paid due to mismanage-
ment, corruption and the deliberate obstruc-
tion of access to information held by local
officials responsible for the programme’s
administration (Roy and Dey 2001).
Rural-Urban Issues
One of the main problems facing the Asia
and Pacific countries is rapid urbanisation.
Urban growth brings with it a host of
infrastructure challenges: increasing
population implies increasing demand for
infrastructure services such as clean water
or sanitation or electricity. Gaps in urban
infrastructure sectors tend to affect the poor
(who are frequently to be found in peri-
urban, informal settlements) more than the
rest of the population.
Poverty also tends to be concentrated in
rural areas, with significant pockets of rural
poverty a remaining in a number of gene-
rally fast-growing countries in the region.
Providing rural infrastructure as cost-
effectively as possible is one of the key chal-
lenges for service providers since the unit
costs of delivering rural infrastructure in
sparsely populated areas are often higher
than urban infrastructure.
Implications for the Environment
Concerns for sustainability have arisen in
the context of an ‘urbanising world’. This has
necessitated a reassessment of the environ-
mental problems in urban areas that reduce
quality of life such as inadequate water and
sanitation: the so-called ‘brown’ agenda’
(McGranahan et al. 2001). Corruption in
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BOX 3: Corruption and Water Pollution
Thirty-seven people were indicted on charges of accepting bribes from water reservoir developers
in the Republic of Korea according to The Korea Herald. In order to avoid paying the costs of
reconstruction of underground water sites, water quality testers were bribed to provide fake test
results. More than 1,700 water sites were found to have contaminated water including high
levels of nitrate-nitrogen, which can cause a condition known as methemoglobinemia or ‘blue
baby’ disease.
Source: Costin 2006.
BOX 4: Tanneries ‘Kill’ the Buriganga River
Much of the leather exported by Bangladesh (US $234 million in 11 months of the fiscal year
2005 to 2006) is processed at the Hazaribagh tanneries. The 243 tanneries (located about three
kilometre north-east of Dhaka) pour 7.7 million litres of untreated, highly toxic liquid wastes
into the Buriganga River everyday. Until 2001, discharge from the tanneries was channelled
about 10 km downstream through a canal running along the flood protection dyke around the
city. But unscrupulous land grabbers, aided by local politicians, built over the sewer, and this has
caused water logging. Rather than evict the encroachers, corrupt Dhaka Water and Seweage
Authority (DWASA) officials devised an alternative – to dump the discharge into the Buriganga.
The tannery owners there have enough clout to continue flouting the pollution control rules.
The 17 kilometre stretch of the river used to have enough stock to support the fisher folk
throughout the year but pollution has killed the fish, destroyed land and contaminated
groundwater.
Source: Khan 2006.
WSE can affect the brown agenda since
inadequate WSE services lead to untreated
sewage and poor water quality or burning
of biomass fuels, resulting in widespread ill
health, low productivity and reduced income
and quality of life and preventable death.
Sustainability
The literature finds that services are
sustainable if the outputs continue to be
realised over the long term (Carter et al.
1999). Parkin (2000a; 2000b) defines the
sustainability of infrastructure as the
‘capacity for continuance’. Sustainability is,
therefore, ‘a general measure of successful-
ness’ (Hardoy et al. 1992). For example, with
reference to drinking water supply, Abrams
(1998) claims that ‘if the water flows, then
all of the many elements which are required
for sustainability must have been in place.
There must have been money for recurring
expenses and for the occasional repair, there
must have been acceptance from the consu-
mers of the service, the source supplying the
service must have been adequate, the design
must have been properly done, there must
have been sound construction’.
Gender Equality
There is a particular gender aspect to the
WSE sectors since improved access to water,
sanitation and electricity can improve
quality of girls and women’s lives – releasing
women and children from the time intensive
task of gathering traditional biomass fuels
or water, raising the productivity of women
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in household chores or by facilitating study
or the operation of home based micro
enterprises.
Service providers might be less inclined
to demand a bribe from a man as women
might be more susceptible to coercion,
violence or threats. Women may be more
victimised by corruption in the WSE sector
as a result of gender inequalities regarding
political and economic status; human rights,
education, health, mobility and choice.
Women are also more likely to be subject
to sexual harassment by service providers
over and above higher costs. Nevertheless,
there are significant differences within Asia-
Pacific in this regard. Asia is one of the
unique regions in the world with the huge
gap between the highly educated women
who actively participate in the socio-
political life of their countries at one end
and illiterate women from another.
2.8 Causes and Motivations
In its survey of corruption in South Asia,
Transparency International (2002) docu-
mented the perceived reasons for corruption
in public services, including the WSE sector.
The majority of the respondents rated lack
of accountability as the most important
reason. Second, was the monopoly power
enjoyed by the utility, followed by lack of
transparency and the discretionary powers
of the utility staff. It is significant that the
low pay of staff came only fifth in order of
importance. Other causes identified in the
report include acceptance of corruption as
a way of life, the ineffectiveness of the
judiciary in punishing corruption and
inadequate training and orientation of
officials. A previous survey (Transparency
International Bangladesh’s (1997) Nation-
wide survey cited the main reasons for
corruption as a desire ‘to get rich quick’ (76
percent), ‘moral degradation’ (58 percent)
and ‘lack of accountability’ (51 percent).
Other causes and motivations for corrup-
tion in the WSE sector include:
Shortage of Service or Unequal
Access to Services
Where services are in short supply or are
badly administered, and where discretion is
possible in the provision of services, then
there is considerable scope for corruption.
Corruption may offer an important means
of accessing WSE services for poor people
living in slums in the absence of more
‘formal’ means of accessing the service. For
example, mastaans (muscle men) often
control slums in South Asia and they facili-
tate ‘illegal’ connections to essential services
like electricity and water. Even though the
services that mastaans supply are limited,
and, generally perceived to be of low quality,
low-income residents and neighbourhoods
may be the worst affected by anti-corrup-
tion clampdowns; attempts to prevent or
close down illegal connections may mean
even less access to water. For example, in
Dhaka, Bangladesh, the poor have been
caught up in a catch-all anti-corruption
drive by the new interim government
against all forms of illegality (Sudworth
2007) which has led to the demolition of
slums and imprisoned many leading politi-
cians, business people and others, including
the son of the last Prime Minister of the
country, on charges of corruption.
Private Sector
The private sector often represents the
‘supply’ side of corruption. Bribe suppliers
are frequently not simply victims of
extortion, but active partners in corruption.
Gunnar Myrdal (1968) wrote in Asian
Drama: ‘One problem of considerable
importance requiring specific attention is the
role of Western business in feeding corruption
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in South Asia’. He argued that Western
businessmen undermined the integrity of
politicians and administrators through
bribes, and that this effect was strengthened
by aid. Indeed, the former World Bank Chief
Economist Joseph Stiglitz once referred to
privatisation as ‘briberisation’.
The World Bank’s strategy on Gover-
nance and Anti-Corruption (World Bank
2007a) identifies the energy and infrastruc-
ture sectors as key focus areas for corrup-
tion. Concerns for commercial performance
and profitability are said to create incentives
in the private companies to control corrup-
tion. However, privatisation might create
new opportunities for corruption related to
the award of franchises, negotiation of
commercial contracts, and approval of tariff
increases. The standard kickback paid in
infrastructure projects, for instance, is often
quoted as 10 percent of the value of the
contract. However, a number of studies in
public service delivery in the Philippines
estimated that the misuse of resources in
public works was between 20 percent and
40 percent with multiple bribes and unoffi-
cial payments at each layer of government
involvement (Afzar et al. 2000). Corruption
can also be more subtle, however, for exam-
ple, where a private company invites muni-
cipal staff to come and visit its headquarters
– ticket and stay paid – but the company
expects a contract to be awarded and a trade
relationship in return for all this hospitality.
The IFIs have been heavily involved in
experimentation with privatisation of
electricity and water over the past two
decades, with mixed results. Privatisation of
water, which involves the selling of formerly
publicly or commonly-owned waters to
private multinationals may not be ‘corrupt’
in some strict sense, but when it involves
deals between national governments and
multinationals that do not take into account
the voice or interests of the poor or women
– and imply a direct rise in water fees and
a reduction in access to women and the
poor – the common perception is one of
corruption. Recently, a World Bank loan to
reform the Delhi Water Board was cancelled
because of the political opposition it
elicited.
Nevertheless, private utilities have been
serving the cities of Kolkata and Mumbai
in India, for decades. Despite changes in
management, their commercial procedures
are much better than those in state-owned
utilities. Accountability is enforced and theft
is strongly discouraged. Commercial losses,
including losses from theft are about 12–15
percent, half as large as those incurred by
the state-owned utilities, which are typically
in the range of 30–35 percent (Gulati and
Rao 2007).
Orissa, an Indian state, privatised its
electricity distribution in 1999 and since
then there have been significant improve-
ments, including in billing and collection.
Even so, a review of the performance of the
utilities conducted by the Orissa Electricity
Regulatory Commission for the year ending
March 2005 showed that the aggregate
technical and commercial losses were about
46 percent. The purely technical losses
accounted for about one-third of the losses.
The commission attributed the remaining
losses primarily to corruption (mainly
stolen electricity but also some inefficiency
in metering, billing and collection). The cost
of the corruption was estimated at about US
$240 million (Gulati and Rao 2007).
Social Complicity, Fatalism and
Acceptance
Higher levels of exposure to corruption in
daily life may promote tolerance and
acceptance of corruption that is reflected in
norms of behaviour.
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Patronage Politics
Poor citizens have a weak voice because
water and electricity are particularly vulner-
able to patronage politics. The trade of
services for votes is a major way that the
poor acquire local infrastructure. Beall’s
(1997) study of waste management in
Faisalabad demonstrates the custom of
providing a service or favour in return for
political loyalty, where communities trade
their votes for basic services and land tenure.
The communities of the poor are often run
by local leaders who act as brokers between
the people and the major political parties.
In Bangalore, it was reported that ward
councillors use their connections with lower
level bureaucrats to favour poor groups in
return for electoral support. Whilst this
process reinforces dependency and clien-
tism, the poor have been able to use these
mechanisms to obtain essential services
(Benjamin 2000). Yet, despite widespread
participation by the poor in this system, it
is generally resented.
Low Salaries
Low salaries are one of the main reasons
given for corruption at the municipality
level. In Asia, civil servants typically start
their careers at almost below subsistence
levels. For example, salary scales in
Lao People’s Democratic Republic are
amongst the lowest in the world with civil
servants earning between US $30–60
per month (US $1-2 per day). The less
bureaucrats are paid, the more it pays
for them to be corrupt (World Bank
2007a). In Nepal, the salary scale of
municipal employees is lower than, for
example, comparable employees in the
private sector. Such employees then use
bribery to meet their basic livelihood
needs. Civil service reform, particularly
addressing salaries and performance, is
therefore a priority. In China increased pay
for civil servants (who have had three pay
rises in three years) is intended to encourage
public officials to be honest, and will also
plough a bit of extra cash back into the
economy. In previous years, officials ended
up on average with an extra 80 to 100 yuan
(US $9.60–12) per month.
Power and Social Mobility
James Scott (1972) observed that in deve-
loping nations where civil servants have
higher status than most citizens, corruption
(by which he means extortion) will thrive
as these officials can leverage their official
status to extort money. Conversely, the
lower status of the official would make it
easier for him to accept a bribe, but not to
demand a bribe. Corruption is not simply
the desire for money. It is both an exercise
of power and gives those who are corrupt a
sense of power.
Centralised Management
Centralised decision-making, procurement,
management and construction of infra-
structure is said to foster corruption. A
USAID study (World Bank 2006c) has
shown that the cost of road works in deve-
loping countries has been inversely propor-
tional to the distance from the capital city.
Such findings have created support for local
governance and accountability structures.
However, decentralisation can either facili-
tate or hinder corruption. On the one hand,
it is argued that decentralised decision-
making is more transparent, making
corruption more difficult to conceal.
(Lederman et al. 2001). On the other hand,
if law enforcement is largely in the hands
of a centralised authority, this may limit its
effectiveness (Green 1997).
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Mind-Set of ‘What’s in it for Me?’
People working for WSE service providers
may be intent on gaining profit or benefit
from their position (‘it is our turn to eat’
mentality) rather than be guided by
altruism. This mind-set can lead to a
patron-client relationship geared to control
of public resources so as to share out jobs,
contracts and patronage to members of
one’s family, ethnic group/region, etc. This
type of thinking is very hard to change and
becomes a way of life for many.
A Legacy of Colonialism or
Globalisation
Certain commentators view corruption as
an outside, essentially Western, influence –
the product of multinational corporations
using bribery and kickbacks to buy contracts
(Chowdhury and Khaled 1984; Bhattacharya
and Rahman 1994; Chowdhury 1985; Umar
1994). Corruption is not perceived as indi-
genous to developing countries, and does
not reflect the true cultural heritage of the
people in developing countries. Lewis
(1996) notes that corruption is typically
viewed ethnocentrically: ‘western’ corrup-
tion is often interpreted as individualised,
deviant, pathological behaviour, while
corruption in developing countries is typi-
cally seen as structurally generated and
generic.
Gender
Evidence suggests that: (a) in hypothetical
situations women are less likely to condone
corruption, (b) women managers are less
involved in bribery, and (c) countries which
have greater representation of women in
government or in market work have lower
levels of corruption.
A survey of enterprise owners and mana-
gers in the Republic of Georgia indicates
that firms owned or managed by women
pay bribes on approximately five percent of
occasions when coming into contact with a
government agency. The percentage is twice
as high for firms with a male owner or
manager (11 percent) (Dollar et al. 1999;
Schimmel and Pech 2004; Swamy et al.
2000). But this might simply be because
women usually have less opportunity to be
corrupt. For example, in WSE institutions
there may be an informal auction for top
posts, which involves bribing for a job
transfer. But the ability of women to pay the
bribes needed to purchase choice posts are
limited by gender relations (i.e. insufficient
power to demand or pay bribes).
Materialism
It is on the rise in the Asia-Pacific region
and there is now more and more respect for
money and people who have it; irrespective
of how they may have earned it. Corruption
BOX 5: Lifestyles of the Rich and Infamous
• A Ledger Keeper in Dhaka Electricity Supply Authority (DESA), a very low level employee,
became the envy of many when he purchased a house in a middle-income residential area of
Dhaka for Tk 3.8 million and a plot in a shopping arcade.
• Many Assistant Engineers of Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) own private
cars, which would be unaffordable on their official salary.
• A metre reader who was placed under suspension joined the ruling political party, got his job
back, became a Collective Bargaining Agent leader, and is now the happy owner of two houses
and a shop.
Source: Transparency International Bangladesh n.d.
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is also associated with growing livelihood
expenses and the breakdown of traditional
social systems and mechanisms such as caste
and class distinctions. For instance, in Nepal,
large extended or joint families were once
common. Under the joint family system,
social expenses for events like wedding
receptions were shared. Now with the break-
up of the joint family, household heads have
to bear their expenses themselves.
System of Award and Punishment
Where there are few rewards for excellent
performance (meaning that bribes are
necessary to get promotions) and bad
performance is seldom formally punished
this provides incentives for corruption.
Corruption in recruitment and promotion
can lead to low levels of competence and
skills in the public service including: (a) lack
of professionalism in job performance;
(b) poor recruitment policies-lack clear
employment criteria and recruitment; and
(c) poor work conditions, including proce-
dures for appointment and promotion of
public officers (Mukherjee et al. 2001).
However, there is also a lack of effective
action against beneficiaries of stolen electric
power or water. In Bangladesh, World Bank
Country Director Frederick T. Temple said
in a workshop that, ‘One of the reasons that
corruption flourishes is that hardly anybody
is ever punished for it. We all know that there
is massive loan default, tax and customs
evasion, power theft, procurement corruption,
and extortion in Bangladesh. Yet detection and
punishment of these offences is very rare. The
weak application of sanctions reflects the
deficiencies of the anti-corruption machinery
and a judicial system in which justice is easily
deferred’ (News Network 2003).
Red Tape
Unduly complicated, lengthy or tedious
procedures for getting a new electricity,
water and sanitation connection may mean
that ordinary citizens need a ‘facilitator’ or
a ‘fixer’ to negotiate the system. Long queues
to pay bills can also discourage honest
consumers from paying bills, and encourage
existence of ‘middle men’. Or else, unclear
processes of issuing water vendor permits
and licences to operate water kiosk, can lead
to exploitative cartels. Moreover, where the
procedures for acquiring services are not
transparent the consumer does not know
whether s/he is paying a bribe or a required
fee. Montiero (1966) writing on India con-
cludes that ambiguity is a key characteristic,
which helps to facilitate corrupt behaviour.
He points out that corruption can some-
times thrive precisely because people do not
know what it is. This suggests the need for
clear and agreed knowledge of ‘the rules’ for
transactions (good knowledge of the rules
by those with power can facilitate know-
ledge of how to ‘bend’ them). As Wood
(1992) has pointed out, there may be
‘parallel rationalities’, including different sets
of rules, which govern behaviour in different
spheres and at different levels. Nevertheless,
whilst the literature suggests that there are
more opportunities for corruption in large
public sectors, experience shows that
Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Nether-
lands, and Sweden all have large public
sectors but are the least corrupt.
Lack of Public Accountability
The civil service system can make govern-
ment employees more accountable towards
their senior supervisors at the ministry than
they are to the public they are serving.
Wade’s (1982) work in South India showed
how local government canal irrigation
systems regularly involved personal accu-
mulation by managers, who were then
transferred to another area just before
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the resulting complaints and conflicts
became disruptive. This way the system
remained largely immune to remedial
interventions.
2.9 Gaps and Difficulties in
Assessing Corruption
Diagnosis of corruption is important in
order to have a baseline against which to
measure the impact of anti-corruption
interventions and track the effectiveness and
cost of specific anti-corruption strategies.
The objectives of monitoring/measuring
corruption include understanding the
patterns and causes of corruption, quantify
the costs of corruption to citizens, increas-
ing public interest in the issues surrounding
corruption and providing a basis for actions
and reform.
A number of indexes exist to measure
either the perception of corruption in the
sector (as developed by TI and others) or
the level of actual corruption in the sector
(Olken 2005). Other tools look at anti-
corruption policies and mechanisms9.
Transparency International has developed
the Public Contracting Monitoring System
(PCMS) and the Project Anti-Corruption
System (PACS) specifically for the construc-
tion industry. These tools monitor public
contracting systems in terms of transpa-
rency, corruption prevention, and control.
The World Bank also has a number of
governance tools for measuring corruption
that could be of relevance to the WSE sector:
Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS)
and Quantitative Service Delivery Surveys
(QSDS) diagnose corruption (in terms of
the leakage of funds and bribery) and other
problems relating to basic service provision
in developing countries.
To be effective, diagnostic tools that
assess the performance of institutions
require continued monitoring in order to
measure changes over time and the pattern
of such changes. One way of ensuring that
survey/diagnostic tool’s outcome raise
awareness and focus efforts is to work in
cooperation with the respective institution
issue to develop guidelines for specific anti-
corruption initiatives to bring about positive
change.
3. CORRUPTION IN WATER,
SANITATION AND
ELECTRICITY SECTORS
3.1 Overview of WSE in the Region
East Asia’s strong growth and rising incomes
are outpacing infrastructure development.
For example, Indonesia alone will need
2,000–2,500 MW of newly installed capacity
annually to sustain a six percent growth rate.
While electricity access has increased signi-
ficantly in the EAP region (from 56 percent
in 1990 to 88 percent in 2002), rural access
in many countries is still low relative to
urban areas. Unequal access to WSE infra-
structure reinforces urban-rural (Table 6)
and intra-urban inequality. Access to power
services ranges from six percent in
Afghanistan to 64 percent in Sri Lanka. And
within the EAP region’s cities, the poor have
significantly less access to piped water
supply; an estimated 38 percent of house-
holds in informal settlements compared
with 66 percent citywide (ADB et al. 2005).
Within India, access to water is intermittent
in all major cities (e.g. no city with a
population of more than one million has a
24 h supply), and access levels range from
below 60 percent in states like Mizoram and
Kerala to close to 100 percent in Punjab and
Delhi (ADB et al. 2005). Moreover, per
capita freshwater in the Asian region is
among the lowest in the world. Water-
related conflicts have also arisen in Central
Asia, the Near East, and in the tropical
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region of Southeast Asia (conflicts between
Singapore and Malaysia).
The situation in South Asia differs
significantly from that in East Asia (Table
5). First, economic growth has been much
weaker; although India, Bangladesh and
Pakistan have seen recent improvements in
growth. Second, the pace of urbanisation has
been slower although rapid urbanisation
remains a major feature. Third, levels of
current infrastructure provision and of
human capital are generally much weaker
(and probably more unevenly distributed)
than in East Asia. Sustained and substantial
reduction in poverty (as has been achieved
in China and Viet Nam) will depend on
overcoming infrastructure constraints that
currently limit growth.
In Papua New Guinea, few schools (15
percent) are connected to the public electric
grid – virtually none (three percent) in
remote areas. One-third of schools (44
percent in remote areas) depend on rivers/
springs/lakes as their main source of
TABLE 6: Summary of WSE Access Indicators
Access to Improved Access to Improved Sanitation
Water Source
Country Electric % of Rural Urban % of Rural Urban
Power Total (% of (% of Total (% of (% of
Consumption Popu- rural urban Popula- rural urban
per Capita lation population) population) tion population) population)
(kWh)
Afghanistan … 13 11 19 8 5 16
Bangladesh 128 75 72 82 48 39 75
Cambodia … 34 29 58 16 8 53
China 1,379 77 68 92 44 29 69
India 435 86 82 96 30 18 58
Indonesia 440 78 69 89 52 38 71
Myanmar 101 80 74 95 73 63 96
Nepal 68 84 82 93 27 20 68
Pakistan 408 90 87 95 54 35 92
Sri Lanka 325 78 72 99 91 89 98
Viet Nam 433 73 67 93 41 26 84
Source: World Bank 2006b.
TABLE 5: Overview of Access to WSE Services in the Asia-Pacific Region
Access to Improved Access to Improved
Water Source Sanitation
Region Population GDP Electric % of  Rural Urban % of Rural Access
(millions) (US $ Power Total (% of (% of Total (% of (% of
billions) Consum- Popula- rural urban Popu- rural urban
ption per tion popu- popu- lation popula- popula-
Capita lation) lation) tion tion
(kWh)
South Asia 1,4446.8 880.2 394 84 80 94 35 23 64
East Asia 1,869.5 2,650.9 1,184 78 69 92 49 35 72
and Pacific
Source: World Bank 2006b.
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drinking water. Forty-two percent of schools
report need for one or more additional
toilets for boys and 49 percent for girls
(Filmer 2005).
Common issues in poorly performing
service providers include: finance, insuffi-
cient capacity, lack of manpower/capacity
(engineers versus managers), low tariffs,
weak financial structure (high rate of non-
revenue water, low water fees, over staffing),
irregular and inadequate supply (poor
supply of water, the services’ low quality,
load shedding, voltage fluctuation, low
voltage, power outages, over-billing). The
Connecting East Asia study identified three
main challenges for infrastructure provision
in the East Asia and Pacific region:
1. The servicing and financing of
infrastructure needs associated with
rapid growth, where the ability of
private finance to meet infrastructure
needs have largely not been met.
2. Address particular challenges asso-
ciated with structural change in the
demand for infrastructure particu-
larly associated with rapid urbanisa-
tion and environmental problems.
3. Ensure that infrastructure is used
effectively to make the pattern of
growth more inclusive (growth in
Asian countries has tended to be
highly concentrated, geographically
particularly around major cities and
zones that provide the bulk of export
production).
3.2 Typology of Corruption in
Water, Sanitation and
Electricity
A general definition of corruption in the
context of water, sanitation and electricity
services is the increase or decrease in access
or quality of WSE services for personal gain
either at one’s own instigation or in
response to inducements.
Globally, the results of the Global
Corruption Barometre (Transparency Inter-
national 2006b) show that utilities are
considered to be relatively less corrupt
compared with most other sectors (Table 7).
The perception remains that political parties
and parliament are most corrupt, followed
by business and police.
TABLE 7: International Perceptions of
Corruption in the Utility Sector
Total Sample 3.0
Africa 3.5
South East Europe 3.4
Latin America 3.3
North America 3.1
Asia-Pacific 2.9
Newly Independent States 2.9
EU and other Western Europe 2.7
Note: 1: not at all corrupt … 5: extremely corrupt
Source: Transparency International 2006b.
Nevertheless, infrastructure service pro-
vision is traditionally a high-risk sector for
corruption (DfID 2002). The monopoly
structure of supply can provide significant
opportunities for corruption (Table 8). For
example, with reference to electricity, the
acute shortage of generation capacity and
its consequent effects – frequent load-
shedding, low voltage and low frequency –
on different economic sectors, as well as on
essential services such as water supply can
increase corruption. The political protection
and intervention given to infrastructure
often blurs financial accountability, and
provides cover for a range of corrupt activi-
ties in allocating scarce services, overstaffing,
excessively high wages and so forth. Finally,
the large scale of infrastructure can often
create opportunities for infrastructure
providers to inflate levels of  capital
spending, or hide under-investment, as well
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TABLE 8: How Corruption Differs/Compares in Water, Sanitation and Electricity Sectors
Similarities
Similarities in where corruption occurs
Customer interface (reconnection, disconnection, metre
reading, new connection, payment of bill, repairs).
Procurement, (biased technical specifications, non-
transparent qualification/evaluation criteria for bidders,
non-competitive process, collusion)
Government policies, investment decisions
Human resources (recruitment, transfer of staff, senior
level appointments, no disciplinary action taken for
corruption)
Areas vulnerable to corruption
In many countries water/electricity have been
considered as a ‘free commodity’ for generations rather
than economic goods with distribution costs that have
to be paid if the service is to remain sustainable.
Who does it
Corruption might be conducted by a range of service
providers from metre readers, commercial staff,
maintenance staff, politicians and senior staff.
The poor bear the brunt of corruption peri-urban, slum
or rural areas, where topography is more difficult, per
capita consumption is less, and most importantly,
incomes are lower.
What makes corruption possible
Monopoly structure/inability to keep pace with the
increasing demands for supply can provide significant
opportunities for corruption
Sector corruption and inefficiency are closely
intertwined
Numerous opportunities for discretionary decisions and
rent-taking
The large flow of public money; Large & lumpy
expenditure easier to hide bribes; poor cost recovery,
problematic tariffs and subsidies, and the increasing
role of the informal marketthe political economy of
infrastructure which skews infrastructure development
towards large–scale, centralised, capital–intensive
projects
The consequences of corruption across the sectors
are similar, for example:
• increase of prices
• decrease of government output
• reduced investment in human capital
Differences
Water companies have a high cost of capital (3-4 times)
compared to the electricity sector (Kirkpatrick et al.
2004). Perhaps reflecting greater scope for corruption.
Better governance and lower corruption have been
found as statistically significant determinants of
efficiency of water provision (Estache and Kouassi
2002).
Sanitation is generally a lower priority than water and
electricity and thus seems to offer less scope for
corruption. Sanitation is often considered to be house-
hold responsibility and outside the public domain. It
seems that people are reluctant to invest in sanitation
– they do not offer bribes to build toilets or to connect
to the sewerage network – no incentives for corruption.
Governments appear more interested in building big
infrastructure projects, i.e. sewerage rather than VIP
latrines.
The energy sector generates substantial cash
transactions compared with other infrastructure sectors,
not only in both small and large capital-intensive
investments but also in revenues, which tend to be
higher than those for such services as water and
sanitation or use of roads. The amounts involved are
large enough to drive a uti l i ty and sometimes
governments to near bankruptcy.
Private participation in electricity distribution is higher
than in the water and sewerage sector. While there is
scope for introducing some competition into billing and
metering and into construction, replacement and repair
work within water services, competition in the actual
provision of water supplies is normally ruled out by the
scale of the investment in fixed assets or network assets
that are needed to deliver the product.
594 Perspectives on Corruption and Human Development
as for large kickbacks associated with
procurement. There are many examples of
these kinds of practices in the region.
Contractors work together or with politicians
to win projects with their local W&S service
providers on favourable terms. They also
cooperate with technical staff to increase their
profit margin once a contract is secured.
Through complex arrangements funds budgeted
for construction are ‘skimmed’ and shared by
a number of different actors. Contractors often
pay either a percentage of the contract value
or a lump sum amount to one or more actors
within the agency. The payments are almost
always made in cash, in the W&S offices or in
the field (Davis 2004).
Kaufmann et al. (2004) consider the
performance of infrastructure services
(water, sewerage, electricity and telephones)
in 412 cities in 134 countries. The authors
find that corruption has significant and
substantial effects on both access to services
and on the quantity and quality of service
delivery. This in turn can lead to a ‘vicious
circle’ (Alesina et al. 1999), in which users
choose not to use publicly provided services,
further reducing a country’s tax base and
its ability to improve the quality of the
services. Empirical research has shown that
bad governance and corruption reduce the
quality of publicly provided services and
investment in the public sector and also
reduces the ability and incentives of
policymakers and users to monitor provi-
ders (Gupta et al. 1998; Davis 2004; World
Bank 2004a).
Corruption has a number of consequ-
ences: for examples see Table 9.
Bottleneck for development
Distorted commercial and industrial enterprise
development, creation of unnecessary barriers to entry,
reduces competition and innovation and growth of the
unofficial economy
Undermines political stability and leads to ineffective
government
Undermines legal and judicial systems and people’s
confidence in the state and the legal system
Sparking civil unrest
Lower quality of public infrastructure and effective
provision of public goods and services
Reduces the effectiveness of social spending by
preventing public services reaching those in need
Reduction of per capita GDP
Decrease in foreign direct investment
Infringement of civil and political rights
Prosecution, fines, blacklisting and reputational risk,
imprisonment, loss of professional status/employment
Broadman and Recanatini (2002); May et al. (2002);
Anderson et al. (2003); Qizilbash (2001); Hope Kempe
and Chikulo (2000)
Djankov and Murrell (2002); Friedman (2000); Hellman,
Jones and Kaufmann (2000); Hellman, Jones,
Kaufmann and Schankerman (2000); Johnson et al.
(2000); Svensson (2003); Batra et al. (2003)
Mauro (1997a); Mauro (1997b); Rose-Ackerman
(1999); Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996); Seligman
(2002); Williams (2000)
Feld and Voigt (2003); Polinsky et al. (2001); Rose-
Ackerman (2004)
[Iran, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and former Zaïre]
DfID (2002); Esfahani and Ramirez (2003); Henisz
(2002); Bo Dal and Rossi (2004)
Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000) ; Hellman,
Jones, Kaufmann and Schankerman (2000); Anderson
et al. (2003); Deininger (2003); Del Monte and Papagni
(2001); Ye and Canagarajah (2002)
Narayan et al. (2000); Gupta et al. (1998)
Alesina and Weder (2002); Smarzynska and Wei
(2001)
Persson et al. (2003)
Stansbury (2005)
TABLE 9: Consequences of Corruption
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TABLE 10: Corruption-Prone Project Cycle Areas
Project selection
• Corruption can negatively affect the selection of projects. For example, corruption can divert resources
away from social sectors and towards defence and major infrastructure projects.
• Corruption may also encourage the selection of uneconomical projects because of opportunities for financial
kickbacks and political patronage.
Planning stages
• Projects can be used as vote winners/opportunities for personal gain rather than on the basis of priority/
availability of financial resources.
• Planning in favour of high value infrastructure (white elephant projects) and against the interest of the poor.
• Project requirements may be overstated or tailored to fit one specific bidder.
When firms bidding for contracts offer ‘training’ or ‘entertainment’ to officials.
Inspection stages
• Weak oversight and supervision mechanisms that prevent the detection of fraud and corruption.
• Kick-backs can be given to persuade inspectors to turn a blind eye to slow implementation of projects,
unfulfilled contract requirements, and other instances of malpractice.
• Mutually corrupt relations among construction companies, inspection teams and government authorities
continued, with inspectors overlooking the improper construction.
Design
• Project design or timing of the project might be manipulated to benefit particular suppliers, consultants,
contractors and other private parties.
• Bribes for favourable environmental impact assessment/planning proposal/approval.
• Over-designed and overpriced projects can increase potential corrupt earnings during implementation.
• Kickbacks to government officials for rapid privatisations of utilities.
Bid and contract signing stage
• Political parties levy large rents on international businesses in return for government contracts.
• Kickbacks for construction and supply contracts.
• Officials receive excessive ‘hospitality’ from contractors and benefits in kind.
• Inadequate advertising of tender.
• Excessively short bidding time.
Construction
• Provision of equipment or goods of lower quality than specified (typical examples include less cement or
steel reinforcements).
• Corrupt contract amendments to a contract’s scope of work and costs.
• Outright theft of materials, equipment or services.
• Corrupt diversion of allocated project funding.
• Duplication of payments, alteration of invoices, lack of supporting records, ineligible payments, over billing,
misuse of funds, unauthorised payments, etc.
• Concealing substandard work.
• Bribe the relevant official to certify that the work was done according to specification.
Service delivery
• Superiors in the public service charge ‘rents’ from their subordinates.
• Siphoning off supplies to market.
• Ghost/absent workers – accepting a salary and not being at the job.
• Use of contacts/money to get better/faster service or to prevent delays.
Maintenance and management stages
• Corruption in procurement of equipment and spare parts.
• Withholding needed approval/signatures for gifts/favours.
• Bribes to win O&M contracts/personnel appointments.
• Lower standard of construction to create the need for expensive repair and maintenance.
Contd. . .
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Detailed information on corruption in
infrastructure – as in any activity – is
difficult to obtain, and is always likely to be
anecdotal, given its intrinsically covert
nature. Nevertheless, Table 10 describes
instances of corruption in the project cycle.
In research conducted by the authors, one
contractor in Bangladesh described the
kinds of corruption in the procurement
process; he said that at every stage of the
process contractors have to pay money.
Generally, new tenders are published in
obscure newspapers, particularly during
festival times, so that potential bidders fail
to hear of them – contractors are expected
to pay to be informed of new tenders. If a
bid is submitted, the Executive Engineer
demands money for the bid to be successful.
In addition, one has to pay bribes to the
local mastaans (muscle men that control
local areas) to implement a project. When
completed work has to be inspected by an
engineer, a good inspection report depends
on making a payment to the engineer (the
amount of bribe depends on the budget of
the work). If s/he refuses to pay, then s/he
will not get the report on time and there is
the risk of harassment. After completing the
work, some companies put khushi kora
money into the budget as incidental costs
(bribes are known as khushi kora – making
happy. The term comes from the promise
‘do the work we will make you happy later’).
The need to pay bribes to the authorities
and mastaans means that the contractors are
obliged to engage in dui numbari kaj (illegal
activities).
At each stage of the project cycle, corrupt
practices can occur either with bidders and
contractors or with individuals of executing
agencies, government, and financing
agencies. For example:
• A contractor with insider connections
can influence the specification of the
project – project identification, prepara-
tion, and design.
• Collusion typically occurs at the tender-
ing and bidding stage, where a group of
bidders place coordinated bids in such a
manner that one of them will win the
project and others will be selected to be
the designated winners for future pro-
jects. In some cases, officers in the project
executing agency are aware of the bid
rigging and the rigging of the contract
price. When this happens, the project
costs include the ‘grease money’ to be
Table 10 Contd. . .
Subscription process
• Extra-legal payments for new connections.
• Consumers pay money in order to speed up the process.
• Officials are paid to turn a blind eye to unauthorised connections.
Billing system
• Opaque system of billing.
• Irregularities in ledger of paid bills.
Disconnection
• Disconnecting customers in good standing.
• Extorting money to reconnect customers.
• Extorting money to prevent disconnection.
Fault redress
• Extorting money for repairs that are meant to be free.
• Gift-giving in return for favours in fault redress.
Source: Compiled by authors.
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paid by the pre-agreed winner, and a
certain percentage goes to the agency’s
personnel, known as ‘for the boys’.
• During project implementation, several
forms of corrupt practices might occur,
including fraud in billing, right-of-way
acquisition, and construction quality.
Ghost or substandard deliveries, or
submission of supplemental billings (cost
overruns), or change orders could be
used with the knowledge of project engi-
neers, auditors, examiners, and supervisors.
• A prevalent form of corruption during
the operation and maintenance phase is
the padding of delivery receipts or
payrolls, ghost deliveries, etc. If a project
is substandard due to corruption, repairs
and maintenance costs are also inflated
after the turnover of the project. Theft
of electricity, metre tampering, illegal
connections, and theft of materials such
as fuel are other forms of corruption
during this phase.
3.3 The Consequences of
Corruption in Water Supply
for Human Development
Water supply is crucial to human develop-
ment, and can be seen with reference to the
MDGs:
MDG Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty
and hunger: Survey evidence indicates the
lives of poor people to be most affected by
corruption. It is not only those who can
afford it who are asked to pay bribes, but
those who are thought to have no other
options. One World Bank survey (2002)
found that poor city residents in Bangladesh
pay two to three times more than their more
affluent counterparts for water. The report
cited this as an example of the inevitable
consequences of poor governance and
systematic inefficiencies. Lack of clean water
and adequate sanitation is a major cause of
malnutrition and a significant contributor
to extreme poverty. Safe, available water and
improved sanitation would enable increased
food production and create livelihood
opportunities by freeing large amounts of
time currently used for water carrying and
recovering from disease. Adequate basic
services such as water and sanitation can
also be key factors in determining the level
of private investment.
Accessing infrastructure services is crucial
for a poor household’s ability to generate
BOX 6: Accountability in Sector Reconstruction
Conflict or disaster-prone regions of the world, i.e. the six tsunami-affected countries (India,
Indonesia Aceh Province, Malaysia, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand) are particularly prone to
corruption.
Even before the tsunami, civil-war-ravaged Aceh was rated as one of the most corrupt
provinces in Indonesia. Abdullah Puteh, the former governor, was sentenced to 10 years in jail
for so-called ‘self-enrichment’ after he misused state funds in 2002 for the purchase of a Russian
helicopter. Following the Tsunami, some international organisations scaled back their relief work
in Aceh. UK-based NGOs Oxfam and Save the Children both suspended key projects in Aceh
after being fleeced by building contractors who improperly used the money to build substandard
structures. Oxfam had earlier committed to spend US $97 million in the region but pulled back
on those plans after discovering financial irregularities in its operations. An outside auditor
recently recovered US $20,000 of US $22,000 paid for construction materials that had been
booked but not delivered.
Source: Guerin 2006.
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income and savings. For example, water-
related diseases cost the Indian economy 73
million working days each year (DfID 2004).
Better water supplies enable a more produc-
tive use of women’s time, or enhance the
scope of household based businesses. The
supply of basic services has a profound
effect on quality of life including health,
well-being, welfare, security, comfort, conve-
nience, poverty reduction and enhancing
human capital.
MDG Goal 2: Achieve universal primary
education: Corruption in the WSE sectors
can be both a cause and effect of low levels
of literacy and education. Where corruption
in the WSE sectors reduces access to these
services by the poor this can have conse-
quences for school attendance. The time
required to collect and transport water over
long distances prevents millions of girls
from attending school. In addition, water-
related diseases cost hundreds of millions
of school days each year throughout the world.
MDG Goal 3: Promote gender equality
and empower women: Water is necessary
not only for drinking, but also for food
production and preparation, care of domes-
tic animals, personal hygiene, care of the
sick, cleaning, washing and waste disposal.
In most societies, women have primary
responsibility for management of household
water supply. Better water supplies can
immediately reduce this burden and help
more girls to go to school. Women’s health
also benefits from not having to carry heavy
water containers over long distances. It also
allows women more time to earn money
and to look after their families. Having a
water point or a latrine close to the home
means women and girls are less likely to be
attacked. Women’s participation in commu-
nity managed water and sanitation has been
found to be essential – women know much
about the quality and quantity of available
water sources over the course of the whole
year and promote the links between water,
hygiene and improved health which is
critical to the required household behaviour
changes.
MDG Goal 4: Reduce child mortality:
Poor quality water and inadequate
sanitation is the second largest direct cause
of child mortality and also contributes to
many other deaths by stunting growth and
contributing to malnutrition.
MDG Goal 5: Improve maternal health:
Disease associated with maternal health can
be reduced by the provision of clean water
and adequate sanitation.
MDG Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria
and other diseases: Large numbers of poor
people are at risk of debilitating illness
because of lack of access to safe drinking
water and basic sanitation. Diarrhoea is the
leading cause of death of children under five
in developing countries. The result is higher
levels of infant and under-five mortality
rates, lower life expectancy and higher levels
of morbidity (illness) among poor people
than among other groups (UNICEF 2006a).
At any one time, half the population of the
developing world is suffering from a water-
related illness (UNICEF 2006b). Poor health
negatively affects people’s income-earning
and capacity because they must invest a
disproportionate amount of time and other
resources in dealing with illness.
Improved sanitation reduces diarrhoea
morbidity on average by 37 percent
(UNESCO 2003) and when hygiene educa-
tion and promotion of hand washing are
included can lead to an additional reduction
of diarrhoeal diseases by an average of 43
percent (Curtis and Cairncross 2003). A
study on the health benefits of  total
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sanitation and improved water facilities in
Bangladesh reports that the positive health
impacts were considerable (AusAID 2006).
• Diarrhoea reduced by 99 percent,
dysentery by 90 percent and other
stomach-related problems (for exam-
ple, intestinal worms) by 51 percent.
• Monthly medical costs for common
illnesses decreased by 51 percent.
Working days lost due to illness fell
from 77 to 35 per year.
• School days lost due to illness fell
from 16 to seven days per year.
MDG Goal 7: Ensure environmental
sustainability: Ecosystems suffer because of
corruption. Bribes might be paid to local
officials to cover up the discharge of indus-
trial or agricultural waste, wastewater or
toxins into water resources, damming or
diversion of river water for personal use at
the expense of downstream users (flora and
fauna) or to allow for excessive abstraction
from rivers and groundwater reservoirs. The
resulting pollution, soil degradation,
destruction of ecosystems, and loss of
productive land seriously impacts water
security as well as the sustainable socio-
economic development and political stabi-
lity – with the potential for conflict over
freshwater between upriver and downriver
communities within national boundaries. In
the water sector, observers estimate that 20
to 70 percent of resources could be saved if
transparency were optimised and corrup-
tion eliminated (Water Integrity Network
2006).
An Example of Corruption in the
Water Sector
Based on research in a South Asian country,
corruption was found in the following
aspects of service delivery by a Water and
Sewerage Board:
Bulk Water Supply to various residential,
commercial and industrial units: The
quantity of water to be supplied is regulated
by gate valves. The person responsible for
controlling these valves is called ‘key-man’
or ‘line-man’. As he is the person with con-
trol over the water supply, he has supreme
power. He can open the valves for longer
durations than scheduled or open valves to
allow larger quantity of water to certain
areas at the expense of some other areas,
depending on the relations between the
people in the area and the line-man. If he
receives bribes from the people in one area
then the supply is prompt. Moreover, the
line-man can also provide an additional
connection to one’s housing, industrial or
commercial units for a bribe depending
upon the volume of supply.
In addition, in many settlements, water
is supplied by donkey carts that tap Water
and Sewerage Board water lines. They are
permitted to do this because they pay a
bribe (bhatta) to the Water and Sewerage
Board supervisory staff.
Accounts and Recoveries Department is
responsible for preparing bills for payment
either for work carried out by the contactor
or the preparation of water supply bills to
the consumers. Where water metres are not
in use, officials may intentionally issue
overpriced bills to consumers in order to
receive a bribe to correct the bill. This kind
of black mailing is rampant and only
influential people can by-pass this practice.
Purchase Department is involved in the
purchase of a range of imported heavy
machinery to minor fixtures. Taking
commissions or kickbacks in procurement
is a common a way to earn easy money.
New Water Connection Department:
Getting a water connection is often an
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intentionally complicated process, making
it much easier to obtain an illegal water
connection. For example, if the connection
application is submitted through a middle
man (an approved contactor or someone
from the department), the application will
be issued within days thus making for a
speedy water supply connection. A deal
might also be negotiated (under the table)
to provide a larger size connection at the
price of a smaller size.
Construction, Design and Civil Mainte-
nance Department: The function of the
department is to construct pumping
stations, reservoirs, underground and
overhead tanks and laying of water supply
lines. The work is executed through private
contactors for which open tenders are
invited. The work is generally awarded after
underhand negotiations and deals. Usually
25 to 30 percent of the tender amount is
taken as a bribe. Furthermore, an extra
amount of money is normally obtained by
the lead engineer by recording additional
forged measurements. Recording of forged
measurements is easier for items which are
difficult to verify such as supply of earth,
excavation, etc. This additional amount is
usually equally divided among the
contractor and the officials.
Mechanical Maintenance Department: The
replacement of components of machinery
like pumps and vehicles is a potential source
of corruption. For the purchase of compo-
nents officials invite tenders, but this is often
done in collusion with suppliers. Fake
requests for purchase are raised by the
department, but instead of supplying the
components the supplier puts in fake bills
for approval. Fake entries are made in the
stock registers. The payment to the contac-
tor is shared between the supplier and the
officials. It was reported that there is signi-
ficant corruption in the maintenance of
municipal vehicles, whereby municipal
officials produce fake bills for maintenance,
fuel, etc.
It is often assumed that community-
managed services or small independent
providers are more demand-responsive and
less corrupt than public utilities. Neverthe-
less, the high prices that low-income
BOX 7: Corruption in Water Supply
in the Philippines
Examples from the Philippines demonstrate how corruption manifests itself include:
The US $1.4 million Magdalena Water Project granted by the World Bank promised the availability
of clean and potable water for the community, the bidding process itself was highly questionable,
and worse, the people had to pay higher prices for water that experts declared unfit for drinking.
The residents and some local officials organised and set up the ‘People’s Watch for Potable Water’
and launched protest actions that resulted in them being allowed to source water from their old
system, and file graft and corruption charges against the town mayor. Still the community is left
with the burden of the loan.
Another case of the Leyte Water District (LWD) illustrates the high risks of anti-corruption
work. The local labour union filed graft and corruption charges against the general manager of
the Leyte Water District after questionable transactions were discovered, and which resulted to
an almost 300 percent increase in water prices in this poor Southern Philippine province. Two
labour union officials have since been shot dead, seen as moves to silence the union.
Source: Water Integrity Network 2006.
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BOX 8: Reform of Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply
and Sewerage Board (Metro Water)
A number of studies have documented the impact of a series of customer-focused service delivery
reforms undertaken at the Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (Metro
Water) in Hyderabad City, Andhra Pradesh state, Southern India at the end of the 1990s.
Metro Customer Care (MCC)
MCC was launched in February 1999 as a dedicated office (open 24 hours) at the Metro Water
Head Office in the city centre to receive and coordinate the response to water and seweage
complaints lodged by citizens using a specially designated telephone number (1916). After
officially registering a customer’s complaint (and issuing a complaint token number through
which they could track the redress of their complaint over time), MCC operators forward each
complaint by telephone to section managers based in the neighbourhoods where the complaints
originated. Once the complaint has been addressed section staff are required to call MCC
operators in order to clear complaints from the MCC Complaints Database. The use of
computerised application procedures limits the scope for employees to manipulate information
in an effort to extort payments from applicants.
An important innovation with regard to the MCC reform was the establishment of an online
computer-based programme, called the Complaints Redressal Efficiency (CRE), to monitor
section staff performance. This programme calculated the percentage of complaints that were
solved within the service norms outlined in Metro Water’s Citizen’s Charter. This tool transformed
the supervisory role of senior managers as they now had accurate quantitative performance data
with which they could hold section managers to account for poor complaints service delivery
performance (low CRE percent).
The Single Window Cell (SWC)
In April of 1999, the Board consolidated applications for new connections into its Single Window
Cell (SWC) and Green Brigade (plumbing installation corps – a previously corruption-prone
area) located in the Board’s headquarters. Customers now go to the SWC rather than filing an
application in their local district office, and all other aspects of the application are managed by
the Board – such as obtaining a road-cutting permit, land surveying, etc. The fee schedule for
various plot and connection sizes is published in the press and posted in the SWC office, limiting
the opportunity for staff to levy excess charges on applicants. As the process has been designed
as a one-visit endeavor, the customer rarely leaves the SWC without having received an application
token number, which is the equivalent of a receipt for acceptance of the application.
Metro Water’s Citizen’s Charter
The customer-focused reform also involved the launch (by the Chief Minister) of a Citizen’s
Charter in January 2000. This outlined measurable service delivery norms for a range of services.
Included in the Charter were the obligations of citizens, such as paying bills on time, reporting
illegal activity, and maintaining a working water metre. The publication of the Charter was
important as it publicly acknowledged Metro Water’s commitment to improving the delivery of
services for citizens throughout the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad.
Sources: Caseley 2003; Davis 2004.
households pay for water from vendors or
water kiosks attract corrupt practices. Water
kiosks owners might be cartel members that
have paid City Council officials to establish
a water connection for a water kiosk. In
Jakarta, in the 1990s, it was alleged that the
public utility was holding back on improv-
ing water supplies in the areas where the
kiosks (or hydrants) operated, for fear of
losing the side-payments that the hydrant
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operators paid to utility officials (Lovei and
Whittington 1993).
Cairncross and Kinnear (1991) report on
an Oxfam project facilitating the purchase
of donkeys and carts for water vending
among Southerners living in a squatter area
in Khartoum. The aim was to assist in
income generation, as well as to allow cer-
tain control over the price of water. How-
ever, the Southerners were effectively barred
from using the water source, which was
controlled by Northern Sudanese. Moreover,
in another area, existing vendors lobbied
(unsuccessfully) against the extension of
piped water into the area (reported in
McGranahan and Sattherthwaite 2006).
Furthermore, water tankers that should
provide water to residents of slums and
villages where there are no water pipelines
are often controlled by powerful mafias that
capitalise on the city’s inept water distri-
bution system and effectively privatised the
water supply. For example, such mafias in
Delhi sold their water to hotels, guest houses
and banquet halls and paid corrupt officials
to turn a blind eye (Marketplace 2007).
3.4 The Consequences of Corrup-
tion in Electricity Supply for
Human Development
Quality of life is greatly improved by the
availability of electricity. In South Asia, only
30 percent of the rural population has access
compared with 68 percent of the urban
population. This situation entrenches
poverty, constrains the delivery of social
services, limits opportunities for women,
and erodes environmental sustainability at
the local, national and global levels. Much
greater access to electricity is essential to
address this situation and to support the
achievement of the MDGs in terms of both
the direct impact of electricity on raising
incomes and the indirect impacts on
education, health, environment and gender
issues.
MDG Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty
and hunger: Electricity can support income
and employment generation. Poor urban
people spend a much greater share of their
household income on energy than the share
spent by higher income groups. This is
because they have smaller and less predic-
table incomes than higher income groups,
and their appliances use fuel less efficiently.
This situation applies particularly to poor
households headed by women. Kerosene
provides lighting for the urban poor at a
higher cost than electricity used by higher
income groups. The poor’s cost of acquiring
energy is increased by having to buy fuel-
wood, charcoal and kerosene in small
amounts because they lack cash resources
needed to buy these fuels in larger quan-
tities. In Bangladesh, where voltage in
distribution networks is unstable, observers
in rural villages have noticed light bulbs
lasting only a few days because of voltage
surges. A low-income rural household might
spend as much on light bulbs as on electri-
city. (A Bank-funded survey revealed that
power outages in Bangladesh cost about US
$1 billion a year and reduce GDP growth
by about half a percentage point.) (Lovei
and McKechnie 2000)
Productivity: Most economic activity is not
possible without electricity; economic
growth creates jobs and raises incomes, even
for the small and medium-scale enterprises
that are the main source of jobs for the poor.
Access to electricity increases household
incomes and reduces the burden of time-
consuming domestic labour. Electricity
supply enables poor households to engage
in activities that generate income – by
providing lighting that extends the workday,
providing telecommunications and by
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powering machines that increase output.
Energy services can help children to attend
school by boosting the productivity of adult
labour to substitute for child labour. By
boosting agricultural production and
household incomes, electricity can help
reduce the malnutrition that is such a big
factor in child mortality. The use of electri-
city in economic production can improve
social welfare, since people are more able
to afford health and other social services
when they have better paying jobs.
MDG Goal 2: Achieve universal primary
education: Electric lighting in homes
enables both adults and children to study
after their daytime activities, and thereby
increases the likelihood that women will
read and children will attend school regard-
less of their income class. Electricity supply
in schools enables the use of educational
media and communications, including
information and communication technolo-
gies. In rural areas, electricity helps retain
teachers by improving their quality of life.
MDG Goal 3: Promote gender equality
and empower women: The lack of
electricity reinforces gender inequalities.
Most of the poorest households are headed
by women. Women and girls are dispropor-
tionately burdened by lack of access to
electricity since they are responsible for fuel
gathering (firewood, charcoal and so on),
cooking and food preparation at the
expense of economic activities and studies.
Corruption aggravates these problems
further. Electricity frees women from the
physical stresses of carrying large loads of
fuel wood and from exposure to fumes from
traditional cooking stoves. Electricity for
lighting and motive power enable women
to develop productive activities that increase
their incomes. Better health, higher income
and improved literacy all help to empower
women. Women in households with electri-
city are more likely to have access to infor-
mation about gender issues from radio and
television than women in households
without electricity.
MDG Goal 4: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria
and other diseases: Lack of electricity
directly influences human health; there are
numerous instances of paraffin poisoning
of children, serious burns and respiratory
ailments in households that burn wood and
dung (the fourth leading health risk in
developing countries). This switch would
reduce the number of women and children
that die from indoor air pollution. Provid-
ing heat to boil water also reduces these
diseases – the leading cause of child morta-
lity. Electricity also has indirect health
impacts, for example by powering equip-
ment for pumping and treating water, these
services contribute to a clean water supply
which reduces the incidence of waterborne
diseases, especially in slums.
MDG Goal 5: Ensure environmental
sustainability: Electricity is generated from
depletable energy resources (coal, natural
gas, petroleum fuels and geothermal energy)
and renewable energy resources (solar, wind,
hydropower and biomass).
Corruption in the Electricity Sector
Globally US $8 billion in capital expenditure
in electricity is likely lost each year to
corruption, and losses due to electricity theft
cost the sector around US $33 billion per
year (Gulati and Rao 2007).10 A variety of
corruption exists in the electricity sector,
from illegal connections, bribing metre
readers to reduce bills or tampering with
metres, collusion in procurement to grand
corruption in the selection of projects.
Corruption in the procurement process may
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take the form of unsolicited bids, supplier’s
credits, and collusion in procurement, where
there is little or no competition among
suppliers. Even where competitive bidding
processes are used, side payments may be
made to ensure favourable bid specifica-
tions, terms, and conditions, and favourable
bid evaluations or endorsements. Side
payments may also facilitate the issuance of
work orders, the opening of letters of credit,
and all stages of project.
In Bangladesh, revenues are collected for
only 55 percent of the power generated. By
one estimate, about half the total system
losses of the Bangladesh Power Develop-
ment Board (BPDB) and Dhaka Electricity
Supply Authority (DESA) are accounted for
by mismanagement and petty corruption
surrounding electricity metering. Anecdotal
evidence from electricity consumers and
articles in the local press suggest pervasive
corruption by some power sector emp-
loyees. A recent survey by the Bangladesh
chapter of Transparency International
(Transparency International 2002) revealed
that public utility employees were regarded
as the most corrupt officials after the police
and lower judiciary. For instance, metre
readers frequently delegate the actual task
of metre reading to informal operators and
focus their own efforts on developing a
business in illegal connections. Petty
corruption in Bangladesh is often well
organised – trade unions protect corrupt
workers, and politicians protect the unions.
There are also instances of grand corrup-
tion in the electricity sector in the region.
A power purchase agreement was negotiated
for an Enron project (Dabhol power com-
pany) in the state of Maharashtra, India.
After the agreement drew widespread
protests and litigation, it was renegotiated
by the successor government, which was
headed by a different political party that was
highly critical of the original PPA. During
litigation over the project, the High Court
of the state of Maharashtra observed that
the state committee involved in the renego-
tiation ‘forgot all about competitive bidding
and transparency’. The annual cost of this
project to the state was competed at Rs 60
billion (US $1.3 billion). A settlement was
reached among Indian financial institutions,
offshore lenders, and foreign investors, and
claims of foreign investors settled. The plant
was turned over by a consortium of govern-
ment-owned companies, but it continues to
remain idle because of the high cost of
generation (Gulati and Rao 2007).
Large power sector losses due to theft
have been a major cause of the bankruptcy
of Indian state electricity boards. These
losses mean that little funding is left for
expansion of networks to improve access –
in South Asia less than half of households
have electricity service. The beneficiaries of
the subsidies are the relatively affluent
households that have electricity service. The
poor lose from the budget subsidies to the
power sector in two ways: lower rates of
economic growth and less social expendi-
ture from which they would benefit directly.
Since the 1990s, the private sector has taken
on the provision of electricity as well as
water services in Asia. Often, this is part of
economic reforms that equate the entry of
the private sector and competition with
efficiency and a way to put an end to the
huge financial losses of state electricity
enterprises.
A Transparency International India
(2005) report on corruption in India found:
• Nearly three-fifths of households
claimed to have interacted with their
respective power utilities in the past
year. Interaction was higher in urban
households (70 percent) than in rural
households (55 percent).
• More than 12 percent of households
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in the country claimed to have paid
bribes to obtain services in the past
year.
• 65 percent of those who sought a
service perceived that the utility was
corrupt.
• Even private utilities are perceived as
corrupt. Nearly three-fifths of the
households are served by private
power utilities think their respective
utilities are corrupt.
• Nearly half (49 percent) of those who
interacted with the utility felt that the
corruption in the utility had
increased in the past year.
• More than one-fourth (27 percent) of
those who had approached the utility
had adopted means like paying
bribes, using influence and approach-
ing middlemen.
• More than one-third (35 percent) of
those who had claimed to have paid
a bribe had paid money to linemen,
while one-fourth (25 percent) had
paid money to an agent or middle-
men.
An Example of Corruption in the
Electricity Sector
Based on research in a South Asian country,
corruption was found in the following
aspects of service delivery by an anonymous
Electric Supply Corporation:
The process of obtaining a Permanent
Light Connection from the company is
described as follows:
1. Application is submitted to Electric
Supply Corporation through an
approved contractor and copies of
documents like site plan of the plot,
approved plan of the building,
National Identity Card of the plot
owner, lease of the plot, sale deed for
the plot are submitted to the Plan-
ning Department along with agree-
ment to self-finance the connection.
The owner has to pay for a connec-
tion. For a medium size residential
complex the developer has to
undertake an amount of approxi-
mately US $833 equivalent.
2. Load Regularization Agreement
(LRA) is issued by the Planning
Department in favour of the land
owner.
3. LRA sent to Chief Engineer of the
Electric Supply Corporation for
approval. Typically, a bribe of US
$3333 equivalent is paid to the Chief
Engineer for the approval of LRA.
4. Approved LRA is then sent back to
the Planning Department.
5. Supplementary Estimate Require-
ment is prepared by the Planning
Department. At this stage another
bribe of US $2500 equivalent is paid
to the Planning Department.
6. Estimate is given to the approved
contractor for payment of official
charges.
7. Estimate is paid through an approved
bank.
8. The payment receipt is submitted to
the Planning Department and the
application along with other docu-
ments in a file is transferred to the
Underground Department. A bribe of
US $833 equivalent is paid at this
stage for transfer of the file to the
Planning Department.
9. A list of material required is prepared
by the Underground Department
according to supplementary estimate
requirement. Normally the official
material cost is around US $11667
(Table 11) equivalent but if proper
payment is not made the material list
is prepared in such a fashion that the
owner ends up paying several times
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TABLE 11: Proportionate Distribution of Legal and Illegal Money for
Obtaining a Regular Connection
Activity Official Fee Bribe (US $
(US $ equivalent) equivalent)
Application submitted to Planning None 50
Department Electric Supply Corporation
through an approved contractor.
Load Regularisation Agreement (LRA) None 83
issued by Planning Department.
LRA sent to Chief Engineer for approval. None 3,333
Approved LRA sent back to Planning None None
Department.
Supplementary Estimate Requirement None 2,500
prepared by Planning Department.
Estimate is given to the approved con- None 17
tractor for payment of official charges.
Estimate is paid through an approved 11,667 None
bank for the purchase of material.
File transferred to the Underground None 833
Department.
Material list prepared by the Under- None 833
ground Department.
Electric Supply Corporation approved 5,000 None
contractor fee paid.
Final estimate prepared by the Under- None 417
ground Department.
Security money per metre deposited Single-phase Three-phase None
through an approved bank. Residen- Commer- Residen- Commer
tial cial tial cial
33 58 83 167
Another Test Form obtained from 8 25
Government Electric Inspector.
Electrical contractor install metres. None None
Metres connected to pole mounted None
transformer by the Operations Depart-
ment of Electric Supply Corporation.
Single-phase Three-phase
Residen- Commer- Residen- Commer-
tial cial tial cial
Total official cost 16,708 16,733 16,750 16,842 11,425
Total cost with bribe 28,133 28,158 28,175 28,267
Source: Sohail 2007.
more than the required amount and
procure excessive material.
10. Electric Supply Corporation approved
contractor charge an official fee of US
$5000 equivalent for installation of
material at the site.
11. A final estimate is prepared by the
Underground Department.
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BOX 9: Corruption in the Power Sector in South Asia
According to a survey by Transparency International (2002) in South Asia more than 60 percent
of the users report irregular connection processes. Direct payment to office staff was quoted
across the region as the most common irregular practice. Bribes paid to get a proper supply and
over-billing emerged as other common forms of corruption. Metre readers and linesmen were
identified as the key facilitators of corruption. Direct extortion was the most reported type of
corrupt interaction. A lack of accountability was cited as the key perceived reason for corruption.
Almost every second respondent in Bangladesh cited monopoly power as the main cause of
corruption.
In Sri Lanka securing an electricity connection through irregular channels was found to be
very common (63 percent); most of these connections were made by paying bribes to the office
staff. A similarly high number of respondents (63 percent) reported encountering corruption in
regular interaction with the power department, with 42 percent of the victims paying bribes to
ensure proper power supply. Repairmen and department officials were identified as the key
facilitators of corruption in the power sector. An equal number (33 percent) of cases of extortion
and voluntary bribery was reported. Monopoly power and low salaries were cited as the major
factors contributing to corruption in the power sector.
In Pakistan a very high percentage (65 percent) of users with access to electricity reported
irregular processes in acquiring it; a much higher percentage reported corruption in regular
interaction with the department (96 percent). Metre readers and billing employees were identified
as the key facilitators; extortion was reported by 72 percent of the victims. A lack of accountability
and low salaries of employees were identified as major contributory factors.
In Nepal about a quarter of respondents with access to electricity reported getting connections
through irregular means. Interestingly, the percentage reporting corruption in their regular
interaction with the power service was quite low at 12 percent. Paying extra for an
uninterrupted supply of electricity and bribes to correct over-billing were the most common
forms of corruption. Linesmen were cited most often as the main facilitators of corruption,
followed by metre readers.
In India improper supply of electricity’ and ‘payment of excessive bill’ were the key forms of
corruption faced by users of the power sector. About 50 percent respondents who had interacted
with the power sector in the past year had to pay bribes to office staff. Of these, money was
directly demanded in 67 percent of cases. The key facilitators in corruption in this sector were
linesmen (37 percent) and officers (24 percent).
In Bangladesh more than one-third of the total users of the public power utility report
irregularities in accessing the services; the percentage was significantly higher in rural areas (45
percent) than in urban areas (23 percent). Of those respondents reporting irregularities in getting
energy connections, almost all of them report that they paid bribes. A third of regular users
report corruption in their dealings with the department. Metre readers (26 percent) and
department officers are identified as the major facilitators of corruption. Almost 80 percent of
the victims of corruption cite extortion as the main form of graft. Lack of accountability (57
percent) and a monopoly power (47 percent) are identified as the key factors contributing to
corruption in the power sector.
Source: Transparency International 2002.
12. Security money of US $33 equivalent
per meter for residential unit and US
$58 equivalent per meter for com-
mercial unit like shops, offices etc. is
then deposited through an approved
bank – this is the official fee.
13. Another Test Form is obtained from
the Government Electric Inspector,
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BOX 11: Corruption Jacking Up Electricity Cost
An ADB study found that ‘deeply rooted’ corruption is increasing costs of power projects in the
Philippines, delaying their implementation and providing Filipino households and businesses
with expensive but unreliable electricity services. The ADB study said corruption was contributing
directly to higher costs of electricity. It noted that household electricity rates in the Philippines
were two to three times more expensive than in most other countries. It said corruption was
involved in almost all phases of a project, from tendering and bidding to operation and
maintenance as well as privatisation and awarding of independent power producing contracts.
The bank said business and residential customers, particularly the poor, should not pay for
corruption through higher electricity rates and taxes.
The efforts to circumvent procedures designed to prevent corruption by some individuals
within executing agencies, financing agencies, government and contractors also lead to project
delays, the study added. The relatively low conviction rates in corruption cases in the Philippines
provide little deterrence to potential offenders, the study said.
Source: Dumlao 2005.
BOX 10: Electricity Connections in Bangladesh
Getting an electricity connection from the Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) and
Dhaka Electricity Supply Authority (DESA) is a very difficult process, involving hassles, delays
and, for the average consumer, bribery. The application form for a service connection asks for
details of property ownership, lease deeds, and, for industrial connections clearance certificates
from the fire department and the Health Division are required. It is easy to find faults in the
dozen or so attachments, unless the appropriate palms are greased. Six signatures of various
BPDB officials are required for the approval (shortened from the previous 30), while the time
involved for moving the case from one office to another is inversely related to the amount of
gratification paid.
A new domestic consumer may pay between Taka 5,000 to 10,000, but a commercial or
industrial connection would cost a lot more. For example, a small factory requiring a bulk low-
tension connection of 45 KW capacity could easily spend Tk 50,000 or more. For small and
medium enterprises, a connection ‘surcharge’ of Tk 1,000 per KW is the norm. Bangladesh Power
Development Board (BPDB) and Dhaka Electricity Supply Authority (DESA) employees offer
their services for arranging new connections, thereby avoiding the hassle of doing the complete
desk round. Very large high tension consumers have a much easier time of it, as they generally
are generally more influential.
Apart from metre readers, supervisors, ledger keepers and other positions connected with
billing and consumer accounting, many Assistant Engineers and some high level officers are
involved-making supervision impossible.
On the consumer side, people across the economic spectrum are said to be involved in
dishonest practices. The number of illegal connections is enormous. Although no one knows
the actual figure, it could be as high as 300,000. Theft also takes place by way of tapping
distribution lines, bypassing metres, ‘fixing’ the metres, and misusing free electricity supply for
BPDB employees. High-tension consumers, particularly some textile mills, jute mills and chemical
plants, often remove the fuses from instrument transformers in order to disable the energy metres.
Source: Transparency International Bangladesh n.d.
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MDG Goal 2: Achieve universal primary
education: Gender differences are of parti-
cular importance with regard to sanitation
initiatives. Simple measures, such as
providing schools with water and latrines,
and promoting hygiene education in the
classroom, can enable girls to get an educa-
tion, especially after they reach puberty, and
reduce health-related risks for all. For
example, in Bangladesh, a school sanitation
and hygiene education programme incre-
ased girls’ attendance rates by 11 percent
(Sen 2000). Health gains from sanitation
enhance attendance and achievement in
schools.
MDG Goal 3: Promote gender equality
and empower women: Household
sanitation protects women and girls from
the risks of sexual harassment and assault
otherwise faced when going beyond the
household after nightfall. Access to
sanitation for female householders brings
time-savings, reduced healthcare costs and
care-giving to other household members
(especially children), allowing time to be
spent on alternative activities. Involvement
in sanitation projects can bring greater self-
esteem and status for women within their
homes and communities.
MDG Goal 4: Reduce child mortality:
Sanitation together with hygiene (in the
form of hand washing) can reduce the two
main causes of death for children, acute
respiratory infections and diarrhoea. Reduc-
tions in worm infections can help in
mitigating cases of extreme malnutrition.
MDG Goal 5: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria
and other diseases: Lack of  adequate
sanitation and hygiene exposes people with
HIV/AIDS to increased risk of infection.
Poor sanitation increases the risk of malaria.
and a total amount of US $33 equiva-
lent is charged for issuance of Test
Form – the official fee is US $8
equivalent and a bribe of US $25
equivalent.
14. Once work is completed by the
electrical contractor and all meters
are installed, they are connected to a
near by pole mounted transformer
(PMT) by the Operations Depart-
ment of Electric Supply Corporation.
This is called ‘energizing of line’ – a
bribe of US $3333 equivalent is paid
to the Operations Department team
for this.
The time it takes to get a connection
depends upon the area and the availability
of the load, although once the bribe is paid
it takes approximately 30 to 45 days to
receive the connection provided there are no
other problems with the application papers.
Without a bribe or good contacts it is
impossible to obtain a connection.
3.5 The Consequences of
Corruption in Sanitation for
Human Development
Of the 2.6 billion people worldwide without
adequate sanitation, two billion live in the
Asia-Pacific region. Most of the people with
poor sanitation – 1.5 billion – live in China
and India. Corruption in sanitation has
huge health and hygiene implications and
adds to cost of healthcare by increasing
infectious disease loads, more so among the
poor who are not well-nourished.
MDG Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty
and hunger: Health gains from sanitation
reduce individual healthcare costs and lost
earnings related to poor health. In addition,
reduced worm infections and diarrhoeal
disease enable improved nutritional status.
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BOX 12: Combating Corruption in Sanitation
In sanitation programmes in general, there are several points where funds and resources can be
diverted for personal gain. Corruption and dishonesty can be seen when: Undeserving people
benefit from subsidies; over-charging for construction, which stops poorer families from getting
good quality toilets; poor construction and inferior materials (e.g. incomplete pits are built or
cement contains too much sand); funds and materials are diverted from sanitation for other,
unrelated purposes. It is estimated that 20 to 30 percent of funds and materials are diverted
from sanitation programmes due to corruption and dishonesty.
In 2003 in India the Socio-Economic Units Foundation (SEUF), a non-profit organisation
in the state of Kerala in southern India, worked together with the local government to carry out
a sanitation programme serving poor families. SEUF’s sanitation programme used the following
strategies to prevent corruption:
• Ensuring access to information and knowledge for households and local govern-ments.
• Monitoring or extra checks by different groups such as water/sanitation committees,
women’s groups, youth groups as well as the households and local government.
• Action should be taken at the lowest level possible, with provision for upward referral of
complaints until action is taken; participation and capacity building for all stakeholders.
The programme used different ways to control spending such as joint bank accounts;
independent audits; double signatures on receipts (the person giving and taking funds); tenders
(three tenders required with public and open selection); and surprise spot checks of suppliers.
Monitoring and mapping exercises need cross-checking to ensure validity and to stop the
flow of subsidies to ineligible households. This experience showed that triangulation is essential
in ensuring the honest allocation of subsidies. Overall, up to 20 percent could be saved on
construction costs in comparison to other programmes while improving quality of sanitation
facilities.
Source: Water Integrity Network 2006.
Improving water and sanitation would
reduce costs of water and hygiene-related
illnesses, therefore, making available addi-
tional resources to treat other diseases.
MDG Goal 6: Ensure environmental
sustainability: The pollution of surface
water also has environmental implications
by sewage include eutrophication and
oxygen depletion with potentially severe
impacts on the whole eco-system and the
subsequent contamination of water sources.
Sustainable treatment of human waste is
critical to improving environmental
management, especially in areas of dense
population.
Corruption in the Sanitation Sector
Corruption in the sanitation sector is not
well understood and is poorly documented.
The lack of sanitation in the Asia-Pacific
region may be a consequence of corruption,
i.e. a result of biased policy and budgetary
decision-making in the allocation of
resources away from the poor and to invest-
ment in large capital-intensive infrastruc-
ture (such as sewerage networks in high
income neighbourhoods rather than
ventilation improved pit latrines in slums).
According to Crook and Ayee (2003), in
Ghana public toilets became, in effect,
politically protected business opportunities
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which, like taxis or bars in other cities, were
given out as political favours. The authors
found that a ‘household toilets’ policy was
shelved because of the interest of the city
government in using public toilets as
revenue-raising (and hence patronage)
devices, which also suited the interests of
those who benefited from a policy of private
franchising of toilet management. The
revenues generated by public toilets were
siphoned off by politicians who either
owned or protected them, in order to buy
the support of crucial opinion leaders and
community ‘vote-brokers’. The provision of
reasonable sanitation facilities may require:
full public provision of basic infrastructure;
transparent, independent and rigorous
regulation of any contracts for service
provision given to non-state agencies; and
the enforcement of ‘conflict of interest’ laws
applying to elected local representatives.
4. ANTI-CORRUPTION
MEASURES
Davis (2004) identifies two elements
common to all of the successful anti-
corruption strategies encountered:
• Changes that increased accountability.
• Changes that increase the moral cost of
misconduct (or the benefits of good
conduct).
Governments, private sector and CSOs in
the region have all developed a number of
mechanisms for combating corruption. In
particular, public pressure to combat
corruption has been built from the grass-
roots and civil society groups play an
important role in supporting efforts to
create public awareness to not tolerate
corrupt practices. Such preventative efforts
against corruption are generally more
sustainable than corrective action.
4.1 Best Practices in the Region
Internationally, a number of trends have
become apparent in cross-sectoral efforts to
combat corruption (Table 12). These
mechanisms include vertical style arrange-
ments such as elections, civil society activity,
the media, public meetings, and formal
grievances procedures and horizon-
tal style arrangements characterised by ‘the
capacity of state institutions to check abuses
by other public agencies and branches of
government (O’Donnel 1999) such as
reporting systems. More recently, citizens
have also been involved directly in the
workings of horizontal accountability insti-
tutions, for example through, participatory
auditing, participatory evaluation of public
spending such as Women’s Budgets, or
citizens’ juries on public policy (Goetz and
Jenkins 2001). In addition, there are now
increased opportunities for citizens to call
providers directly to account, for example,
through choice, competition and freedom
of information, information technology, and
user accountability, the ability of users of
services to make demands on services.
Some countries like India, Indonesia, and
Pakistan use ‘integrity pacts’ to protect
procurement processes from corruption. All
potential suppliers that bid for a contract
have to sign such pacts with the procuring
agency; both parties pledge to refrain from
any form of corrupt practice and to establish
an external monitoring system. The pacts
may call for deposits and sanctions that
apply in case of a breach of the provisions.
Indonesia requires the use of integrity pacts
in all government procurement, while
Pakistan’s national procurement framework
requires the use of integrity pacts for public
purchases worth more than Rs 10 million
(about US $170,000). An example of the
Integrity Pact in use is the Greater Karachi
Water Supply Scheme (KIII Project) project.
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TABLE 12: Trends in Controlling Corruption
Economic Measures
Liberalisation of markets
Privatisations/de-monopolisation of public services
Tax reform
Supervisory institutions
Stringent aid conditionality
Better financial management
Administrative reform
Civil service reform
Clear rules, laws and processes
Reducing public sector size
Transparent administrative procedures
Reducing discretionary powers
Abolish unnecessary procedures/licences
Competition into civil service
Public sector wages
Meritocratic recruitment and promotion
Legislation, oversight and auditing on public
procurement
Oversight bodies and offices, i.e. Ombudsman
Anti-corruption agencies (for example, Hong Kong,
China (SAR) and Singapore)
Incentives to perform
Political reforms
Decentralisation
Supporting elections
Privatising government functions
Centralise political authority
Increase auditing capacity by higher levels of
government
Political will
New public management
Institution building
Good governance
Evidence
Treisman (2000); Kaufmann (1998); OECD (1999)
Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003)
Kaufmann (1998); Johnson (1997); Tirole (1996)
Shihata (1997)
Lanyi (2004); Azfar and Gurgur (2004); Meagher
(2004)
Francis (2003); Reinikka and Svensson (2004);
Rivera-Batiz (2002)
Rose-Ackerman (1997); Colazingari and Rose-
Ackerman (1998)
Pope (2000); Ruud (1998); Ruzindana et al. (1998)
Tanzi and Davoodi (1998); Elliot (1997)
Avgerou and Walsham (2000); Heeks (1998);
Wallace (2000)
Schleifer and Vishny (1993); Kaufmann et al. (2000)
Rose-Ackerman (1978)
Bliss and di Tella (1997); Clarke and Lixin (2002)
Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001); Di Tella and
Schargrodsky (2000)
Das (1998); Evans and Rausch (1995)
Kang (2000); Kelman (2002)
Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996); Bowles (2000)
Quah (2001); Weder and Brunetti (2000); Wescott
(2003)
Muir and Saba (1995); Ostrom et al. (1993); Goulet
(1989)
Huther and Shah (2001); Ostrom et al. (1993);
UNCHS (2001)
Rose-Ackerman (1978); Persson et al. (2003)
Leiken (1996-1997); Kaufmann and Siegelbaum
(1995)
Holbrook and Meier (1993)
Klitgaard (1988)
DiIulio et al. (1993)
Hood (1991); Rausch and Evans (2000); Jabbra and
Dwivedi (1989)
Bardhan (1997); Nugent and Robinson (2002); Tanzi
(1998)
Esfahani and Ramirez (2003); Fisman and Gatti
(2002)
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Economic Measures
Reduce monopoly in the provision of public
services
Legal and judiciary measures
National anti-corruption action plans
Law enforcement capacity strengthened
Criminalisation of payment of bribes
Streamlining laws
Judicial independence
Information Technology
Automation
e-government
Investigation and monitoring
Direct democracy methods
Participatory budgets and spending reviews
Co-production of service delivery
Direct democracy and citizen participation
Taking measures to increase public debate and
transparency, especially in the media
Empirical backing for increased accountability
Socio-cultural
Strengthen ethical codes
Strict sanctions
Increase risk of being caught
Change culture of public tolerance of corruption
Public’s awareness of rights to services and
knowledge on how to report corruption
Source: Adapted from Haarhuis 2000.
Evidence
Acemoglu and Verdier (2000); Broadman and
Recanatini (2000); Clarke and Lixin (2002)
Ruzindana et al. (1998); Stapenhurst and Kpundeh
(1999)
Becker (1983); Becker and Stigler (1974)
Svensson (2003); Heimann (1995)
Rose-Ackerman (1999)
Rose-Ackerman (1978); Ades and di Tella (1997)
Hafkin (2000); Heeks (2001)
Bellamy and Taylor (1998); Raab (1998)
Reinikka and Svensson (2004); Korac-Kakabadse et
al. (1999)
Abers (1998); Devas (2001); Goetz and Jenkins
(2001)
Ostrom (1996); Tendler (1997)
Schilderman (2002)
Avgerou and Walsham (2000); Benjamin (1998)
Hafkin (2000)
Ebrahim (2003); Feld and Voigt (2003); Batra et al.
(2003)
Paldam (2001); Miller et al. (2002); Lambsdorff
(2002); Halpern (2001)
Holbrook and Meier (1993); Quah (1999); Rose-
Ackerman (1978);
Kaufmann et al. (2000); Rose-Ackerman (1978);
Klitgaard (1988)
Paldam (2001); Getz and Volkema (2001); Heilman
et al. (2000); Halpern (2001)
Paul (2002); Alam (1995)
An integrity pact, with a formal no-bribery
commitment, was signed by KWSB,
consultant bidders and TI Pakistan. It
resulted in a successful bid of Rs 62 million
(US $1.04 m) against the reserved fees of
Rs 249 m (US $4.2 m). The project adopted
the least costly selection method. The
bidding process was monitored by
Transparency International Pakistan to
ensure it is clean and transparent. In the
event of a breach of the Integrity Pact,
sanctions come into force against the
bidders and officials, including liability for
damages, and blacklisting from future
tenders. The procurement process is to be
followed by monitoring of the contract by
civil society, specifically TI Pakistan. In
Indonesia, an IP in local government, the
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BOX 14: Slum Networking Project (SNP)
in Ahmedabad
The Slum Networking Project (SNP) in Ahmedabad involves a partnership between the Municipal
Corporation (AMC) and three partner non-governmental organisations (NGOs), one of whom
acts as a financial intermediary between community members and the AMC, holding the
community’s financial contributions until all construction work is satisfactorily completed by
the contractor. Staff of the NGOs have trained community leaders on how to measure and weigh
pipes, how to evaluate the quality of masonry work, and how to document and report any
problems they discover during construction.
Contractors who have worked with the SNP said that they have far fewer oppor-
tunities to ‘fudge’ construction work as compared to typical contracts with the Municipal
Corporation. ‘The community have been told to watch us’, one foreman explained. In short, a
cadre of monitors has been established in neighbourhoods where the Slum Networking
Programme has been initiated. Assuming sufficient skills between community members and/or
NGO advocates, this strategy is likely to be more workable than that of ‘independent technical
audits’ of projects. In Ahmedabad, contractors reported that they are not expected to pay the
standard kickbacks to technical staff for SNP contracts because ‘everyone knows we cannot get
that money back from the project’. The reduction of kickbacks in Ahmedabad is not only a result
of the intense monitoring of contractors, SNP staff report that exposure to NGO staff and
community members has strengthened their commitment to supplying poor households with
network services.
Source: Davis 2004.
BOX 13: The Partnership for Transparency Fund
The Partnership for Transparency Fund (PTF), is primarily focused on supporting civil society
engagement in national anti-corruption and good governance projects. The PTF makes micro-
grants of US $25,000 or less to CSOs engaged in specific projects, such as monitoring public
procurement or government service delivery, media campaigns, preparation of legislation,
whistleblower protection, promotion of freedom-of-information and other activities to enhance
transparency and integrity in public service. Examples of PTF grants to the Asia and Pacific
region include:
• The Centre for Social Development (CSD), a leading local NGO in Cambodia, was funded to
develop anti-corruption legislation and an anti-corruption strategy.
• Transparency International India (TIN) undertook an advocacy programme with Delhi
Government on Citizens Charters as an instrument for reducing corruption in public
administration.
• The CSO Environmental Cooperation and Linkages, Inc. (ECOLINK) implemented a project
in Oroquieta City, the Philippines aimed at addressing corrupt and inefficient practices in
the procurement, use and maintenance of government vehicles.
• Forum Against Corruption and Turmoil Nepal (FACT Nepal) received a grant to broadcast a
local radio programme on anti-corruption and good governance for an hour every Friday.
The name of the programme was Hamro Chaso (our concern).
Source: http://www.partnershipfortransparency.info/.
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BOX 15: Bangladesh Rural Electrification and
Renewable Energy Project
In Bangladesh a bank-financed project is supporting the work of the Rural Electrification Board
and its rural electric cooperatives (Pally Bidyut Samities or PBS) to expand electricity services in
rural areas. The REB and the PBS have protected themselves from corrupt practices commonly
seen in other power sector utilities through a number of innovative arrangements:
• Administrative arrangements – the Board of each PBS is selected by consumers. This Board
and REB management approve the salary structure for the PBS, which is usually market-
based (de-linked from the government salary scale). Because metre reading is a common
source of corruption, metre readers are hired on contracts of only one year. With a good
performance record, the contract may be extended, but it can never exceed three years-after
which the metre reader will have to seek a different career. A good performance record as a
metre reader can lead to a linesman or other job with a PBS, and this job expectation is a
good incentive to maintain a good track record as a metre reader.
• Operational arrangements – every year the management of each PBS negotiates a results
agreement with REB. This is known as a Performance Target Agreement (PTA). If a PBS
meets the PTA, its management receives a bonus. Not meeting the PTA target results in
penalties. A standard PTA has about 20 targets, with high weights given to system loss,
collection efficiency, revenue per kilometre of line, cost of supply per kilometre of line and
debt repayment.
• Investment Decisions – PBSs use independent consulting forms to survey rural areas to identify
potential consumers and to design the electricity distribution network. These firms also
calculate the revenue that is expected to be generated by each proposed line and the lines
generating the highest revenue are selected first for construction. The list of lines to be
constructed next year is disclosed to the public on the notice board of each PBS. These practices
reduce the risk of corruption and nepotism in investment decisions and help PBSs to avoid
constricting uneconomical lines.
Cooperatives have developed management practices to reduce theft, such as not allowing
staff to be metre readers for more than three years and staffing billing departments with women,
who have a better reputation for integrity in these jobs than men do. Empowering the poor to
demand better service has seldom been tried in the power sector, yet holds promise for the
future. Bangladesh has also awarded independent power producer contracts through transparent
international competitive bidding based on the price of electricity supplied. This has resulted in
prices of less than US $0.03 a kilowatt per hour, roughly half the price of directly negotiated
deals in such countries as Indonesia and Pakistan (Lovei and McKechnie 2000).
Source: World Bank 2006a.
District of Kabupaten Solok was designed
between three actors: the public (not only
officials involved in contracting, but all civil
servants under the jurisdiction of the
Kabupaten government) and the private
sectors as well as civil society. Thus, it is
more comprehensive than the traditional IP.
In addition to applying criminal and disci-
plinary sanctions in case of a violation of
rules, civil servants can be punished for
absence during working hours.
In Andhra Pradesh, India, revenue losses
of 38 percent due to theft and inefficiency
prompted authorities to establish special
courts to punish electricity theft and to
install millions of new metres for customers.
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BOX 16: Kecamatan Development Programme, Indonesia
Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Programme provides block grants to eligible sub-district
governments, which in turn, use the funds to finance proposals from their villages for small
scale public goods infrastructure (such as roads, well, bridges) and for economic activities. It
was scaled up from a successful pilot of 40 villages in 1998 to tens of thousands in 2005, and
became the largest network of community-driven development projects in the world. Its approach
to combating corruption is two-pronged. First, it aims to change the conditions that breed
corruption in villages by breaking existing monopolies over information, resources, and access
to justice. Second, it aims to prevent corruption in the project itself by skewing the incentives of
the project structure against corrupt behaviour.
At the heart of KDP’s anti-corruption approach is the principle that villagers themselves
have decision-making power over planning, procurement and management of funds. Some of
the concrete measures of its approach include:
• Simplifying financial formats so that they can be understood easily by villagers.
• Transferring funds directly into collective village bank accounts.
• Insisting that all financial transactions have at least three signatures and that at least three
quotations are found for the procurement of goods, to be shared publicly at village
meetings.
• Insisting that details of all financial transactions are posted on village notice-boards.
• Requiring that regular village meetings are held to account for project funds at which
villagers have the right to suspend further disbursements of funds if irregularities are
found.
• Providing village-level sources of information and channels for complaints independent
of local government.
• Intensive field-level supervision by elected village facilitators and sub-district level project
facilitators.
• Independent monitoring of the project by NGOs and local journalists.
The elements of the project most effective in limiting corruption are transparency, community
participation, and the provision of independent channels for resolving complaints.
The World Bank-funded Kecamatan Development Programme (KDP) in Indonesia, (which
supports village-level community-based infrastructure) utilises a ‘corruption map’. This mapping
tool walks through the project cycle, considering the design, implementation and monitoring
stages, and setting out the incentives of actors, the forms of corrupt behaviour and the risks
associated with each potential leakage. This map is then used for the project to develop specific
responses to each medium to high-level risk, and later for facilitators to structure their oversight
of the various processes. The mapping process has been critical in establishing transparency and
empowering communities to monitor implementation (and ongoing operation and maintenance)
at the project level.
Recent research has demonstrated that infrastructure built through the programme is
substantially less affected by corruption than the more traditional service delivery
arrangements. The best results were achieved where the allocation of resources by sub-
district governments was subject to professional scrutiny from above (through audits ordered
by higher level government officials) and public scrutiny from below (through village level
organisations).
Source: Plummer and Cross 2007.
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BOX 17: The Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority (PPWSA)
The Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority (PPWSA) experience has been heralded as exemplary
in Asia and the Pacific. The PPWSA is the largest water supply utility in Cambodia serving the
Phnom Penh metropolitan water. The Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority has improved hugely
over the last decade. Coverage has gone up from 25 to 90 percent over the past 10 years. The
number of household connections for the poorest people in the city has risen from 100 in 1999
to over 13,000 in 2006. There are a number of elements to Phnom Penh’s reforms, including:
• Transparency and autonomy from government.
• Developing the organisation’s workforce, e.g. giving more responsibility to higher
management, promoting promising staff, giving higher salary and incentives to staff, fostering
the spirit of teamwork, management team remuneration based on incentives on financial
performance, collection rates, and reduction of unaccounted for water.
• Increasing water tariffs to cover maintenance and operating costs, whilst subsidising
connection fees and bills for the poorest people.
• Minimising illegal connections and unaccounted for water, e.g. setting up inspection teams
to stop illegal connections, penalising those with illegal connections, giving incentives to the
public to report illegal connections, etc.
• Improving collection levels, e.g. installing metres for all connections, computerising the billing
system, updating its consumer base, confronting high ranking non-payers and cutting off
their water if they refuse to pay, automated accounting and management information system,
etc.
• Rehabilitating the whole distribution network and treatment plants, e.g. hiring locals instead
of international consultants for the job, manually looking for the pipes as all blueprints were
destroyed during the civil war, mobilising the communities to report leaks, etc.
• Good customer service such as a free-phone number and a 24-hour repair team for water
leakages.
All stages of PPWSAs reform were accompanied by capacity building efforts, including a
twinning arrangement with Brisbane City Enterprises, regulatory training for government
officials, and seminars on water sector reform.
Most of the illegal connections in the past were linked to PPWSA employees; they were installing
illegal connections at US $1,000 per connection. The public were encouraged to report illegal
connections, and a discipline committee was set up to investigate cases involving PPWSA staff.
Any staff associated with illegal connections was removed or punished immediately. In addition,
automated billing and collection system to replace often corrupt bill collectors. More importantly,
where PPWSA staff used to cause problems, they are now a major part of the solution.
Source: ADB 2006.
As a result, 2.25 million unauthorised
users were brought into the billing
records, collection dues reached 98 percent,
and a large number of electricity thieves
were successfully prosecuted (Newbery
2006).
Instead of waiting for citizens to
approach local government with their
concerns, the Seoul Metropolitan Govern-
ment took the initiative and approached
citizens directly. It is important to process
reports promptly and notify the result of the
investigation to the public accurately and
fairly. Public information campaigns
are essential for the initiative to be suc-
cessful.
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The IFIs have a key role in combating
corruption in the region. The IMF addresses
corruption issues in its policy advice,
surveillance activities and technical assis-
tance, and in the conditionality attached to
its programmes, as in the Republic of Korea,
Thailand, and Indonesia. In this respect,
financial assistance could be suspended or
withheld unless corrective measures are
taken. The World Bank’s anti-corruption
work consists of four pillars:
1. Prevention of corruption in World
Bank projects.
2. Helping countries that request assis-
tance from the World Bank to curb
corruption at the national level (for
example, the World Bank helped
Papua New Guinea to create the
Independent Commission Against
Corruption).
3. Integrating anticorruption concerns
in the World Bank’s country assis-
tance strategies (Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Thailand are among
the countries in the region where
current assistance strategies specifi-
cally mention anti-corruption as
objectives of the World Bank’s assis-
tance).
4. Supporting international efforts such
as the OECD anti-bribery convention
and other initiatives.
In the Philippines, USAID’s work focuses
on policy and regulatory reforms to reduce
the scope for discretionary decisions on the
part of officials in areas where corruption
incentives have traditionally been strong:
(i) abuses in public procurements; (ii) un-
fair taxation and customs; (iii) inefficient
regulation of key infrastructure and general
business; (iv) non-functioning and incom-
petent judiciary; and (v) contested local
elections.
4.2 Accountability for Water,
Sanitation and Electricity
By way of general definition, Schedler et al.
(1999) state ‘A is accountable to B when A
is obliged to inform B about A’s (past or
future) actions and decisions, to justify them
and to suffer punishment in the case of
eventual misconduct’. Accountability has
two elements: answerability (making power
holders explain their actions) and enforce-
ability (punishing poor performance).
Jabbra and Dwivedi (1989) present a
number of themes in the study of account-
ability. These are:
• Organisational or administrative
accountability: hierarchical relation-
ships of reporting between bureau-
cracy and politicians, and internal
reporting.
• Legal accountability: legislative and
judicial checks on politicians and
officials.
• Professional accountability: profes-
sional codes of conduct.
• Political accountability: enforced by
legislature, competitive political
parties and elections.
• Moral accountability: moral and
ethical principles in accordance with
prevailing societal norms and
behaviour.
Accountability has also been analysed in
terms of ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ (Hirschman 1970).
Public sector users can show their approval
of services through voice (protest) or exit
(by finding alternative sources of supply).
Voice can work through both formal and
informal institutional channels. Formal
channels include the electoral process, which
provides an established mechanism by
which to evaluate and re-elect public
officials. Informal channels include social,
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cultural and religious associations as well as
the media through which citizens form and
express public opinion. In particular, voice
can play a role in motivating public officials
to work for the poor, to improve delivery
of public services and to be user-oriented
among others. The literature suggests a
negative association between voice and
corruption – the higher voter turnout and
the higher civic participation, the lower the
levels of corruption and the greater the
effectiveness of public service delivery
(Putnam 1993; Crook and Manor 1998).
The World Development Report (World
Bank 2004a) conceives service delivery as a
relationship among providers, clients and
policymakers. There are three key actors in
service delivery: service providers, citizens
and policymakers. The relationships among
these actors are important to consider when
improving services:
• Citizens and Service Providers:
Although citizens directly interact
with service providers, they often feel
helpless in influencing changes in
service provision. The lack of a com-
petitive market in service provision
makes it difficult for citizens to hold
service providers accountable.
• Citizens and Policymakers: In theory,
citizens could communicate with
policymakers, who then in turn could
change policies or apply pressure on
providers. However, the means of
communication between users of
services and policymakers are often
few or ineffective. In addition, policy-
makers may be interested or equip-
ped to influence service providers.
• Policymakers and Service Providers:
Even when policymakers are interes-
ted in bringing about improvements
in services, they may not have the
ability to do so. Well-intentioned and
knowledgeable policymakers may be
able to make policy-level changes, but
still lack the resources or leverage to
bring about on-the-ground imple-
mentation of policies.
Accountability can be differentiated into
the short route (a contract between citizen
and provider) and long route (from citizen,
to policymakers, to provider). WDR 2004
states a preference for the short route and
proposes a number of ways to give the poor
a greater voice in service delivery.11 To be
effective, these mechanisms must reduce the
cost and increase the rewards of voice. It is
stated that if the poor had a say in service
delivery they would be more likely to get
access to affordable and appropriate services
– either directly or via government.
4.3 Community-Based
Accountability Mechanisms
Citizens can play a vital role in anti-
corruption initiatives; as they reside at the
level of infrastructure project implemen-
tation, they are often the most appropriate
people to gather views, opinions and
feedback and to act as a watchdog on the
process. Supply responses include more
transparency and right to information,
ethics education, and address shortages in
WSE supply.
With reference to Bangladesh, Wood
(1994) has developed a ‘resource profile’ of
the poor, specifically covering four cate-
gories of resources: material, human, social
and cultural (Wood 1994). He suggests that
it is by strengthening these profiles that poor
people’s capacity will be developed to a level
at which they will be able to access the basic
services provided by the state and develop
greater voice that builds checks and balances
(Wood 1994). Evidence also suggests, in
rural India (Plummer and Cross 2007), that
higher levels of education and literacy
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BOX 18: Satyagraha in Delhi Vidyut Board to
Get the Bill Rectified
Gandhi developed satyagraha, a form of non-violent resistance, to fight against injustice.
Parivartan use satyagraha as a mechanisms to fight corruption.
A consumer in Delhi Vidyut Board received an incorrect electricity bill. A Parivartan volunteer
helped this consumer to rectify the bill. For two months, the volunteer and the consumer had
made several visits to the Board but nothing happened. Every time, the officer would politely
apologise for the delay and seek more time.
Finally, the volunteer went with a resolve to not to leave until the bill had been corrected. He
met the concerned Executive Engineer (EXEN) again. The EXEN, as usual, again apologised for
the delay and requested the volunteer to come after a few days.
The volunteer replied – ‘Sir, I am not in a hurry. I have told my people at home that I will
come back in a week. So, you complete all your work and then, when you get time, you may like
to attend to my work’.
The EXEN said – ‘But I have to go now for a meeting with my Chief Engineer. I am already
late. The meeting is expected to last until late in the evening. So, I will go home straight from
there’.
The volunteer said – ‘Sir, please don’t worry. I will keep sitting here. When you come to the
office tomorrow, you will find me sitting here. You may go ahead with your meeting without
worrying about me’.
Believe it or not, the EXEN first attended to the volunteer, got the revised bill issued and
then went for the meeting.
Source: http://www.parivartan.com/satyagraha.asp
correlates with lower corruption, more
accountability, better targeting, and less
political capture.
There are a number of successful exam-
ples of citizens’ action and these are dis-
cussed below:
Supporting Civil Society Initiatives
Civil society organisations have worked
successfully against corruption; for example
by:
• Carrying out surveys of businesses,
consumers and public opinion to provide
feedback for delivery of public services
and fostering competition.
• Acting as advocates for clean govern-
ment.
• Stakeholder consultations and public
hearings.
• Exposing abuses and creating public
awareness to build awareness about the
problems and solutions.
• Acting as service provider in areas where
(corrupt) governments fail to deliver
services.
• Formulating and promoting action plans
to fight corruption.
• Monitoring government action and
decisions.
• Providing leadership to remove corrupt
leaders.
Non-Governmental Organisations can
promote integrity and combat corruption
by, for example, raising awareness of corrup-
tion and its costs, mobilising citizen support
for clean government, and documenting
and reporting cases of corruption. For
example, in the Republic of Korea, NGOs,
such as TI Korea and the Citizens Coalitions
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for Economic Justice, have pressured for law
reform as well as campaigning for the
disclosure of political funds; and launched
a ‘losing campaign’ against corrupt candi-
dates fighting the 2000 General Elections.
Another NGO Peoples Solidarity for Partici-
patory Democracy has launched a minority
shareholder campaign to increase the
transparency of corporate management, and
monitor freedom of information and
budget misuse under the Sunshine Project.
NGOs have used TV and radio broad-
casts to communicate their messages and
campaigns to the widest possible audiences.
Transparency Thailand (TT) produced a
series of radio shows dealing with the prob-
lems of corruption and the lack of transpa-
rency in government and business circles.
The shows were aired on a major Bangkok
radio station with an audience of over one
million people. Later, TT was invited to
broadcast an additional 15 minute radio slot
on the country’s military radio network
covering many more remote and rural areas
of Thailand. In 2000-2001, the Partnership
for Governance Reform in Indonesia and
the World Bank jointly organised and
developed an action research project called
‘Corruption and the Poor’. The project was
undertaken in three urban slums in
Makassar, Yogyakarta and Jakarta and aimed
to explore how corruption affects the urban
poor in Indonesia through use of the Parti-
cipatory Corruption Assessment (PCA)
techniques.
The Electricity Governance Initiative
(EGI) has developed a framework of indi-
cators of good governance in the electricity
sector, the EGI Indicator Toolkit, and has
completed assessments in India, Indonesia,
Thailand and the Philippines (conducted by
coalitions of NGOs, government, utility, and
other private-sector representatives).
In Nepal, residents of squatter settle-
ments have been able to get services with
the help of the local ward chairman and by
exerting pressure in unison on service provi-
ders. This is normally done by taking a
‘delegation’ of residents to the local service
provider office and demanding services.
Officials reciprocate by promising to provide
service (a water or electricity connection)
to save embarrassment or commotion in
front of other consumers. In the case of
water, protest marches to the Nepal Water
Supply Corporation by housewives bran-
dishing empty water pots proved to be very
effective in eliciting prompt responses from
the water service providers.
Training Communities as Monitors
Training communities to monitor the
delivery of infrastructure and control of
quality of  construction creates direct
accountability to communities. If the users,
and particularly the poor, can monitor and
discipline poorly performing service
providers, this is said to result in better
infrastructure services. Service users are
considered best placed to monitor the
services on which they depend, due to
greater incentives and information, as well
as face-to-face interaction with frontline
providers. Community pressure can also
create incentives for zero corruption where
front-line service providers are a permanent
member of the community. There is a need
to provide free training for key members of
interested advocacy groups in aspects such
as procurement, so that in the future the
comments of such groups are based on a
more sound knowledge of  the actual
systems. In the Philippines, a study con-
ducted by one of the watchdog NGOs indi-
cated that there are only 500–700 trained
observers against a demand of  8,000
observers (World Bank 2007b).
Work has also been done on monitoring
the location of water points and public site
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selection with user and community involve-
ment. Water Point Mapping is intended to
address inequities in access resulting from
the political nature of resource allocation
and the failures of  targeting. Where
decision-making on where and how to
allocate resources is not transparent, it often
leads to unequal outcomes and makes it
hard to gauge where budgets are being
spent. Mapping water points is intended to
make investments in the water sector
transparent. A study in India found that real
coverage in piped water systems increased
for poor people when socio-economic
mapping and site selection for water points
was carried out with the public (particularly
women) and local government (Shordt and
Stravato 2005). Duflo (2003) has also
analysed how variability in water flows, poor
design and construction and poor mainte-
nance were distortions that resulted from
corruption in a canal irrigation system in
South India.
In Bangalore, the Children’s Movement
for Civic Awareness surveyed the quality of
the city’s roads. The children were given
checklists in order to monitor the presence
of side drains, evenness of surface of the
footpath, obstructions to pedestrians, num-
ber of potholes, number of cracked areas,
presence of signs or painted lines to indicate
a road hump, and unfilled or un-compacted
diggings for electrical or telephone cables.
The children presented the findings on
quality of roads to the Bangalore municipal
commissioner at a public hearing and the
findings were reported to newspapers. Such
surveys have helped to make public officials
more accountable and to improve the
quality of infrastructure (Public Affairs
Centre).
The Right to Information (RTI) has been
recognised around the world as an impor-
tant instrument for checking corruption and
misuse of power. An NGO called Parivartan,
along with a number of people living in
slum areas in Delhi have been accessing
records of public works in various parts of
Delhi, where corruption is suspected in the
delivery of public works. Community-based
audits have been conducted where corrup-
tion is suspected in the delivery of public
works. This mechanism has mobilised
public opinion on local government policies
and practices and helped establish transpa-
rent decision-making practices. The NGO
has also provided training and support for
community vigilance during construction
projects to provide a useful safeguard
against corruption, for example by explain-
ing projects, interpreting technical details,
relaying concerns to engineers. The RTI had
made some impact but government
officials/public servants were slow to be
sensitised to it and the majority of
population, particularly the poor, has low
awareness levels of rights and entitlements
under the Act.
First used in Bangalore in 1993, report
cards use citizen feedback (from the poor
and marginalised sections of society) to rate
the performance of public services agencies,
such as the electricity board, water board,
telecommunications, and public banks
amongst others. The underlying premise of
the report card is that urban services fail
because of lack of competition in services
delivery. Information can be used to signal
that the service provider needs to take
corrective action (adopt client friendly
practices and policies, introduce perfor-
mance standards and improve transparency
in operations) as well as to enable compa-
risons between agencies and locations.
Organised public feedback in the form of
report cards can be used to challenge service
providers to be more efficient and respon-
sive to consumers. Exposing public adminis-
trations to pressures and demands from
citizens has a major impact on improving
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BOX 19: The Concerned Citizens of Abra for
Good Government, the Philippines
The Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Governance (CCAGG) is a non-governmental
organisation that monitors government projects in the Abra region of the northern Philippines.
CCAGG was formed in 1986 when new opportunities were created for civil society organisations
to participate in development programmes by President Corizon Aquino. Under the new
community participation policy, CCAGG members signed a memorandum of understanding
with the National Economic Development Authority and received training from the agency in
project monitoring. CCAGG members used the local media (radio, newspapers) and organised
community meetings to inform residents about public infrastructure projects.
While monitoring community employment and development projects, CCAGG members
were shocked to see a newspaper advertisement by the Ministry of Public Works and Highways
(MPWH) declaring that it had successfully completed 27 projects in Abra province. Knowing
that this declaration was untrue, CCAGG members decided to take action against the agency’s
misinformation. To make a strong case against the agency, the members of CCAGG developed
detailed documentation of the actual state of projects that had been declared as completed – but
in fact were only just beginning or were mid-way through the construction stage – including
affidavits composed by residents of project areas and photographs of the project sites. CCAGG
submitted these findings to the national government and demanded that the Department of
Public Works be investigated. An official government audit concurred with CCAGG’s findings
and several officials were charged with corruption. While several officials were convicted, the
prosecuting lawyers argued for leniency on behalf of the government officials and asked that
they receive only official reprimands as punishment. Outraged by this development, CCAGG
members mobilised public opinion and the Office of the Secretary of MPWH was bombarded
with telegrams from concerned citizens demanding that the convicted officials receive more
severe punishment.
The Secretary finally relented and 11 government officials found guilty of dishonesty and
misconduct were suspended. In addition, the Chief and the Deputy Chief Engineer of MPWH
in Abra were not only suspended without pay but were also debarred from serving in the province
in the future. This was probably the first case in the history of the Philippines in which a civil
society organisation’s vigilance had resulted in the conviction and punishment of government
officials on charges of corruption. Further, as a result of this case, the Regional Director of the
MPWH issued a directive requiring that projects in Abra province be funded only after they had
obtained clearances from CCAGG.
Subsequently, CCAGG consolidated its activities and its members developed a unique
technique for monitoring government projects. Members of CCAGG – primarily housewives,
students, and other youth members – observe road construction projects and report their findings
to specialist colleagues, such as engineers and accountants. These staff members in turn conduct
detailed investigations on project sites. CCAGG investigations monitor a variety of corruption
in government projects, especially road construction projects, including the use of sub-standard
materials (cement mixtures) and/or poor construction techniques, and fraud in contracting
procedures (such as rigged contracts). In one road construction project, for example, CCAGG
members found that contractors had embezzled project funds. In response to these findings, the
government forced the contractor to pay from its own resources to expand a road.
Recognising the critical role the organisation plays in preventing corruption, as well as the
expertise it has developed in monitoring public works projects, the national Commission on
Audit (COA) – the SAI of the Philippines – entered into a partnership with CCAGG to conduct
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service delivery and public administration
effectiveness. Modelled on the private sector
practice of conducting client satisfaction
surveys, report cards solicit user perceptions
on the quality, efficiency, and adequacy of
the various public services that are funded
by tax-payers. The Lihok Filipina’s ‘scorecard
project’ has been used in the Philippines,
where trained volunteers pose as clients to
gauge government’s efficiency and respon-
siveness in the delivery of services (World
Bank 2004b).
Transparency International Bangladesh
created grassroots pressure groups called
Committees of Concerned Citizens (CCCs)
to ‘promote integrity and curb corruption
in public sector service delivery systems in
selected sites of  Bangladesh through
grassroots participation of the recipients of
public services’. CCCs are intended to estab-
lish Islands of Integrity in public services,
generate debate on infrastructure provision,
and lobby for higher quality public services
through a variety of means – report cards,
citizens meetings, newsletters, research
papers, peoples theatre groups, essay and
cartoon competitions for school, seminars
and press campaigns.
Involving Women in WSE Service
Delivery
Two studies show that corruption is less
severe where women hold a larger share of
parliamentary seats and senior positions in
government and that women are less
involved in bribe-taking (Bailey 2003).
NGOs emphasise the importance of
ensuring equitable representation of
women, as the main users and managers of
water. There is anecdotal information, for
example, about the advisability of having
women serve as treasurers on local water
committees to prevent theft of operation
and management funds. It is hoped that
their involvement in the committees will
also increase women’s confidence and
strengthen their roles in their communities.
Moreover, female water-kiosk attendants
appear to be fairly common, and at times
are preferred, having a reputation of being
less corrupt than their male peers (Kjellen
and McGranahan 2006).
participatory audit exercises in the Abra region. The exercises focused on assessing the impact of
the audited government programme/project to determine whether the programme/project
achieved its desired results. This exercise was sponsored by the UNDP and was described as
successful by all the concerned parties. The chairman of the COA described the results of the
exercise as ‘very focused and efficient’. The lessons from the audit process were later incorporated
into a manual on the Conduct of Participatory Audit published by the COA. While successful,
the experience of the COA-CCAGG participatory audit highlights several challenges that need
to be addressed for future cooperation between civil society organisations and public auditors.
Audit Methodology: The COA staff objected to demands made by the CCAGG staff to discuss
preliminary audit findings with community members. In turn, CCAGG staff were concerned
that restricting official audits to the post-project period increased the likelihood of losing
potentially valuable findings.
Sustainability: Even though the participatory audit exercise was declared a success by all
participating organisations, it was discontinued with a change in the COA administration. The
new COA commissioner had other priorities and shelved participatory audit exercises. This
raises serious questions on the sustainability of participatory audits.
Source: Ramkumar and Krafchik 2005.
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Tracking of Public Funds and
Expenditure
Public services often fail poor people if
budgets are misallocated or misappro-
priated, this means that service quality,
quantity and access suffer. Discrepancies
between policy statements and actual deli-
very can trigger civic action against corrup-
tion in the public sector, thus contributing
to improved accountability.
Public awareness of the goods and
services they should receive and citizen
engagement in budget processes has been
increased through public hearings. There are
many examples of such initiatives, such as
those conducted by Mazdoor Kisan Shakthi
Sangathan (MKSS), or the Workers and
Peasants Power Association, a grassroots
organisation based in India, which has
helped to improve transparency in the
financial administration of local authorities
and contributes to a more equitable distri-
bution of resources.
A gender-sensitive budget analysis can
reveal whether men profit more from public
expenditure than women, but can also
reveal whether a cut in public spending
caused by corruption means that women are
more likely to be more affected. At local
levels in particular, gender-oriented partici-
patory budgetary planning and analysis is a
way of strengthening accountability, trans-
parency and gender responsiveness and
stemming corruption.
Public expenditure tracking surveys have
been used in Thailand to follow the flow of
funds through tiers of government and to
determine whether the funds actually reach
their intended destination. The survey looks
at the cost structure of the project and
monitors who is doing what, where, when
and how funds are channeled in practice to
beneficiaries. Tracking surveys not only
highlight the uses and abuses of public
funds, but also give insights into capture,
cost efficiency, decentralisation and
accountability. Having a reference price list
for infrastructure projects in the region
could be helpful.
PROOF (Public Record of Operations
and Finance) is a public campaign launched
in 2002, in Bangalore. The PROOF cam-
paign aims to institute systems to ensure
quarterly financial disclosure by the city
Municipal Corporation and ensure that
citizens participate in the process of evalua-
tion of local government performance. The
Municipal Corporation supplies quarterly
financial performance in a user-friendly
format.
Using the Media to Detect and
Prevent Corruption and
Highlighting Good Practice
The media can do much to disseminate
information about public services. For
example, higher newspaper circulation in
Indian districts is associated with better
local-government performance in distribut-
ing food and drought relief (Besley and
Burgess 2002). The media (and especially
the independent media sector – including
Internet, informal journals and newsletters)
can control corruption by informing public
policy and decision makers, raising public
awareness about corruption, its causes,
consequences and possible remedies, inves-
tigating and reporting incidences of cor-
ruption, exposing corrupt officials, and
prompting investigations by official bodies.
Many anti-corruption initiatives, such as the
Report Cards in Bangalore, have been
launched in high-profile press conferences,
and efforts made to ensure that the media
coverage is wide. For example, with the
preparation of press kits with small print-
able stories, media-friendly press releases,
and translation of the main report into local
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BOX 20: The Media in Papua New Guinea
In Papua New Guinea (PNG) Transparency International PNG, the Ombudsman Commission,
and the Media Council runs a hotline through which members of the public can report suspected
cases of corruption directly to the media. A task force of senior journalists and editors has been
appointed to investigate public complaints and, if they are verified, to publish them in the press.
The Media Council has built an extensive network of community groups. The council itself
consists of members from all of PNG’s mainstream media – the national broadcasting
corporation, three national newspapers, the country’s only television station and both FM radio
stations – as well as associated members of advertising agencies and smaller commercial and
non-commercial publications. Council members also invited various NGOs and business groups
to form an independent working committee. More than 20 public and private groups have pledged
their support, including Transparency International PNG, the Ombudsman Commission of PNG,
youth and women’s groups, the Business Council of PNG, the Institute of National Affairs and a
number of private businesses. These groups provide resources in areas such as manpower,
networking, law, business, insurance, finance, administration and national affairs. Besides
reducing the scope for intimidation and harassment, the Media Council network is a source of
support for whistleblowers, while the campaign provides a platform of solidarity for reporters
covering corruption. The campaign also focused on the June 2002 national elections, beginning
with a series of training workshops for journalists on how to cover the candidates’ campaigns.
They were also asked to keep a watchful eye on practices such as ‘ghost voting’, which Prime
Minister Sir Mekere Morauta had identified as a major threat to free and fair elections. Young
journalists are taught how to investigate and report on corrupt practices in general. In the weeks
leading up to the June 2002 elections, newspapers published full-page ads calling on voters to be
critical of candidates and to stop selling their votes.
Source: Keaeke 2003.
languages. The media can also reinforce the
work and legitimacy of both parliaments
and their anti-corruption bodies and create
pressure for change to laws and regulations.
The role of radio to disseminate relevant
information has increased, especially with
the introduction of community radio
stations.
Transparency International Bangladesh
(TIB) developed the ‘News Scan Database’,
a database of corruption stories from
newspaper archives. This tool is intended
not only to measure the nature and extent
of corruption in Bangladesh, but also to
encourage the media to further investigate
and report instances of corruption.
Freedom of the press is negatively corre-
lated with the level of corruption: ‘Official
Secrets Act’ censorship and anti-libel laws/
criminal libel actions have been used to
muzzle and intimidate journalists. But
information is not enough. People must also
have the legal, political and economic means
to press demands against the government.
In the Indian city of Hyderabad, the
Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage
Board (HMWSSB) established a weekly
press briefing with local reporters in which
he discussed the progress of the Board’s
reforms. The MD also participates in a
weekly television programme called ‘Face to
Face’ in which representatives of the city’s
service agencies field questions and com-
plaints from customers during a live
broadcast. Finally, the HMWSSB uses local
press and news programmes to publicise its
new toll-free complaints hotline and
Citizen’s Charter (Davis 2004).
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Access to Information
Access to information is one of the most
effective tools for curbing corruption. Infor-
mation is central to effective civil society
participation and monitoring of govern-
ment activities. An informed citizenry can
considerably enhance accountability of
public officials on their conduct and on
decisions made on matters affecting the
public such as service delivery.
One of the basic underlying principles of
public servants is transparency of their
work. Public servants are obliged to provide
their superiors, state control agencies, with
information about their work. Around the
world, the introduction of greater transpa-
rency in the functioning of government and
public bodies has increased access to infor-
mation. Information mechanisms include
routine regular production of reports and
similar documents, the use of the Internet
and computer networks, radio and tele-
vision broadcast media, Public Service
Announcements (PSAs), print media such
as newspapers, and personal appearances by
government officials.
The provision of information about the
WSE sectors to consumers is crucial to
combating corruption. For example:
• Information boards can be erected at
the water point site, showing the total
project cost, who contributes, amounts
of contributions, contractor by name,
prices, expected date of completion.
BOX 21: Radio Against Corruption: To Be Alive
Stalin K, a human rights activist, created the radio programme to expose corruption in India’s
western Gujarat province. To Be Alive is a community-focused programme broadcast on state
radio in the poor, rural region of Kutch, Gujarat’s largest district. The programme, broadcast
through the government network All India Radio, has become something of a ‘public watchdog’
that warns those tempted to abuse their position that somebody is watching. To Be Alive has
exposed a range of corrupt practices. For example, it sparked a government inquiry into primary
health centres across the country where illegal charging was believed to be taking place.
High illiteracy makes printed media inaccessible to most of the population, while televisions
are prohibitively expensive and their signals rarely reach the country’s more remote regions.
Community radio stations play an important role in educating their audiences on issues including
human rights, politics and the environment. Such programming is essential in a country where
many children are unable to attend school due to financial constraints. Community radio stations
aim to provide information about issues that the mainstream communication media tend to
ignore. The radio show To Be Alive aims to:
• Play an important role in educating its audience on major issues including corruption
and human rights.
• Educate poor people about their rights.
• Encourage citizen participation.
The programmes are made by local people. ‘They are poorly educated but they are extremely
creative and intelligent people’, says Stalin K. ‘They write, record and edit the programmes’. Despite
their lack of formal education, for both women and men, the medium of radio proved liberating
and they learned quickly. Community radio has changed people’s expectations of the
accountability of the authorities – they actually expect more from authority figures now.
Source: BBC News 2005b.
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• Publish technical information such
as utility performance levels for
public information. For example, the
Australian Institution of Engineers
publish Report Cards on the nation’s
infrastructure that rate the asset
condition, asset availability and
reliability, asset management and
sustainability.
• The Republic of Korea, Australia and
Hong Kong, China (SAR) publish
procurement plans and provide
ample information about previous
and ongoing procurement on Inter-
net sites.
• Under India’s Right to Information
Act 2005, citizens have access to
information on procurement pro-
cesses.
• Australia, China, India, the Republic
of Korea, and Singapore make audit
reports publicly available for scrutiny.
• Some countries, like India and
Thailand, also empower individuals
who are not involved in procurement
to bring allegations of corruption to
the attention of specialised audit or
anti-corruption bodies.
When a service provider can compare its
performance with others, this information
will trigger internal reforms in terms of
policymaking and monitoring, better
resource planning, better accounting, audit-
ing and procurement and better perfor-
mance. Service users and NGOs can also
make comparisons about the performance
of different operators in different regions,
BOX 22: Parivartan: People Get Sewers after 20 Years
through Right to Information
Sundernagari is a slum colony in East Delhi. The sewer system in this area was laid out in 1983,
but has not been made operational. A number of residents of the area approached the politicians
and Water Department (Delhi Jal Board) officials requesting them to make the sewers operational.
They were told that action was being taken, papers were moving and the sewers would become
operational very soon. However, these were empty promises. Nothing happened for 20 years. In
the absence of sewers, the people faced immense suffering. They are forced to use public toilets.
There were a number of attacks on women in the area.
Noshey Ali, a social activist living in the area, filed an application under the Right to
Information Act in March 2002. He sought to know the status of the sewer system and when it
would be made operational. The Jal Board officials replied that when the system was taken over
by Jal Board from Delhi Development Authority (DDA), they did not hand over any maps.
However, the Jal Board stated that they had conducted a survey of the area and the system was
expected to be operational by June 2003. However, nothing happened for another year. So, another
application was filed by Noshey Ali in March 2003 to inspect the relevant files of Jal Board.
However, Noshey Ali was told that there were no files connected with this issue. This meant that
the Jal Board officials provided false information under the Right to Information Act the previous
year. Under the Delhi Right to Information Act, there is a provision for deduction of salary of
concerned officials who provide false information. When threatened with this sanction the
concerned Executive Engineer promised to get the survey done on an emergency basis.
The survey was completed within a week and the proposal has been sanctioned by the Jal
Board, the expenditure of this amount has been approved and contracts awarded. The work on
sewers has already started and the sewers will become operational very soon.
Source: http://www.parivartan.com/story.asp?id=60.
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to use voice in an informed way and create
a competitive pressure for service providers
to improve. In cases where no reporting
exists, freedom of information laws may also
enable service users to access to internal
emails and memos.
However, public agencies are often not
effective in communicating information to
the public, or dealing with enquiries on
what they are doing. This could be due to
incompetence or negligence, but it may
also serve as a result of bureaucrats seeking
to use their control over information to
strengthen their power.
Poor people often lack access to infor-
mation that could assist them. This includes
information on rights protected under law,
where to get legal assistance, information on
service delivery, how to gain access to ser-
vices, and development initiatives. Impro-
ving access of poor people to libraries,
internet, advice offices, government offices
and constituency offices is recommended so
that they can get the information they may
need in order to mobilise or create organi-
sations that enable them to access resources
as well as to develop a personal sense of
capability and entitlement. Access to
information legislation provides citizens
with a statutory ‘right to know’.
4.4 Operator Accountability
Arrangements
The accountability arrangements targeted to
WSE service providers are often linked to
anti-corruption programmes and ongoing
programmes such as public service reform
BOX 23: Characteristics of Well Performing Utility
Well-performing utilities have a number of characteristics that assure high quality performance
and minimise the risk of corruption, which include:
• Citizen role in oversight and monitoring, auditing, public hearings, planning and budgeting,
participatory corruption assessments.
• Information and awareness campaigns for example through the media.
• De-monopolising service delivery.
• Staffing reforms promote performance/merit based career structures.
• Reform to customer interface: metering billing, collection, complaint mechanisms.
• Complaint redressal.
• Transparent hiring and promotion to help avoid abuses of patronage, nepotism and
favouritism.
• Systems to provide appropriate oversight of discretionary decisions and of personnel with
authority to make discretionary decisions.
• Remuneration and incentives and benefits package benchmarks against the prevailing market.
• Training staff for their professional and personal development.
• Regular and timely rotation of assignments.
• Procurement reform/Transparency in public tenders/Integrity pacts.
• Benchmarking utility performance through survey and feedback mechanisms.
• Legitimisation of illegal connections.
• Reforms to improve the integrity of business (professional associations, codes of conducts).
• Separation of regulator and provider roles.
• Public oversight of negotiations with operators.
• Development and publication of minimum standards.
• Audits and reporting.
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programmes, procurement and audit
reforms. These tools are intended to achieve
a variety of  objectives ranging from
mechanisms to protect whistleblowers,
checks on staff, effective complaints
mechanisms and procedures for appeals,
staff training in areas such as ethics and
reducing discretion in service delivery.
Disclosure
Most forms of corruption involve the loss
of funds from the treasury or company and
a gain of funds into private bank accounts.
Thus, audits, the disclosure of assets and
better systems of public sector financial
management can decrease the likelihood of
corruption and detect it when it does occur.
The monitoring of, for example, personal
assets and liabilities (such as investments,
bank accounts, pensions, as well as domestic
and foreign property), income, and life-
styles of those who hold positions where
they transact with the public or are other-
wise well-placed to extract bribes can
significantly reduce corruption. Many coun-
tries – recognising that assets may be hidden
in the bank accounts of friends and family
– extend asset monitoring to close family
members. Penalties for failing to disclose as
required, or for making false or misleading
disclosure, must be severe enough to act as
a significant deterrent, i.e. discharge and
other disciplinary sanctions.
Debarment
Efforts to fight the supply side of corruption
need to be strengthened; debarment is a
stronger sanction than the termination of a
single contract. Firms found to be paying
bribes can be debarred from eligibility for
public contracts for a certain period.
However, while debarment might deter
corruption, it could also be part of a corrupt
scheme of competitors or corrupt officials
to extort bribes. Otherwise, qualified and
honest companies consider may abstain
from bidding to avoid being subject to
debarment. The possibility of debarring
companies found guilty of corruption or
collusion from tendering for public con-
tracts has been integrated in different ways
and to varying degrees into the legal
framework of Bangladesh, China, India,
Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea,
Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore and Viet
Nam. The debarment periods are often –
but not always – defined: one year in the
Philippines; two years in the Republic of
Korea; up to three years in China, the Kyrgyz
Republic, Mongolia, and Palau; at least five
years in Singapore. A contract won through
corrupt practices may be terminated in
Bangladesh; Hong Kong, China (SAR),
China; the Republic of  Korea; the
Philippines and Singapore.
Information Communication
Technology (ICT)
ICT can facilitate easy access to information
by the public and can also ensure that indi-
vidual civil servants can be held accountable
for their actions. The use of ICT has
transformed the delivery of public services
and reduced corruption as well as improved
efficiency and transparency in public
transactions and services (such as closed
circuit TV in service provider offices). Pilot
projects have demonstrated the usefulness
of ICT in tax collection, election moni-
toring, public procurement, maintaining
land records. The Internet can be used for
on-line public tendering, opening the
information flow, and reducing opportu-
nities for making potentially corrupt
personal contacts. The OPEN (Online
Procedures Enhancement for Civil Appli-
cations) is a web portal that publishes
information relating to permits and licences
issued by the Municipal Government of
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Seoul (n.d.). The aim is to increase the
transparency and accessibility of adminis-
trative procedures to the public, decreasing
public-client interactions and thereby
reducing corruption. OPEN is facilitated by
the Republic of Korea’s advanced informa-
tion technology infrastructure, which has
been used to modernise services and
increase the convenience for citizens. In the
Republic of Korea an e-procurement system
was introduced by the government in 1998,
for purchasing goods and services and
arranging contracts for construction pro-
jects online. All procurement from purchase
requests to electronic tendering and pay-
ment is processed on line. Automation has
simplified the bidding procedure, improved
competition, avoided preferential treatment,
and eliminated non-arbitrary behaviour.
Officials take a ‘pledge of integrity’ which,
together with punitive measures for wrong-
doing, has led to an open and transparent
procurement process. Portals are open to
public access and allow feedback. Similarly
India has computerised registration and
records (computerisation of land records in
Karnataka; property registration in Andhra
Pradesh and inter-state border road checks
in Gujarat). These systems require a good
level of IT literacy and access to the internet.
There is, therefore, a risk that this might
result in a widening societal gap between
those with access and capability and those
without, the latter generally being the
poorer elements of society.
Blowing the Whistle
Whistle-blowing reports of malpractice can
enhance the detection of fraud and corrup-
tion. Whistleblower protection encourages
officials, employees and aggrieved citizens
to report instances of ethical misconduct,
waste, fraud and other forms of corruption.
Whistleblowers inside service delivery insti-
tutions can be encouraged to complain to
institutions such as anti-corruption com-
missions or Ombudsman offices, or through
telephone ‘hot-lines’ (operated at a central
level or departments of the government).
The Republic of Korea’s whistleblower
and witness protection mechanism takes a
three-pillar approach. First, it guarantees the
confidentiality of  the whistleblower’s
identity and provides for employment
protection to prevent discrimination or
dismissal at the workplace. Second, both
mechanisms are enforced by means of
disciplinary and penal provisions. Third, the
whistleblower is granted physical protection
if the matter so requires. In addition to these
passive incentives, the Korean Anti-
Corruption Act also establishes a financial
reward system for whistleblowers.
Indian law also contains regulations on
whistleblower protection, consisting essen-
tially of a guarantee of confidentiality and
certain provisions for the physical protec-
tion of the witness and for awards. The field
of application of these regulations is limited
to tax and customs fraud, however.
Codes of Conduct
Codes of conduct provide guidance on
avoiding the misuse of official position and
resources for improper advancement of
personal or financial interest, i.e. advantage
to family, close friends and persons or
organisations with whom they have busi-
ness or political relations. Likewise, Codes
of Conduct prevent the use of public pro-
perty, facilities, services and financial
resources for private purposes except when
permission is lawfully given. The principle
of ‘zero tolerance’ is often embodied in such
codes-obliging individuals to report suspi-
cion or evidence of corruption committed
by colleagues or others.
A number of countries (Australia, Hong
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Kong, China (SAR), China, Indonesia.
Japan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, the
Philippines, Singapore and Viet Nam) have
codes of conduct for public officials that
specifically address corruption and conflicts
of interest. Such codes often reflect the UK
Committee on Standards in Public life (the
Nolan Committee) principles of ethical
behaviour such as: fair reward, integrity,
honesty, objectivity, accountability, reli-
ability, fairness. The code can be monitored
through public complaints systems and
enforced through disciplinary boards.
Breaches to the Code may have implications
for career or employment.
The Republic of Korea has adopted a
Code of Conduct for Maintaining the
Integrity of Public Officials. This code,
enacted by Presidential Decree in February
2003, specifies the standards of conduct to
be observed by both state and local public
officials. It covers areas related to the
prevention of conflict of interest, the pro-
hibition to use public office for private
purposes, and the obligation of neutrality
and impartiality. It also regulates the
legitimate acceptance of gifts from persons
related to public duties and other unfair
advantages, which is of particular impor-
tance in a context in which the presentation
of gifts forms an integral part of the
national culture. Reports suggest that, since
the code came into force, the number of
duty-related offerings of gifts and hospitality
have reduced substantially.
Companies and subcontractors that wish
to participate in public tenders in the
Republic of Korea must set up codes of
conduct for their employees and prevent
whistleblowers within the company from
being disadvantaged. The Codes of Conduct
must contain clauses that prevent undue
influence on the procurement process.
Different schemes are employed to iden-
tify, avoid and manage conflicts of interest
in the region. Australia, the Cook Islands,
Japan, Palau, Samoa, Viet Nam, and to a
limited extent the Republic of Korea and
Pakistan require public officials involved in
procurement to avoid conflicts of interest
and to disclose them when they occur.
Samoa excludes from procurement procee-
dings officials with declared conflicts of
interest. Other countries support the adop-
tion of high behavioural standards with
systematic training that addresses corrup-
tion risks. The Republic of Korea has also
set up a mechanism for regularly monitor-
ing compliance with these codes.
Citizens Charters
Citizen Charter is a document which
publishes service standards that customers
are entitled to expect across an entire
organisation or service area. It is a set of
measurable and auditable promises made to
customers. Charters change service provi-
sion by defining service standards, ensure
that users are consulted about their needs
and set targets for response times, waiting
times, charges and fees. Charters increase
accountability through the publication of
information about and requirements for
government services. Officials can be trained
in good practice and threatened with
negative consequences if they fail to meet
at least minimum standards. However,
charters normally have a non-statutory
basis.
Complaints Mechanisms
Just as in the private sector, open and effec-
tive complaints channels and complaint
handling procedures in the public sector
serve to raise levels of performance and to
identify those responsible for malpractice.
Complaints can be used as a management
tool to monitor corruption in service
delivery. Complaints about corruption
Corruption in Social Services and Human Development 633
BOX 24: Seoul: Report Card to the Mayor
The financial crisis in 1997 acted as a catalyst to create a more effective, efficient, and transparent
government in the Republic of Korea. Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) adopted a package
of anti-corruption measures in 1999 under mayor, Goh Kun. The ‘Corruption Report Card to
the Mayor’ was initiated in Seoul in 1999. Officers in-charge of civil affairs and citizens who have
submitted a civil application (or signed a contract with Seoul Metropolitan Government in a
corruption-prone area such as sanitation or construction) receive a postcard, which they mail
back if they have experienced wrongdoing in their dealings. Report cards to the Mayor have
been mailed to:
• Construction companies as well as individuals involved in the construction industry (such as
the drafter, architect, supervisor and sub-contractor) who have entered into a contract with
the city government. These stakeholders receive a postcard every month until construction is
completed.
• Water-supply construction companies that have been hired, as well as individuals involved in
the water-supply construction.
• Individuals or architects who have obtained a new building permit or approval.
• The owner/manager of environmental waste related to businesses that are undergoing
inspection, for example, in relation to regulations for discharging pollutants, wastewater, or
waste materials.
Report cards are also available from 727 locations across the city including City Hall, city
offices, local district (gu) offices and application counters at the local neighbourhood (dong)
offices. If a report card is returned to the Mayor’s office, the mayor orders an investigation. If the
investigation finds that there has been misconduct appropriate punitive measures are imposed.
A reward may be offered to the person who filed the report. The average processing period is 10
days, with seven days for simple issues.
The types of corruption reported to the Mayor include incidents of attempted bribery and
companies/individuals offering payments in return for a service. Disciplinary action resulting
from the ‘Corruption Report Card to the Mayor’ includes warnings, training, suspension or
early retirement.
Nevertheless, the rate of receipt/distribution of the card is said to be low. Some people don’t
show the Report Card to the Mayor because they have nothing to report; didn’t believe that it
would curb corruption or were afraid of the consequences of reporting corruption – they were
concerned that the reporter’s details would not be kept confidential.
Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government 2001.
should trigger investigation, prosecution or
other sanctions.
Law
National law in almost every country in the
region prohibits corruption and the taking
of bribes. The kinds of laws include:
• Laws and regulations governing public
licences, government procurement con-
tracts or other public undertakings.
• Legislation to eliminate any indirect
support of bribery such as tax deducti-
bility of bribes.
• Anti-money laundering legislation that
have substantial criminal penalties for the
laundering of the proceeds of corruption.
• Legislation requiring transparent com-
pany accounts and financial state-
ments – providing for penalties for
omissions and falsifications, or hiding
such bribery.
634 Perspectives on Corruption and Human Development
Such legislation requires sanctions to
effectively combat corruption. The enforce-
ment of these laws usually falls to three
bodies: The Criminal Courts, the Adminis-
trative Courts (or Tribunals) and the Civil
Service Membership Associations.
The Republic of Korea, for instance, has
seen the reform of laws and institutions
including the ‘Real Name Financial Tran-
saction System, 1993 (a ban on the use of
false names in all financial transactions to
prevent tax evasion and hiding of illegally
collected money); Freedom of Information
Act (1996); Election Campaign Law (1995,
1997) and the Anti-Corruption Law (2002).
The law was reformed as a result of media,
petitions, demonstrations and grassroots
lobbying.
International Legislation and Conven-
tions are additions to national legislation.
They are often binding and ratified by a
number of countries, and attempting to
increase the political will to curb corruption
and corruption-related crimes such as trans-
national bribery, international crime,
money laundering and extradition. The
most comprehensive international conven-
tions are:
• The OECD Convention on Combat-
ing Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transac-
tions exerts further pressure on
companies to uphold integrity by
rendering corrupt business practices
risky by criminalising bribery of
foreign public officials, improving
accounting and auditing practices,
BOX 25: Singapore: An Exemplary Case for
Urban Water Management
Public Utilities Board (PUB) invariably ranks in the top five percent of all the urban water utili-
ties of the world in terms of its performance. Only a few of these indicators will be noted below:
• 100 percent of the population has access to drinking water and sanitation.
• The entire water supply system, from water works to consumers, is 100 percent metred.
• Unaccounted for water as a percentage of total production was 5.18 percent in 2004.
• The number of accounts served per PUB employee was 376 in 2004.
• Monthly bill collection efficiency: 99 percent in 2004.
• Monthly bill collection in terms of days of sales outstanding was 35 days in 2004.
 Corruption is endemic in most Asian utilities. However, it is not an issue at PUB, which
emphasises staff integrity as a key organisational requirement. It has taken measures to prevent
corruption by staff training on Code of Governance and Code of Conduct, effective internal
control processes, regular audits and strong and immediate sanctions against those who may
prove to be corrupt. Staff members are required to make annual declarations, which include
Declaration of Assets and Investments and Declaration of Non-indebtness.
 Complaints of corruption are promptly investigated and reported to Singapore´s Corrupt
Practices Investigation Bureau. PUB is a part of the overall Singapore milieu where there are
strong anti-corruption laws at the national level with appropriate sanctions that are regularly
implemented. In addition, in recent decades, the Government has consistently shown its strong
political will to curb all forms of corruption, and take firm actions against all and any form of
corruption. With a good remuneration package, functional institution, and a strong anti-
corruption culture, corruption is not an issue at PUB.
Source: Tortajada 2006.
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increasing transparency in public
procurement procedures, and deny-
ing tax deductions for bribe pay-
ments. Moreover, the OECD adopted
the Recommendation on Improving
Ethical Conduct in the Public Service
in April 1998.
• In 2003, the United Nations Conven-
tion against Corruption was adopted
by the General Assembly in 2003. A
major breakthrough of the Conven-
tion is that countries agreed on asset
recovery, which is a particularly
important issue for many developing
countries and demand binding agree-
ments with governmental and private
partners. However, Australia, China,
Indonesia, Mongolia and Sri Lanka
are the only five countries in Asia-
Pacific to have ratified the UN Con-
vention Against Corruption to date,
suggesting a lack of government
determination in the regional to
tackle corruption.
Cost Recovery
In the WSE sector, an important mechanism
for monitoring corruption is to take action
against unpaid bills and illegal water
connections. Corrupt management practices
typically lead to increases in supply costs,
which in turn result in increased tariffs or,
alternatively, mounting financial losses
leading to reduced service.
Low water tariffs, far from ensuring that
low-income households can afford piped
water, turn water distribution into patron-
age (e.g. politicians have preferred to keep
domestic water prices artificially low), which
often contributes to utilities’ financial diffi-
culties, inhibiting investment, and prevent-
ing water and sanitation networks from
being extended to low-income settlements
(even when residents are willing to pay)
(McGranahan and Sattherthwaite 2006).
Mechanisms to ensure cost recovery
include:
• Fix water tariffs in blocks according
to the quantity used. This reduces
opportunities for corruption and
guarantees access by the poor.
• Use water metres in each household
(low levels of tariffs are not compati-
ble with metering).
• Set up centralised, ‘one-stop’ applica-
tion/approval points for household
water connection.
• Frequent, responsible inspections.
An interim solution to petty corruption
in bill collection has been to create workers
co-ops or to hire a private collection agency
on management contracts. Contracts of this
kind normally include collection targets and
BOX 26: Cooperatives in Dhaka, Bangladesh
An employees’ union were awarded the contract to run the water system in one part of the
capital city Dhaka, with another zone given to a local private company. After the first year of this
experiment, the employees’ co-operative had produced results so good that the water and
sanitation authority handed over the private sector’s contract to the union. The employees’ co-
operative achieved substantial improvements not only in customer services, billing and collection
of fees, but also in reducing water loss. Corruption was reduced as staff were paid a real living-
wage. Overall, the co-operative out-performed not only the private company, but also the existing
public utility which suffered from over-bureaucratisation and inertia.
Source: http://www.wdm.org.uk/campaigns/water/public/bangladesh.htm
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stipulate sanctions for failure to meet these
targets, including contract termination. The
few management contracts implemented so
far in have led to noticeable improvements
in collection rates, but have encountered
opposition from trade unions.
One distribution utility in India took
steps to tighten procedures and plug the
leakage of revenue by metering. Unions of
linemen and section officers saw the steps
as a move to victimise their members by
making them specifically responsible for the
energy received and sold. They argued that
accountability should be ensured across the
utility at all levels and not confined to a few
low-level employees. It took the utility two
years and a change in the management to
get all the feeders metred (Gulati and Rao
2007).
4.5 Regulator Accountability
Arrangements
Proper regulation of utility companies
which operate with a monopoly is
important to reducing corruption. In the
absence of any regulation of price, quantity
and quality, monopolies could restrict the
service supply or charge an excessively high
price to consumers. Establishing indepen-
dent regulators for WSE services can allow
significant improvements in governance of
public services, as long as such institutions
operate with transparency (access to infor-
mation, public involvement and public
hearings), simplicity (well-defined, rules-
based principles), and accountability (elec-
tion of regulators, term limitations, avoid
political intervention) (Ogus 2003; Estache
and Martimort 1999).
The issue of regulation has been widely
debated in the literature on corruption. It
is tempting to conclude that tightening of
regulations is needed to reduce opportu-
nities for corruption. However, this might
be counterproductive since many opportu-
nities for corrupt transactions can also arise
from excessive regulation. The literature
suggests that combating corruption requires
less regulation, simpler procedures, and
greater transparency (Bowles 2000; Platteau
1996; Lederman et al. 2001). However,
paradoxically, increased discretion of offi-
cials can also create more corruption oppor-
tunities. Furthermore, those individuals who
are most influential in bringing about
change (e.g. political elites, bureaucrats,
chief executives) are often also the ones who
may lose most if corruption is curtailed.
With infrastructure privatisation, many
countries are creating new regulatory
institutions to monitor the behaviour and
performance of newly privatised infras-
tructure monopolies. The report ‘Connect-
ing East Asia: A New Framework for Infra-
structure’ (ADB et al. 2005) notes that
companies investing in infrastructure, both
inside and outside of the region, say they
are keen to invest where government poli-
cies and regulations are predictable. Among
the constraints to investment, the compa-
nies cited the lack of enforcement of con-
tracts, inconsistencies in regulations and in
the courts, and corruption.
A recent study of bribes paid to utilities
in a number of transitional economies in
Central Asia found that the replacement of
public ownership by private ownership
reduced the amount of corruption, due to
the change in incentives to control corrup-
tion (Clarke and Xu 2001). Nevertheless,
other studies of these phenomena have
shown that the process of privatisation may
make corruption worse (China, for example,
White 1996; Duckett 2001). As such, privati-
sation in itself is not a panacea for corrup-
tion – corrupt companies may gain market
access and power, and thus out-compete
‘noncorrupt’ firms. In the private sector,
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efforts should be made to develop and
implement business ethics programmes and
codes of conduct, with a view to encourag-
ing self-regulation.
There are a number of mechanisms that
regulators of the WSE sector may adopt in
their on-going efforts to ensure accountable
and responsive infrastructure delivery. These
mechanisms are focused on ‘combating
corruption’ by establishing audit institutions
and anti-corruption commissions as well as
by ensuring social regulation of the sector.
Audit Institutions
Corruption can be combated by enhancing
institutions for public scrutiny and
oversight. An audit’s primary purpose is to
provide a third-party view about whether a
pubic sector manager’s claims about the
financial performance of a budgetary entity
are reported in the time period they are
claimed to be in, in the budget category they
are reported to be in, that figures cover all
transactions in a particular budget category
given some level of audit risk.
Most countries in the region recognise
the role of regular independent external and
internal auditing in the infrastructure sector.
For example, Bangladesh, the Cook Islands,
the Fiji Islands, the Republic of Korea,
Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Samoa, and
Singapore all require regular yearly or half-
yearly audits of procuring agencies.
Audit institutions play a major role in
auditing government accounts and opera-
tions and in promoting sound financial
management and accountability in their
governments. Appropriate auditing proce-
dures applicable to public administration
and the public sector, and measures and
systems can provide timely public reporting
on performance and decision-making.
Conventional mechanisms for investigating
corruption, such as audit and auditor gene-
ral, may not be adequate when the institu-
tions are weak, as is common in many
smaller developing countries.
Anti-Corruption Commissions
Independent anti-corruption agencies are
established to:
• Investigate corruption cases and initial
prosecutorial function.
• Educate and raise awareness about the
harms of corruption as well as possibly
to train government employees and
elected and appointed officials (in co-
operation with the civil service college).
• Provide analysis, policy briefs and even
propose draft legislation to policy-
makers.
An anti-corruption agency is more likely
to be established where corruption is, or is
perceived to be, so widespread that existing
institutions (such as conventional law
enforcement agencies) are less able to detect
and prosecute complex corruption cases. As
such, an anti-corruption agency often has
greater public credibility. All countries in
South East Asia have at least one anti-
corruption agency. But the ones that work
best are centralised, independent agencies
such as Thailand’s National Counter
Corruption Commission. Malaysia’s Anti-
Corruption Agency reports to the govern-
ment, and so is subject to political control
(Economist 2004). Often cited successful
commissions include:
• well established Independent Com-
mission against Corruption (ICAC)
of Hong Kong, China (SAR), which
is the main body responsible
for implementation of the anti-
corruption strategy and activities. Its
three-pronged approach focusing on
prevention, punishment and educa-
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tion has proven to be very effective.
ICAC also launched a newspaper to
encourage further public participa-
tion. It was concerned with all levels
of officials as well as private sector
corruption. The Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance was used effec-
tively to: (i) encourage companies to
adopt codes of conduct, (ii) set up the
Hong Kong Ethics Development
Centre, and (iii) carry out surveys on
ethics and the public’s perceptions of
corruption.
• Pakistan’s National Anti-Corruption
Strategy (NACS) was launched in
2002. While commitment to imple-
mentation of the strategy is still to be
seen, the strategy is a comprehensive
document and was drafted using a
combination of local (the National
Accountability Bureau) and inter-
national expertise.
• The Republic of Korea has the Korea
Independent Commission Against
Corruption (KICAC).
• Singapore Corrupt Practices Investi-
gations Bureau (CIPB).
• Whilst Fiji and the Solomon Islands
have an Ombudsman’s office, Papua
New Guinea is the only Pacific Island
country with an effective anti-corrup-
tion institution in the form of a
powerful investigative Ombudsman
Commission. Vanuatu has an Om-
budsman’s office that has produced
many reports on prime ministers,
cabinet ministers and senior public
officials, many of them are still in
office.
Nevertheless, organisations in the region
face fundamental problems due to impor-
tant shortages of staff, training and adequate
financial resources especially in the area of
law enforcement. Whilst such institutions
seem to be important but they are not
enough – just setting up new institutions is
not going to solve the problem.
Social Regulation
Wade (1992) compares local irrigation
systems in the Republic of Korea, where
public servants are networked into their
local communities, with those in India,
where care is taken to ensure they are not,
and notes that this may be a factor contri-
buting to the far greater efficiency of
irrigation systems in the Korean case. The
Korean officials take more responsibility for
carrying out their duties properly within the
wider community, while their Indian coun-
terparts are presented with a low risk stra-
tegy for personal gain. Social embeddedness
creates social pressure to do a good job, so
that any wrongdoing on their part that
causes harm to the local community could
lead to social ostracism. A mix of local
public pressure, expectation, competition,
information and publicity ensure account-
ability is shared between users and service
producers. Davis (2004) highlights the need
to bring engineers face-to-face with the daily
hardships of customers in order to increase
the moral cost of misconduct and to develop
a sense of duty.
5. CONCLUSION
5.1 Major Findings
The experience in the Asia-Pacific region is
diverse: countries can be found that provide
best practice models for combating
corruption (Hong Kong, China (SAR) and
Singapore) and other countries where
corruption in relatively entrenched (Papua
New Guinea and Bangladesh).
Access to Water, Sanitation and Elec-
tricity (WSE) services is important for
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people’s quality of life and thus human
development. Water-related diseases cost the
Indian economy 73 million working days
each year (DfID 2004). Of the 2.6 billion
people worldwide without adequate sanita-
tion, two billion live in the Asia-Pacific
region. Most of the people with poor sanita-
tion – 1.5 billion – live in China and India.
The inability to access these services is
primarily a crisis of governance; corruption
affects the governance of the WSE sectors
by affecting who gets what, when, where and
how (Stålgren, 2006). In particular, the
monopoly structure of water, sanitation and
electricity sector (either public or private)
and shortages in the quality or quantity of
WSE services can provide significant
opportunity for rent-seeking. Corruption in
the WSE sector results in the misappro-
priation of resources and hindering the
attainment of the MDG targets for water
supply and sanitation.
The World Bank estimates that in highly
corrupt countries project corruption
accounts for 30 to 40 percent in the water
and sanitation sector (Water Integrity
Network 2006). In Bangladesh, more than
30 percent of urban household respondents
got their electric and/or water bills reduced
by bribing the metre readers (World Bank
et al. 2002). The World Bank suggests that
20 to 40 percent of water sector finances are
being lost to dishonest and corrupt practices
(Stålgren 2006). A recent case study from
India’s water sector indicates that side
payments occurred in 50 percent of all
transactions (Davis 2004). At the household
level, corruption is felt in deficient water
service delivery and practices, contributing
to 40 billion working hours lost annually at
a global scale (Stålgren 2006). Where the
great majority of poor households lack con-
nections – as is the case in most developing
countries – the costs of petty corruption are
likely to fall disproportionately on the poor.
Transparency International’s (2002) South
Asia survey (in Bangladesh, India, Nepal,
Pakistan and Sri Lanka) found that lower
income households spend a larger propor-
tion of their income on bribes public
services. In the water sector, observers
estimate that 20 to 70 percent of resources
could be saved if  transparency were
optimised and corruption eliminated
(Stålgren 2006).
The core themes in most of the anti-
corruption initiatives are transparency,
accountability and access to information.
These are achieved through a number of
mechanisms, which can be broadly grouped
into three main categories:
1. Providing a legislative framework
that establishes the right of access to
information. These are generally
government initiatives, for example
the Delhi Right to Information Act
and the Seoul e-procurement system.
2. An organisation (e.g. NGO) or
enlightened government office that
works to obtain and disseminate
information from and for citizens, for
example, Report Cards on public
service delivery in India, the Radio
Against Corruption initiative in India
to educate citizens on issues of
corruption, the Committees of
Concerned Citizens in Dhaka and
Parivartan in Delhi, which both
enable the grassroots organisations to
participate in discussions about
public services and also disseminates
information to raise awareness.
3. A process is put in place, whereby
citizens can express their views or
provide feedback on the performance
of public services, for example,
Report Cards in India, which uses
citizen feedback to rate public
services and the Citizen Evaluation
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System in Seoul, which allows citizens
to express their satisfaction/dissatis-
faction with services.
Anti-corruption measures exist; con-
cerned actors can learn from experiences in
other sectors (corruption in the WSE sectors
is facilitated by general inadequacies in
governance systems), as well as from a few
successful reforms already undertaken by
private, public, local, national and interna-
tional stakeholders in some countries in the
Asia-Pacific region. The success of anti-
corruption mechanisms in part depends on
the simplicity of the mechanism or process,
both in terms of the level of technology
required and what, if any, specialised skills
or resources are needed. Those initiatives
that require less sophisticated technology,
skills and resources are likely to be more
easily replicable in other countries and other
parts of the country. A number of the
mechanisms require a high level of ICT
infrastructure and skills, which would be
impractical and problematic to sustain in
many developing countries.
Some of the initiatives described in this
paper require technical capacity or specific
skills to be successfully implemented. For
example, a number of the mechanisms
require an ability to carry out quantitative
research techniques and to be able to
manage the data generated, such as the
Report Cards.
An appropriate regulatory/legislative
framework is important in the success of an
initiative, for example the Right to Infor-
mation Act in India. However, this needs to
be adhered to by the relevant authorities
with a strong civil society providing a check
on these authorities. Many of the initiatives
require not only political will, but also a
strong civil society. In the absence of this, it
is unlikely that citizens will demand
accountability from the authorities.
Some of the initiatives rely on dissemi-
nation of information through various
media. Depending on the context, this can
be done through the internet, publications,
public theatre and radio. One of the most
accessible means of dissemination is the
radio as demonstrated by the Radio Against
Corruption Initiative in India. In many
developing countries, radio is the main, and
in rural areas the only, source of infor-
mation.
Initiatives can be purely a government
activity (such as e-procurement, the OPEN
system and Report Card to the Mayor in
Seoul, or the Independent Commission
Against Corruption in Hong Kong, China
(SAR)), partnerships between government
and NGO/civil society (such as the Concerned
Citizens of Abra, PROOF in India and the
Integrity Pacts in Seoul) or purely NGO/
civil society initiatives (such as the Radio
Against Corruption). IFIs have promoted
good governance and anti-corruption for
some time and in a number of ways, for
example, by funding action research, for
example, the World Bank in Indonesia, in
order to gather information on the types of
corruption confronted by poor people and
its harmful effects on their livelihoods.
Many of the case study initiatives
depended on a ‘champion’, for example, a
civil rights activist or an enlightened mayor,
for sustainability and a level of success. This
has implications in terms of replicability and
also explains why an initiative can work in
some places but not others despite simi-
larities of conditions and environment, for
example in different areas of the same city.
Collective action appears to be a necessary
element to: (a) enforce access to informa-
tion, (b) provide effective dissemination of
available information, (c) advise and raise
awareness of citizens on their rights and
responsibilities, and (d) press for action
when evidence of corruption is found.
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In many instances poor people do not
perceive corruption as wrong, because they
have always experienced things in such a
way or else they see the holders of certain
positions as having rights to do things and
to enjoy privileges different from ordinary
people. As a result, they are disinclined to
question the behaviour, decisions or treat-
ment metred out by government officials
amongst others. WSE service delivery might
be regarded as a gift or favour with certain
obligations to be loyal and thankful. Poor
people’s greatest strength lies in their
numbers. If poor people mobilise around
issues such as corruption they can exert a
degree of pressure and influence on the
structures of governance. Such combined
action can go a long way to overcome
resource constraints (time, skills, labour and
money). In this way, the poor can establish
and assert their own sense of worth, claim
the right to equal treatment irrespective of
their social or economic circumstances. The
subcontinent has a tradition of local level
institutions that could help in combat-
ing corruption and implementing and
monitoring service delivery such as the
Panchayati Raj Institutions. Sen proposes
the co-production of appropriate public
services whereby, ‘we can think of people
participating along with governments in
defining needs, in making choices appro-
priate to those needs, and in enforcing
accountability.’ Sen has described the success
of public services in Kerala as due to the
‘willingness of people to join together to
demand accountability from the systems
and their employees’ (Wuyts et al. 1993).
5.2 Policy Pointers
A number of policy implications have been
developed to inform and influence anti-
corruption policies in the WSE sector that
support and encourage human development
concerns.
Civil Society
• Mobilise civil society (media, NGOs,
community based organisations, busi-
ness, labour, and professional associa-
tions) to monitor corruption in the
Water, Sanitation and Electricity sector
(WSE).
• Create anti-corruption network of NGOs
involved in infrastructure service delivery
to share information on anti-corruption
initiatives.
• Conduct surveys of WSE service provi-
ders and public opinion to provide feed-
back for delivery of WSE services.
• Foster general anti-corruption education
programmes in society, for example, put
corruption on the curriculum in schools.
• Improve the capacities of NGOs and civil
society organisations to understand
sector technicalities in WSE service
delivery – for example, training sessions
or seminars can be held on procurement
principles.
• Ensure the media exercise public scrutiny
on WSE issues, for example, by writing
letters to the editor.
Public Sector
• There are a number of mechanisms that
aim to reinforce good practice on trans-
parent governance across sectors; these
include establishing competitive public
procurement procedures and encou-
raging the adoption of international
rules, improving transparency and
accountability in budget preparation,
execution, and oversight of expendi-
ture; strengthening procedures for an
effective and merit-based civil service,
particularly recruitment, promotion and
pay; developing codes of ethics in WSE
service provider institutions based on
‘zero tolerance’ of corruption and to be
enforced by strong sanctions.
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• At the national level, mechanisms such
as comprehensive national strategies
for combating corruption and streng-
thened law enforcement mechanisms
can also have a direct impact on the WSE
sector.
• It is important to recognise gender
differences in WSE service delivery and
the use of accountability arrangements.
• Enact Right to Information Laws and
provide access to public information, for
example, on water and sanitation projects
in slums, to ensure transparency.
Private Sector
• Establish public-private partnerships to
develop anti-corruption strategies.
• Promote international standards and
principles.
• Management commitment to implement
anti-corruption strategies.
• Develop and implement codes of
conduct and ensure their effectiveness
through internal control mechanisms,
training of personnel and sanctions.
• Adhere to accounting and auditing rules
to ensure transparency in business
transactions.
• Monitor foreign partners and their
collaborators.
• Build coalitions for business integrity.
Regulators
• Strengthen independent audit and
investigative bodies, for example, with
sufficient human and financial resources,
to monitor the WSE sector.
• Mobilise civil society to exert informal
regulation of WSE service delivery.
5.3 Recommendations for Ways
Forward
A number of recommendations can be
made for the success of anti-corruption
mechanisms in the WSE sector:
• Anti-corruption measures should be
realistic and backed by sufficient
resources, combating corruption
requires financial, human, capital, and
time, major anti-corruption efforts take
time and long-term commitment.
Combating corruption requires political
will as well as consequences of failing to
meet public expectations; however,
political cycles and the desire for
immediate improvement in a crisis
situation often lead to the development
of time frames that are too short; public
support (professional groups, the private
sector, political will, trade unions,
religious institutions and other civil
society groups) is also important in
ensuring long-term sustainability and
commitment.
• Programmes should be tailored to each
country context: Reform efforts can be
encouraged by outside partners (e.g.
donors), but they have to be home-grown
and locally-driven if  they are to be
successful. There is no ‘one size fits all’
solution.
• Focus on creating islands of excellence:
Islands of excellence are pockets of clean
practice in either geographical areas or
the WSE sector in a local government
setting. Actors (the public and the private
sectors as well as civil society) agree to
renounce corrupt practices and adopt a
code of ethical conduct. Whistle-blowing
mechanisms as well as internal policies
sets out clear guidelines for employees
and business partners.
• Address poverty issues: Levels of
tolerance for petty corruption may be
high, particularly if salaries are low and
infrastructure services are inaccessible.
Inadequately paid public servants are
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more vulnerable to temptation than
those who are paid well. Proper compen-
sation and incentives, within a compre-
hensive package of civil service reform,
and legalising WSE service delivery in
slums can play a role in combating
corruption.
• Demand and supply side issues:
Corruption has to be dealt with from
both the demand and supply sides of the
equation. The literature generally focuses
largely on the ‘passive’ corruption of
government officials who accept bribes,
rather than the ‘active’ corruption of the
companies or service users who pay
them. Public sector agencies usually have
a code of conduct, ethics training, whistle
blowing procedures and whistleblower
protection mechanisms that sets out in
clear terms those values and standards of
behaviour that are to guide public offi-
cials in their daily work. There are also
numerous ways to raise awareness among
the general public of the effects of offer-
ing bribes as well as to trigger civic action
in the WSE sectors. Anti-corruption
messages have been disseminated via
television and radio to reach a broad
audience in a wide variety of countries.
Regular annual events have also been
organised – such as an anti-corruption
day or week at schools or town halls,
media briefings, public hearings and
marches, contests and competitions.
Street theatre is another popular means
for sensitisation in many countries. Parti-
cipatory research and its dissemination
such as report cards and surveys can also
mobilise the public against corruption.
• Policing is not an answer to insti-
tutionalised corruption: Corruption can
be so institutionalised that it is not
necessarily the responsibility of those that
carry it out. For example, contractors
may cut corners because their company
has underbid in order to get the job and
then have to ‘make up’ through skimping
on materials. This is not just the contrac-
tor’s fault; it is due to a system that takes
the lowest bid even if it’s below what is
reasonable. As such, reform programmes
in the infrastructure sector should focus
on making ‘the system’ right rather than
removing corrupt individuals. It is
important to remove the root causes of
the problem where corruption is syste-
mic. In fact, prevention can be more
effective and more economic than
investigation and prosecution.
• Education, especially at tertiary and
professional levels: Education can play
a key role in combating corruption, for
example, by promoting professional
ethics, changing public expectations
and attitudes, and developing public
understanding of the consequences of
corruption. Efforts should be made to
promote professional ethics in the WSE
sector; for example, by inclusion of anti-
corruption education on the curriculum
of professional education related to the
sector.
• To ensure that basic services reach all
poor people combating corruption alone
is not enough; more resources are needed
to achieve the Millennium Development
Goals. Attention will also have to be paid
to creating institutions that increase the
range of service providers, permit greater
access to services to the poor, empower
users of services, and expand the reach
of public services through decentra-
lisation and improved local governance.
ENDNOTES
1. Improved drinking water sources include
household connection, public standpipe,
borehole protected dug well, protected
spring, rainwater collection (UNICEF,
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2006b). Unimproved drinking water
sources are unprotected well, unprotected
spring, rivers or ponds, vendor-provided
water, bottled water or tanker truck water.
2. Improved sanitation facilities are a
connection to a public sewer, connection to
a septic system, pour-flush latrine, simple
pit latrine, ventilated improved pit latrine.
Unimproved sanitation facilities include
public or shared latrine, open pit latrine or
a bucket latrine (UNICEF 2006b).
3. In economics, the principal-agent problem
refers to the issue of  how to get the
employee or contractor (agent) to act in the
best interests of  the principal (the
employer) when the employee or contractor
has an informational advantage over the
principal and has different interests from
the principal.
4. Examples include the Corruption
Perceptions Index, Global Corruption
Barometre, Bribe Payers Index, as well as
regional and national surveys and Indices.
5. Judgements of what is ‘excessive’ and
‘appropriate’ are finely tuned to local
culture and circumstance. Darr’s study
(2003) of upstate New York electronics
salesmen, reports that they often took
customers to lunch, and that this was
considered appropriate in an ongoing
relationship. But offering lunch to
prospective buyers was considered a ‘bribe’
because it was excessive, i.e. not called for
given the lack of a previous relationship in
which reciprocity was expected.
6. Reciprocity allows individuals to make
claims on others: if I do something for you,
I then expect to be able to call on you in a
time of need at some point in the future.
7. A conglomerate of businesses, usually
owned by a single family.
8. An example would be the development of
Singapore since the 1970s.
9. For more information see the Global Inte-
grity. Website: http://www.globalintegrity.
org/.
10. This is based on a simple assumption that
10 percent of capital investment, and
potential revenue from operations lost in
bribes. The assumption is based on
anecdotal evidence rather than rigorous
analysis of data.
11. Increasing clients’ choice in services through
private sector delivery and voice in
policymaking and service delivery
processes.
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